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Introduction 
The book that the reader has in hand, the fruit of an interdisciplinary 
seminar held in Berlin in December 2004 which brought together 
scholars from Germany and different regions of the Americas, is gui-
ded by a dual perspective and objective, a fact reflected by the authors 
and themes that it brings together. It is on one hand, a view from out-
side Brazil that seeks to understand how Brazilian society is respond-
ing to the processes of global integration. At the same time, there is 
also an internal perspective of observation that documents the plural-
ity of ways that social actors and analysts interpret the transformations 
underway. The common thread of the various perspectives of analysis 
involved, which, therefore, unifies the different articles joined here, is 
not their focus on Brazil, but more properly the interest in the relations 
between Brazil and the world, based on the context of the Americas. It 
can be said that it is not a book about Brazil, but of a set of reflections, 
oriented by the case of a specific country, about the way that local, 
regional and global processes and contexts have been interweaving in 
various fields.  
In the political realm, the deep crises generated by the corruption 
scandal in the government of the Workers Party in 2005 triggered 
ambivalent reactions and sentiments among the analysts. Whatever the 
lesson that one can learn from it, the Brazilian crises has important 
consequences, to the degree to which it marks the expectations placed 
in the Latin American left, at a time in which governments have been 
elected in various countries on the sub-continent, which, like the Wor-
kers Party in Brazil, earned their principal electoral conquests from 
the defense of social justice and a solid base among the poorest sec-
tors.  
The new forms of insertion of Latin America and Brazil, in par-
ticular in the “post-national” world, are treated in historical perspec-
tive in the article by Jorge Larraín, revealing the connections between 
the history of (subordinated) integration of the countries of the region 
to modernity, the neoliberal cycle of the 1990’s and the alternatives 
presented to these policies.  
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From a more programmatic perspective, Gustavo Lins Ribeiro 
continues the analysis begun by Larraín. His immediate interlocutors 
are post-colonial studies. Thus, in place of a maximum “provincializa-
tion of Europe”, proposed by Dipesh Chakrabarty, Ribeiro defends a 
post-imperialist agenda that could provincialize the United States. In 
the realm of institutional policy, Jean Daudelin studies recent move-
ments of Brazilian diplomacy, showing that if the country’s foreign 
policy does not – and this is not its objective – provincialize the Em-
pire, it at least leads to expressive growth of the importance of Brazil 
in the international arena.  
In the economic realm, apparently ambiguous developments are 
noted, marked by the complete insertion of the Brazilian economy in 
the context of global accumulation simultaneously with a certain dis-
integration of the national economy. While, since 1990, Brazil has 
followed, with certain success, an aggressive strategy of opening to 
the world market of goods and capital, internally an apparent disor-
ganization of the economy is found, with exponential growth of in-
formal relations and even of illegal and criminal activities, such as 
drug trafficking and the predatory exploitation of natural resources. 
This does not indicate, by any means, the emergence of a dual econ-
omy: the informal and illegal sectors are completely intertwined with 
the more modern and dynamic economic sectors and are also trans-
nationally connected. The article by Marcos Antonio Macedo Cintra 
presents an overview of developments in Brazilian economy during 
the accelerated phase of internationalization. It considers both the 
changes noted in the economic policies adopted in recent years, as 
well as their repercussions on the “real economy”, thus indicating the 
difficulties imposed on economic growth in the present context.  
The paradoxes of economic integration are reflected in an ampli-
fied manner on the social plane. On one hand, the non-governmental 
social movements and organizations that have multiplied since the 
final years of the military dictatorship have been able to establish in-
creasingly effective alliances on the American continent and world-
wide. This has increased their effectiveness and power in political 
negotiations. Nevertheless, simultaneously to the strengthening of 
these forms of mobilization, there has been a growing vulnerability of 
politically unorganized sectors. Thus, the many years of policies to 
limit social spending, associated to the deep social inequality that ap-
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pears chronic in Brazilian society, make the poor sectors even more 
vulnerable to the offers of populist politicians and leaders who seek to 
instrumentalize less organized groups. New religious leaders who 
promise immediate benefits in the living conditions of their followers 
have thus had growing influence among the groups that live at the 
limit of anomy. Equally concerning is the explosion of violence and 
criminality, mostly associated to drug dealing and the control of deal-
ers over favelas and neighborhoods of the periphery of Brazilian met-
ropolitan regions. Therefore, pari passu with the civil society that is 
pluralized, transnationalized and which seeks to broaden the effec-
tiveness of democracy and the rule of law, an incivil society has been 
growing, which takes advantage of the absence of the State and of law 
to impose its power.  
The tensions between civil and incivil society are reflected in dif-
ferent contributions found in this book. The article by Alberto Olvera 
is concerned with placing these discussions in context, by showing 
how Latin American civil societies, even those squeezed by the au-
thoritarian history and by the draining of the space of politics that 
accompany the processes of structural readjustment, effectively con-
tribute to the deepening of democracy in the region.  
The many dimensions and contradictions in the processes of inter-
nationalization of civil society are addressed in the contributions of 
Bila Sorj and Aparecida Fonseca Moraes about the women’s move-
ment and by Patricia Pinho’s article about the connections between 
African Americans and Afro-Brazilians. In distinct manners, both 
articles show that transnational relationships between social actors are 
marked by expectations that are not always realistic, and principally, 
by the asymmetries of political power present in the relations between 
the respective nation states.  
In the article by Marjo de Theije, the paradoxes of transnationali-
zation are treated from a frequently forgotten focus: the relationship 
between migration and religion. Based on a careful ethnographic 
study, the author discusses the daily life of the actors, showing how 
social relations, values and beliefs are being recodified by migratory 
movements.  
In the field of cultural and symbolic production, we have wit-
nessed in recent years a reordering of that which is defined as national 
culture. Historically, the construction of the national identity took 
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place through the ideological eulogy of the racial mixing that cele-
brates Brazil as a melting pot capable of combining the cultural differ-
ences and preferences of the various groups that compose the country. 
In the context of globalization, a plurality of a different nature is cele-
brated. This involves a broad and creative reception of various and 
contradictory cultural influences which, at times, as in the case of 
Funk and Hip Hop, seek to denounce the assimilationist policy that 
presided over the formation of the national culture. In cities such as 
Recife, São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, these cultural manifestations are 
already mass movements, leaving forms of expression such as samba, 
frevo or maracatu adapted, refunctionalized and challenged in their 
role as the principal carriers of national culture. Nevertheless, what is 
found in the cultural field is not a national/global dichotomy, but  
varied processes of recreation, fusion and reinvention, from which 
constantly arise new configurations and mixtures.  
The articles by Heloisa Buarque de Hollanda and Olívia Maria 
Gomes da Cunha conduct an analytical inventory of the new cultural 
creations. Buarque de Hollanda focuses on the dynamics of cultural 
production, also studying it from the perspective of aesthetic analysis 
and classification, while Cunha is interested in one of the contexts in 
which the new creations emerge – the space of the favela.  
Esther Hamburger uses a film that documents the tragic assault on 
a passenger bus in Rio de Janeiro as the theme of a study of relations 
between violence and culture in new Brazilian audio-visual produc-
tion.  
In the contribution from Robert Stam which concludes the book, 
culture and violence are also present. Stam begins with a look at the 
Tropicália cultural movement; but the analysis is not limited to his-
tory. Through interpretation of song lyrics, films and videoclips, Stam 
shows how the celebration of mixture and the persistence of symbolic 
mechanisms of racial violence combine in equal proportions in the 
formation of Brazilian multiculturalism.  
Because of the breadth and currentness of their themes, the articles 
joined in this book are an invitation to reflect upon phenomenons that 
go beyond national borders. They involve a search for categories suit-
able to the analysis of new configurations and constellations marked 
by a redefinition of relations and articulations between the regional 
and the global, the local and the national. They are cultural, social and 
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political processes with a dynamic and open character. For this reason, 
what the book offers the reader are not definitive analyses, but various 
places to examine and interpellate a reality in full movement. In any 
case, the book has completed its rule if from its reading arise new 
questions and new modes to observe studied realities.  
The editors would like to thank all of the institutions and people 
who made this book possible and, in particular, the Ibero-Amerikani-
sches Institut and the Lateinamerika-Institut for their institutional sup-
port as well as the Thyssen Foundation for financial support to this 
initiative. 
 
 
Jorge Larraín 
Latin America in the Post-national World 
The present situation of Latin America has to be explained in terms of 
the interaction between two main sets of factors. On the one hand 
there are the long-term cultural, political and economic processes 
which underlie its development since the early 16th century. On the 
other hand, there are the more conjunctional processes and results of 
events happening in the shorter term: namely, globalization, the preva-
lence of neoliberal policies since 1980 and the recent economic down-
turn which started in 2000 and which is just beginning to recede. In 
this paper I would like to consider both aspects. I shall start by briefly 
considering some characteristics of Latin America’s long-term road to 
modernity. 
 
1. Some features of the Latin American path to modernity 
For a start, four main cultural features, formed during three centuries 
of colonial rule, can be said to condition the character of the Latin 
American path to modernity. First, a catholic religious monopoly 
which was never seriously challenged by the main protestant denomi-
nations or by religious dissidence of popular origin. Second, political 
centralism which never had to compete with local (feudal) powers and 
third, a tendency to authoritarianism in politics which has survived 
even within formal democracy. Finally, an economic preference for 
exporting raw materials and primary products which fails to result in 
strong and independent industrial bourgeoisies and proletariats. All 
these elements point to a strong Latin American centralist cultural 
tradition (Véliz 1984: 15-16). 
The centralist and authoritarian features and the absence of a 
strong bourgeoisie give a special character both to the first experi-
ments with democracy and to the economic orientation in Latin Amer-
ica. The construction of democracy had initially an imitative charac-
ter: most constitutional projects very closely copied European or 
North American models. The majority of these projects were not suc-
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cessful and had an ephemeral character: they did not survive for a long 
time. In addition, they managed to achieve very reduced popular par-
ticipation. In so far as the economy is concerned, contrary to the 
European road to modernity, industrialization was postponed and re-
placed by a raw material exporting system which retained the back-
wardness of the productive sectors, especially under the hacienda sys-
tem. 
It was only during the first half of the 20th century, when due to 
the export crisis the oligarchic governments came to an end, that the 
state played a central role in two substantial advances of modernity. 
First, the expansion of democracy by the widening of the franchise 
which allowed the middle and working classes to participate in the 
political system from which they had been excluded so far. Second, 
the beginning of import-substituting industrialization, which promoted 
a new kind of inward-oriented economic development. 
However, the widening of democracy with the incorporation of the 
middle classes in political power and the implementation of social 
legislation, was not exempted from contradictions of an authoritarian 
character. During the three years that followed the Great Depression 
of 1929, seventeen governments were overthrown by force in twelve 
Latin American countries (Véliz 1984: 273). In several cases, it was 
military interventions that gave rise to populist and nationalist regimes 
which widened political participation and established forms of welfare 
state and social legislation from above and against the conservative 
forces entrenched in parliaments. These regimes sought the support of 
the masses by organizing them. Peron in Argentina and Vargas in 
Brazil helped create trade unions from within the state. 
Thus between 1930 and 1970 a process of modernization was con-
solidated in Latin America which widened democracy and the process 
of industrialization began to make progress. The latter was realized 
with heavy state protection and investment, which continued practi-
cally until the end of the 1970s. At the same time, the populist coali-
tions that carried out these reforms also established incipient forms of 
social legislation and welfare state. Therefore, it could be argued that 
the general orientation of the modernizing process in Latin America at 
this time had more affinity with the European road to modernity than 
with the North American one.  
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In spite of this clear-cut influence of European modernity, there 
are important differences that remain between the European path and 
the Latin American one. Conditioned by cultural traits formed during 
three centuries of colonial rule, Latin American modernity tends to 
have a centralized character while European modernity is inclined to 
have more decentralized features. This affects both democracy and the 
economy. The European parliamentary system generally distributes 
power more evenly, while the Latin American presidential system 
tends to concentrate power. In Latin America “presidentialism” is an 
important source of serious conflicts between the executive and legis-
lative powers; such conflicts are not necessarily as acute in the Euro-
pean parliamentary regimes. This factor has contributed in an impor-
tant manner to the political instability of Latin America because the 
executive as much as the legislative branches of the state claim popu-
lar legitimacy and tend to blame each other for their problems (Hart-
lyn/Valenzuela 1997: 23). An example of this is the recent parliamen-
tary attempt to impeach President Lucio Gutiérrez of Ecuador. 
On the economic front, the British industrial bourgeoisie was born 
far away from the state centres of power in small provincial work-
shops, whereas the Latin American industrial bourgeoisie was created 
by state action and has always been much more dependent on state aid 
in order to exist and prosper. The key role of the state in the birth of 
entrepreneurial classes has led them to interfere much more actively in 
politics in order to achieve favourable conditions in their own inter-
ests, which is also destabilizing and potentially increases the possibili-
ties of corruption. 
A second important difference between the European trajectory 
and the Latin American one has to do with the practical efficacy of 
citizens’ rights. While in Europe there is a greater correspondence 
between citizens’ rights and their respect in practice, in Latin America 
declared rights enacted in constitutions and laws often lack guarantees 
and accessible procedures that protect them in practice. According to 
Whitehead “the majority of subjects experience the insecure and un-
predictable character of their rights” (Whitehead 1997: 69) and often 
are defenceless in the face of the enormous power of the state and 
enterprises. This is related to what O’Donnell has called “a democracy 
of low intensity citizenship” which occurs when the state is unable to 
enforce its legality, not so much in the area of political rights, as in the 
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area of civil rights: “peasants, slum-dwellers, Indians, women, et al., 
are often unable to get fair treatment in the courts, or to obtain from 
state agencies services to which they are entitled, or to be safe from 
police violence … etc.” (O’Donnell 1993: 16).  
The difference between Europe and Latin America can be under-
stood further by means of a distinction between the polycentric struc-
ture of European modernity and the concentric structure of the Latin 
American modernity (Mascareño 2000; Leiva 2003). A polycentric 
society would be that in which its diverse component systems such as 
politics, law, economy, religion, science and art are highly autono-
mous and able to organize themselves without interference from oth-
ers, thus excluding the possibility that one of them controls the others 
and becomes the centre of society. On the contrary, in Latin American 
concentric society, although there is functional differentiation, the 
political system instrumentalizes the other systems by imposing upon 
them its own logic and interests (Mascareño 2004: 68-69 and foot-
note 15). The autonomy of politics is realized at the cost of the other 
spheres’ own autonomy.  
This is the reason why Brunner has argued that in contrast to the 
modernity of central countries, Latin American modernity suffers 
from a  
voracity of politics which swallows everything and behind which every-
one seeks protection or justification: equally entrepreneurs, intellectuals, 
universities, trade unions, social organisations, clerics, the armed forces 
(Brunner 1988: 33).  
The enormous gravitation of politics and the state also reaches art, 
culture and education. The consequence of this tendency, widely rec-
ognized by many authors, is that, in general, civil society in Latin 
America (the sphere of individuals, classes and non-governmental 
organizations) is weak, insufficiently developed and very dependent 
upon the state.  
By 1973 a new phase set in which end the stage of protected and 
centralized modernization. At this time in Latin America the processes 
of industrialisation and development entirely lost their dynamism, 
economic growth came to a standstill and even became negative dur-
ing the 80s, and as a consequence social and labour agitation became 
widespread. The international recession resulted in unemployment, 
inflation and increased political instability everywhere. Under the 
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threat of increasingly radicalized left-wing urban movements, a new 
wave of military coups set in all over Latin America. This time round 
right-wing dictatorships are established, not only more durable than 
those of the 1930s in Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile, 
Bolivia, Ecuador, etc., but also with longer-term social and economic 
impacts associated with the application of new economic policies of 
liberal character.  
 
2. The Impact of the new Neoliberal Stage 
The novelty of the situation, which came to confirm old cultural 
trends, is that the renewed liberal character of economic policies can 
coexist with authoritarianism in politics. This has three important ef-
fects on the modernizing processes: on the one side the reaffirmation 
of the authoritarian centralist tendency in conflict with the rule of law. 
Second, the relative depoliticization of society and, third, the begin-
ning of a change from the relative influence of the European social 
democratic model of welfare state to the preeminence of the North 
American model of individual liberty.  
In the first place, the authoritarian centralist tendency was con-
firmed by the new wave of dictatorships. This is just the last instal-
ment in a long history in which the breakdowns of democracy and the 
recurrent presence of dictatorships figure prominently. True, from the 
first years of widespread anarchy (1810-1850) to the 20th century, 
there has been much improvement. Yet one would be mistaken in 
believing that the 20th century represents a dramatic shift from the old 
pattern. During this time there were 3 periods in which many Latin 
American governments were overthrown by force: 1930-1933, 1948-
1954 and 1964-1980.  
Some authors have contrasted European stability, where there is a 
closer correspondence and articulation between the political system 
and the legal system (Mascareño 2004: 65), with the Latin American 
instability, where power and legality are frequently decoupled. In the 
first case there is a form of articulation between the two systems 
which mutually respect the autonomy of each other in their own 
sphere. This means that “the function of politics – to take binding 
collective decisions – is not … directly realized through power, but 
processed by means of legality and only then transformed into law” 
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(Mascareño 2004: 73). It also means that political power provides 
external support so that legality could be enforced within other sys-
tems, beyond the legal system itself (Mascareño 2004: 65). 
That this does not always happen in Latin America can be ex-
plained by the concentric structure of its modernity, whereby politics 
has acquired primacy over other spheres and often does without legal-
ity, or, more frequently, accommodates legality to its own interests 
and prevents it from fulfilling its role in other spheres. Given the char-
acter of Latin American culture, the de facto surpassing of legality is 
almost always accompanied by a strong nominal legalism which seeks 
juridical justifications. But all the same, the coupling of power and 
legality has been always weaker in Latin America, given the cultural 
centrality of power and authority. The European polycentric structure, 
on the contrary, seems to guarantee that politics, even though also 
playing a central role, respects the autonomy of legality and avoids 
flouting it. 
The second effect of the changes occurring since 1970 in Latin 
America is the relative depoliticization of society (at least in the tradi-
tional sense of institutionalized democratic politics). There has been a 
change from a positive evaluation of politicians, parties and ideologies 
as essential elements for leading a nation in the years prior to the 
1970s, to the present extremely negative evaluation and generalized 
disillusion with them. The depoliticization of Chileans, for example, 
can be detected throughout the 1990s by most surveys, which consis-
tently show a decrease in the identification of people with political 
parties, a growing lack of interest in political affairs and a negative 
evaluation of politicians. The loss of prestige of politicians and the 
disaffection with politics in general has also become acute in Vene-
zuela, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador and Argentina. 
The origins of this are clearly related to two factors. First, the fail-
ure of politics to deliver the kind of economic development which 
could redistribute wealth and thus bringing down widespread poverty. 
Second, the political repression taking place during military dictator-
ships. Military dictatorships sought to depoliticize society by eliminat-
ing elections, abolishing political parties and closing down parlia-
ments. However, after a few years of forced depoliticization by terror, 
the very policies of exclusion and violation of human rights, led to the 
opposite result in the long-term: society became more intensely politi-
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cized against military governments. This led to a search for crucial 
agreements and strong coalitions among the opposition forces in order 
to negotiate the end of military rule, thus allowing the return to de-
mocracy. Paradoxically, it was the negotiated conditions for the transi-
tion to democracy that had to do with depoliticization (Silva 2004: 
159-160). This in three different ways. 
First, democratic coalition forces exercised a strong restraining in-
fluence on popular mobilization so as not to give the military a motive 
to return. In almost every country of the region trade unions were par-
tially dismantled and those which survived experienced a severe loss 
of influence and power. Politicians of the centre-left frequently re-
sorted to self-censorship and did not want to support any movement 
which could cause political upheaval among the armed forces or en-
trepreneurial sectors.  
Second, part of the negotiated deals to return to democracy in-
cluded, even if sometimes only implicitly, total respect for the self-
regulating nature of the economic sphere in order to protect it from the 
ups and downs of everyday political discussion. The price of democra-
tization was the increased autonomy of and the loss of state control 
over the economy. Politics became more self-referential and people 
lost interest in it.  
A part of this process was the new attitude of social scientists, 
many of them persecuted and exiled. The years of bloody dictator-
ships in Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia, not 
to speak of the more or less permanent situation of repression in Cen-
tral America, changed their perception of politics. Their focus of 
analysis radically shifted, from strategies for social change and devel-
opment to problems of the political system, democracy and human 
rights. Important as these problems are, the exclusive re-focussing on 
them by default left the management of the economy to the new neo-
liberal forces (Lechner 1991). This abdication of responsibility also 
had depoliticising effects. 
Third, when democracy returned, the newly elected governments 
did not satisfy people’s expectations that those responsible for the 
human rights abuses would be brought to justice. Which again pro-
duced deep disillusionment and political demobilization. Human 
rights groups experienced great difficulties in getting support from 
politicians. Democratic governments accepted or even enacted am-
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nesty laws which exempted the military from any responsibility. In 
Chile, for instance, many deputies from the governing coalition (Con-
certacion) voted against the political condemnation of Pinochet when 
he took his seat in Senate. The Concertacion’s strategy to cause a 
minimum of problems with the armed forces prompted a marked pol-
icy to lower the profile of complaints by the surviving victims and 
families of the disappeared victims. It was only from the moment  
Pinochet was detained in London, ten years after the return to democ-
racy, that Chilean tribunals started processing some criminal lawsuits 
which involved members of the armed forces and changed the inter-
pretation of the amnesty law which exempted them from responsibil-
ity. 
The newly acquired autonomy of the economic system in Latin 
America since the arrival of neoliberalism and its market-oriented 
economic policies, has nevertheless not meant that the economic sys-
tem has replaced politics in the concentric pattern referred to above. 
The economic system continues to be frequently threatened not only 
by globalization, but also by political interventions, sometimes of a 
very arbitrary nature. It is true that the State is now weaker in terms of 
its capacity to implement progressive and redistributive social poli-
cies, but the executive power is stronger in terms of being able to take 
more or less arbitrary decisions (Boschi 2004: 290). Politics, through 
its privileged means, power, continues to be the central element which 
has been unable to fully subject itself to legality in Latin America, or 
rather it accommodates legality to its own interests. Thus President 
Meza of Bolivia or President Kirchner of Argentina or President 
Chavez of Venezuela frequently take decisions which interfere with 
the market and sometimes with international agreements. It cannot be 
maintained that the new autonomy of the economic system has dis-
placed the preponderance of the presidential political system. 
The third effect of changes occurring since 1970 in Latin America 
is the transition, very marked in some countries like Mexico, Argen-
tina, Peru, Colombia and Chile, from a more interventionist social 
democratic European model of capitalism to a North American model 
of individual autonomy and diminished state intervention. It cannot be 
said that the welfare state existed everywhere in Latin America or that 
it was remotely as complete as the European model. Yet it had a rela-
tively important influence. At any rate, the little welfare state that 
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could be found tended to be dismantled with the arrival of neoliberal-
ism and the new model of individual citizenship drawn from the North 
American model. This has resulted in the privatization (and sometimes 
deterioration) of public education, health and social security and the 
sale of state public services and facilities. It has also meant the end of 
a series of interventionist economic policies, such as subsidies, price 
fixing, import and export controls, financial regulations of capital 
movements, differentiated and high custom tariffs, high state expendi-
ture, etc. Within the new North American model trade unions and 
social organizations are weakened and, generally, a new kind of citi-
zenship is brought about whereby citizens are basically conceived of 
as individual consumers of goods and services in the market.  
Although up to a point the European social democratic regimes 
have also suffered the impact of the new neoliberal ideas and, under 
the pressure of having to curb excessive state expenditure, have been 
forced to cut their funding of the welfare state, public health and edu-
cation, it is also true that even during the most radical right-wing gov-
ernments of Mrs. Thatcher in Britain or Mr. Kohl in Germany the 
welfare state was not really dismantled to the extent it has been (the 
little that there was) in Latin America. Besides, economic policies in 
Europe have been coordinated, made uniform and regulated by the 
European Union for all the member states, which up to a point means 
a bigger degree of intervention in the economy. In Latin America, on 
the contrary, the tendency has been to deregulate, sell state assets, 
open frontiers and markets and enter into free trade agreements.  
 
3. The Articulation between Politics and Economic Neoliberalism 
From the mid-1980s onwards, a massive return to democracy has 
taken place in Latin America. What is important and different from 
other occasions is the renewed resilience of democracy which has 
allowed it to survive until now in most countries. Yet despite this 
newly acquired strength of democracy in the region, the picture of 
political instability has been growing worse since 2000 in Peru, Bo-
livia, Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, etc. The failed coup 
attempt against Chavez in Venezuela, the quick change of resigning 
presidents in Argentina (5 presidents in 2 weeks), the resignation of 
Fujimori in Peru and Sanchez de Losada in Bolivia, the very precari-
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ous situation of Toledo in Peru, Gutiérrez in Ecuador and Meza in 
Bolivia, are symptoms of political systems in which legality continues 
to be frequently overstepped. In spite of this continuing political in-
stability, dictatorships have not come back and this may have to do 
with the almost total disappearance of the revolutionary left and the 
discouragement of the United States (Silva 2004: 168).  
The return to democracy was on the whole very rapid, Chile being 
the last country to come back to it in 1989. But it did not mean a 
change from the neoliberal economic policies started by the dictator-
ships. As Yocelevzky has put it, a factor shared by Latin American 
processes of democratization has been “the discrepancy between the 
democratic character of political change and the non-egalitarian, con-
centrating and excluding character of the development model upon 
whose base those changes occurred” (Yocelevzky 2002: 44).  
In many ways, therefore, it can be seen that one of the main differ-
ences of Latin American modernity compared with European moder-
nity is the type of articulation between politics and the economy. 
Whereas in Europe there seems to be a greater consistency between a 
socially oriented democracy and an economy quite regulated by the 
state or the European Union, in Latin America there is a co-existence 
between centralist and authoritarian features in politics with liberalism 
in economics. Sometimes this is seen as a contradiction or inconsis-
tency on the part of the Latin American ruling classes. What this criti-
cism overlooks is that neoliberalism in itself, at least in Hayek’s ver-
sion of it, which seems to be prevalent in Latin America, inherently 
entails this duality of authoritarian conservatism in cultural and politi-
cal matters and liberalism in economic matters. 
What Hayek proposes is a conservative kind of liberalism which 
highlights three elements: first, an inherent respect for tradition which 
fits into an evolutionist conception of culture. Second, a distrust of all 
attempts at constructing a social order by means of planning which is 
a consequence of the inherent limitations of reason. Third, a separa-
tion of liberalism from democracy. According to Hayek, democratiza-
tion demands an absolute power of the majority and in that way it 
could become a sort of anti-liberalism. This opposition between de-
mocracy and liberalism is at the heart of neoliberalism and has fre-
quently allowed the ideological justification of dictatorships in Latin 
America. According to Hayek it is possible to have totalitarian democ-
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ratic governments and authoritarian liberal governments and the latter 
are certainly preferable to the former. Why is it that this kind of 
thought could become so widespread in Latin America? 
My hypothesis is that this is related to the prevalence of Catholi-
cism in Latin America. In contrast to the European and North Ameri-
can paths to modernity, which were influenced by a protestant ethic 
that values democracy and legality and that, on the other hand, pro-
motes the scientific and rational control of nature, the Latin American 
path to modernity has been influenced by Catholicism and by authori-
tarian and centralist forms of government and has had a less marked 
orientation to the rational control of nature and to technology. The 
enormous cultural weight of Catholicism in Latin America has been 
no doubt related to the great success and acceptance of Hayek’s brand 
of neoliberalism in the region.  
In spite of the democratizing influence of Enlightenment thought 
after Latin American independence, which no doubt resulted in a par-
tial moderation of authoritarianism, the latter’s cultural strength has 
not been entirely extinguished in Latin America’s socio-political life, 
as we have just seen. Weber’s classical thesis linked Calvinism and 
protestant Puritanism with the rationalistic spirit of capitalism. Tradi-
tional Catholicism appears to have a greater affinity with Hayek’s type 
of neoliberalism. In his conception religion, authoritarianism and a 
free market system become fused. This could help explain the greater 
ease with which an overwhelmingly catholic Latin America has 
adopted a more radical sort of neoliberalism,1 while in protestant 
countries a stronger bond survives between protestantism, democracy 
and rational constructivism.  
It is also important to see the connection between a prevalent neo-
liberal outlook and the new weakness of the industrialization process 
in Latin America. State-protected and state-promoted industrialization 
had been the Latin American approach during the first half of the 20th 
century. The present neoliberal policies of openness to the interna-
tional market and avoidance of subsidies and state protection have 
                                                     
1  The affinity between Catholicism and Hayekian neoliberalism should not make 
one forget that the same Catholicism is able to engender quite enlightened forms 
of opposition to neoliberalism and capitalism as those to be found in Liberation 
Theology. Yet it is also true to say that they do not prevail within the catholic 
church and have tended to be repressed by the hierarchy. 
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meant in practice not only the abandonment of industrialization but 
also an actual process of deindustrialization in many Latin American 
countries. Even more, many orthodox economists in the region pro-
pound the idea that industrialization is not in itself the only road to 
development and that by following the theory of comparative advan-
tages some countries can hope to fully develop with almost no indus-
trialization. With the exception of Brazil and Mexico this could be the 
case of the majority of Latin American countries which basically con-
tinue to export primary products.  
In effect, free trade and economic policies open to the world mar-
ket have brought about a considerable diminution of industrial produc-
tion and employment in Latin America. Some big countries like Mexi-
co and Brazil managed to expand their industrial exports after a while. 
The rest, on the contrary, followed a more radical model of laissez-
faire which diversified the export of primary products, but also made 
more permanent the low level of industrial production and employ-
ment. In this, the Latin American path to modernity has been very 
different from the Asiatic one, where the state took an important role 
in the acquisition and adaptation of state-of-the-art technologies and in 
the promotion of industrial exports (Gwynne 1996: 228-229; 220).  
 
4. Results of the Globalized Neoliberal Stage: an Appraisal 
In assessing the results of the neoliberal stage and globalization in 
Latin America, it is clear that in spite of some macro-economic gains 
like the control of inflation, the influx of foreign capital and fiscal 
stability, the social impact of radical neoliberal policies plus the re-
sults of the economic crisis taking place since 2000, have been on the 
whole very negative: there has been a steady rise of unemployment 
and a loss of stability of many jobs. In countries like Peru, Bolivia, 
Paraguay and Ecuador, the so-called “informal sector” – with its low-
wage no-benefits jobs – is greater than the “formal” one, and in the 
rest of Latin America, with the exception of Chile, the informal sector 
employs more than the 40% of the workforce (Gwynne 2004: 55). 
There has also been downward pressures on real wages, reduction in 
the minimum wage, increased inequalities in the distribution of wealth 
and a substantial increase in poverty.  
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Countries like Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela, 
the so-called Andean countries, have today a lower per capita income 
than in 1990. In the majority of Latin American countries, more than 
25% of the population live under the poverty level. In at least seven 
countries of the region more than half of the population live in that 
condition, even if poverty has somewhat receded in many of them. On 
the whole, in Latin America 225 million people (43,9%) have incomes 
below the poverty level (PNUD 2004: 36). 
It is no surprise then that the divergence between the Latin Ameri-
can region and the developed world should continue to grow. In 1978, 
the per capita income of the six core economies was five times that of 
the six richer Latin American countries and twelve times that of the 
six poorer ones. By 2001, the ratio had increased to seven and 29 re-
spectively. But asymmetries have also become internal to Latin Amer-
ica. The gap between the six richer countries and the six poorer ones 
has almost doubled between 1978 and 2001 (Gwynne 2004: 8-9). 
Most of the direct foreign investment, virtually 75%, has gone to 
Mexico, Brazil and some Caribbean offshore financial centres. Brazil 
and Mexico are practically the only countries in Latin America that 
have acquired some industrial technological capacity and which can 
therefore export manufactured products, while the rest of Latin 
American countries export mainly primary products. 
The negative results have brought about strong resistance to the 
model practically everywhere and as a result serious problems of gov-
ernance have arisen in the region. In Argentina, Peru, Bolivia, Uru-
guay, Venezuela and Ecuador there has been growing opposition to 
neoliberal policies. The governance problems are also related to a 
crisis of the party system. Traditional parties are no longer able to 
represent the needs and hopes of the voters, and hence they have all 
but lost support. In the recent municipal elections in Bolivia (5th De-
cember 2004) traditional parties like the Movement of the Revolution-
ary Left (MIR), the Movement of the National Revolution (MNR), 
New Republican Force (NFR) and National Democratic Action 
(ADN) were almost completely wiped out and the new Movement 
Towards Socialism (MAS), originating amongst the “cocaleros” (coca 
cultivators), became the biggest party. In Uruguay, the elections at the 
end of 2004 brought about the collapse of the traditional parties (Colo-
rado party and Blanco party) which had alternated in ruling the coun-
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try for more than 170 years. A coalition of moderate left-wing forces 
achieved an absolute majority in parliament and also elected the presi-
dent of the country (Tabaré Vásquez). 
There has also been a tendency to endless fragmentation of politi-
cal parties and lack of loyalty to them. In many countries social move-
ments have become far more important than parties. In the last Co-
lombian election there were around 70 political parties. In Ecuador the 
practice of winning an election while representing a party, only to 
change it once elected, is widespread (Arriagada 2004: 4). Over all of 
Latin America the support of people for parliaments and political par-
ties has fallen below 25% (PNUD 2004: 12). Exceptionally, Chile 
maintains a solid and representative party structure, but almost 3 mil-
lion young people refuse to register to be able to vote. Inevitably, all 
this has affected the functioning of democracy. 
Economic issues related to the daily lives of the people have be-
come paramount in Latin America, so much so that for most people 
their economic well-being has become more important than democ-
racy itself. The politicians and parties’ loss of prestige has necessarily 
affected adhesion to democracy, particularly among the young. The 
survey conducted by the PNUD shows that a majority of Latin Ameri-
cans are prepared to drop democracy if it does not solve their eco-
nomic problems. In fact, 54.7% of all Latin Americans reply that they 
would be prepared to accept an authoritarian government if it was 
capable of solving the economic situation (PNUD 2004: 27, 31). Even 
if since 1989 Latin American countries have not fallen again into dic-
tatorships, the widespread poverty and inequality has made democracy 
less appealing. 
Widespread poverty and disaffection with democracy and politics 
seem to be the two common elements which affect most Latin Ameri-
can countries in the 2000s. Together they contribute to an increasing 
problem of governance or, at least, to an increasing gap between peo-
ple’s expectations and the ability of democratic institutions to deliver. 
This is why the credibility and the very stability of democratic institu-
tions is at risk. And yet, it is difficult to generalize about the likely 
consequences. For a start, on the economic front there is hardly a new 
model emerging which could present itself as an alternative to the 
prevalent neoliberal policies. So the opposition to them is disinte-
grated and not strong enough to threaten their viability. On the politi-
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cal front, in spite of the increasing problems of governance and depo-
liticization, democracy has survived but also with different levels of 
risk.  
Three different situations seem to be emerging. A first group of 
countries including Venezuela, Bolivia, Argentina and Uruguay since 
the election of Tabaré Vásquez, have been hit so hard by an economic 
and political crisis that their political stability has been threatened and 
both their governments and peoples are increasingly disaffected with 
globalization and the leadership of the United States. A second group 
including Peru, Ecuador and Colombia, also in deep crisis, suffer from 
an important split between the people, which are mostly disaffected 
and disillusioned, and the governments, which still want to pursue 
American-led globalization as a way out. Finally there is Chile and 
Mexico, which in spite of having some problems, have still managed 
to grow and have fully embraced American-sponsored globalization. 
Popular resistance to globalization in them is far less marked.  
Where can Brazil be placed? Well it is difficult to say. Brazil is 
clearly more stable politically and follows more orthodox economic 
policies than the countries in the first group. Brazilian people are not 
as disaffected with the government as Peruvians or Ecuadoreans in the 
second group, nor is the government fully neoliberal when the coun-
try’s industrial interests are at stake. On the other hand it is far less 
keen on United States-led globalization than Chile and Mexico. More-
over its sheer size and huge population make it qualitatively different. 
Maybe then, Brazil is in a league of its own, or in a bigger league, as 
many of its politicians increasingly believe. Notwithstanding that, 
there is little doubt that it shares many common cultural features and 
most important problems with the rest of Latin America – even if in a 
distinct way – and because of that, its future is tied up with the future 
of Latin America.  
The variety of situations in Latin America poses a challenge to the 
role which the region can play in the world. If, as the title given by me 
to this paper suggests, the world is entering a post-national phase, then 
there is little future for Latin America as a balkanized conjunction of 
nations. The example of the European Union is in this sense crucial to 
Latin America. And perhaps Brazil’s unique position in the region is 
strategic to playing a leading role in trying to achieve the elusive goal 
of a Latin American Union. 
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Gustavo Lins Ribeiro 
Post-imperialism.  
A Latin American Cosmopolitics1 
In the last fifteen years, two major historical events have radically 
impacted upon the dynamics of the world system and have led to dif-
ferent discourses and policies in international relations. First, with the 
end of the Cold War (1989-1991) a triumphant capitalist global inte-
gration started to unfold in a so-called unipolar world, the euphemism 
that designates North American imperial hegemony. Second, in 2001, 
the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Centre’s Twin Towers in Lower 
Manhattan reinforced classic imperialist perspectives of conservative 
U.S. political and military elites.  
Up to the end of the Cold War it was customary to explain the 
configuration of the world system by means of discourses often based 
on ideologies and utopias that referred to humankind’s destiny. These 
discourses, postmodernists would say, were deeply rooted in meta--
narratives of the Enlightenment, promises of salvation through pro-
gress, accumulation, power, science, technology and, to a lesser or 
greater degree, social justice. With the end of the Soviet Union though 
triumphant capitalism had no major ideologies and utopias to con-
front. In the ten years between 1991 and 9/11, political ideologies and 
utopias gave way to culture, disguised as civilization and religion, as 
the new substance for a dual vision of the world. The clash of the so-
cialist and capitalist worlds was substituted by the clash of civiliza-
tions. 9/11 confirmed that evil had to be understood through a cul-
turalist note. Culturalism, a perspective often associated with symbolic 
analysis, ethnic, racial and identity issues, has clearly transcended 
materialism, a perspective highly associated with class relations and 
political economy. Now it is time for the West and the rest, all kinds 
of orientalisms and occidentalisms, modernity, identity politics and 
multiculturalism. Interest in culture and power has almost brought 
                                                     
1  This is a revised version of the chapter that provided the title of my last book, 
Postimperialismo, published in 2003 by Gedisa, Barcelona. 
Gustavo Lins Ribeiro 32
about the fading away of interest in class and power (Fonseca 2005). 
It may be the case that social classes have been buried in the rubble of 
the Soviet Empire. 
My arguments must be placed against a backdrop of crisis in ide-
ologies and utopias that has characterized the past two decades. This 
crisis is reflected in the academic world in different ways. Neoliberal 
recipes, for instance, have started to restructure university life. There 
has also been a relative decline in the visibility of Marxist theories 
during this period. The world system theory may be the only excep-
tion, perhaps because it has given a sense of a world totality, some-
thing useful in an era of heightened globalization. It does not follow 
though that critical stances have been totally outmoded. We have un-
doubtedly entered the era of the 'post' prefix with strong moments of 
post-modernist and post-structuralist critiques, also heavily inclined to 
dwell more on discourses and culture than on class or labour relations.  
Globalization has increased the number of contacts and exchanges 
among people located in different countries. In the academic world, 
this has meant a growth in the international flow of knowledge and the 
possibility of increasing cooperation. Nevertheless, in many ways, 
such trends have mirrored unequal relations existing within larger 
structural globalization processes. Theory has flown from metropoli-
tan centres to non-metropolitan centres while the flow of “raw data” 
has moved in the opposite direction. The circulation of critical discur-
sive matrices has occurred within a Western university system that has 
become globalized in the past five decades. Such matrices could be 
called ideascapes, the category Arjun Appadurai (1990) coined to 
interpret the dissemination of ideas and discourses within “global cul-
ture”. I’d rather call them cosmopolitics (see below). This global uni-
versity system operates as a world system of intellectual production 
(Kuwayama 2004; Gerholm 1995) whereby hegemonic centres define 
canons and professional standards as well as accumulate global sym-
bolic capital.2 In exploring the existence of a world system of anthro-
pology, Japanese anthropologist Takami Kuwayama states that: 
Simply put, the world system of anthropology defines the politics in-
volved in the production, dissemination, and consumption of knowledge 
                                                     
2  Arturo Escobar and I have edited a volume to explore the existing unequal rela-
tions among world anthropologies (Ribeiro/Escobar 2006). 
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about other peoples and cultures. Influential scholars in the core coun-
tries are in a position to decide what kinds of knowledge should be given 
authority and merit attention. The peer-review system at prestigious 
journals reinforces this structure. Thus, knowledge produced in the pe-
riphery, however significant and valuable, is destined to be buried locally 
unless it meets the standards and expectations of the core (2004: 9-10). 
Kuwayama is aware of the problems arising from dualistic readings, 
he recognizes the complexity of centre/periphery intra and inter-rela-
tions and the existence of elites in the periphery closely connected to 
those of the centre (pp. 49-46).  
The world system’s approach has been recently enriched by two 
other important perspectives: the ‘geopolitics of knowledge’ and the 
‘provincializing Europe’ projects. Geopolitics of knowledge is a no-
tion developed by Walter Mignolo (2000; 2001; 2002) who relates 
economic geopolitics to the geopolitics of knowledge in order to stress 
the idea that the locus of enunciation in academic subjects is geopoli-
tically marked. Mignolo argues in favor of diversality or the possibil-
ity of epistemic diversity as a universal project. Chakrabarty’s attempt 
at “provincializing Europe” is also central to the development of more 
complex forms of global cross-fertilization as well as more democratic 
modes of academic exchange worldwide. While transcending Euro-
centric modernity is one of his goals, Chakrabarty asserts that 
[The project of provincializing Europe] does not call for a simplistic, out-
of-hand rejection of modernity, liberal values, universals, science, rea-
son, grand narratives, totalizing explanations, and so on. […] It cannot 
originate from the stance that the reason/science/universals that help de-
fine Europe as the modern are simply ‘culture specific’ and therefore 
only belong to the European cultures. For the point is not that Enlight-
enment rationalism is always unreasonable in itself, but rather a matter of 
documenting how […] its ‘reason’, which was not always self-evident to 
everyone, has been made to look obvious far beyond the ground where it 
originated (2000: 42, 43). 
In his dialogical stance, Chakrabarty avoids a romantic dualistic posi-
tion since he recognizes that without Enlightenment universals ‘there 
would be no social science that addresses issues of modern social jus-
tice’ (idem: 5). However, he also underscores the fact that in a world 
of globalized scholarship, translation of multiple forms of understand-
ing life into universalist European categories is clearly a problematic 
process (idem: 17).  
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1. Cosmopolitics 
These debates immediately place us within global power fields, i.e. in 
social and political arenas shaped by unequal exchanges between 
hegemonic and non-hegemonic centres. They also make mandatory 
consideration of the many tensions between universalism and particu-
larism, tensions that, as Ernesto Laclau (2000) argues, cannot be con-
sidered as beyond the reach of power relations. Indeed, for Laclau the 
aspiration to universalism is the result of power effects. Relations 
between universalist and particularist claims are thus always traversed 
by specific hegemonies. In reality, there is a permanent struggle 
among different particularist positions to occupy the place and per-
form the role of a universal proposition. In the academic globalized 
world, under the hegemony of Anglo-American discourses, the issue 
is to foster different particular subject positions and enunciations and 
keep them in an articulated tension.  
I find the notion of cosmopolitics useful in this regard. It seeks to 
provide a critical and plural perspective on the possibilities of supra- 
and transnational articulations. It is based, on the one hand, on posi-
tive evocations historically associated with the notion of cosmopoli-
tism and, on the other hand, on analysis in which power asymmetries 
are of fundamental importance (on cosmopolitics see Cheah/Robbins 
1998; Ribeiro 2003). Cosmopolitics comprises discourses and modes 
of doing politics that are concerned with their global reach and impact. 
As an anthropologist, I am particularly interested in those cosmopoli-
tics that are embedded in conflicts regarding the role of difference and 
diversity in the construction of policies and supranational alliances.  
Several cosmopolitics are counter-hegemonic discourses anchored 
in particular situations. This is the case with post-colonial critique, 
Zapatismo, subaltern studies and interculturalidad, a perspective that 
is being more clearly elaborated in the Andes, especially in Ecuador 
(Walsh/Schiwy 2002; Castro-Gómez 2002; García Canclini 2004). 
Since there are several progressive cosmopolitics, articulation be-
comes a key-word. Indeed, the effectiveness of cosmopolitical initia-
tives on the transnational level relies on networking. There is not a 
singular cosmopolitics capable of dealing with the entire complexity 
of the global counter-hegemonic struggle and with the existence and 
proliferation of critical subjects in fragmented global-spaces. Support-
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ers of counter-hegemonic cosmopolitics need to identify their mutual 
equivalences to be able to articulate themselves in networks and po-
litical actions. Effective non-imperialist cosmopolitics that inform 
transnational political activists and progressive forms of global aware-
ness also require a complex articulation of multi-located and plural 
struggles and subjects.  
 
2. Towards a Latin American Cosmopolitics 
The height of international visibility of Latin American theoretical 
contributions occurred in the 1970’s with the consumption of depend-
ency theory in Northern hegemonic centres and elsewhere. Since then, 
in spite of important works by Latin American scholars (see, for in-
stance, Néstor García Canclini’s work on hybridity; Aníbal Quijano’s 
on the coloniality of power and Enrique Dussel’s on multiple moder-
nities), the region has not produced theoretical discourses that have 
impacted upon global audiences like dependency has.  
At the same time, the current hegemony of the Anglo-American 
academic system has generated distortions in the production and dis-
semination of academic cosmopolitics and theories. I think, for in-
stance, of the worldwide diffusion of multiculturalism. Postmodern-
ism also perfectly illustrates the centrality of the North American uni-
versity system in the reception and diffusion of theories. Originally 
formulated in France, post-modernism acquired great global visibility 
when, in the 1980’s, it was increasingly absorbed and debated by 
North American academic centres. More recently, post-colonial and 
subaltern studies, highly related to the work of Indian scholars, have 
undergone a similar process. It is the dissemination of post-colonial-
ism that interests me. My arguments are a call for a critical dialogue 
between post-colonialism and another cosmopolitics which I call post-
imperialism. 
 
3. A critical dialogue with postcolonialism 
In a session at the 1999 meeting of the American Anthropological 
Association, a young American anthropologist called contemporary 
Brazil a “postcolonial country”. It was the first time I heard a re-
searcher classifying Brazil that way. I wanted to understand her reason 
for using that category. For me, it sounded like an anachronism. I was 
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surprised at the young professor’s answer to my question as to why 
she labeled Brazil a postcolonial country: “You are right, Brazil is not 
a postcolonial country, this category does not apply there.” 
This small, for many people irrelevant incident, made me think 
how the dissemination of theories and concepts may follow paths that 
are similar to the diffusion (in its old sense) of other cultural construc-
tions: swift and subtle mechanisms that are often imperceptible and 
random modes of generating familiarity and the mandatory use of a 
tool, a merchandise, words or ideas which, in many ways, are “mis-
placed ideas” (to borrow the title of the essay by Roberto Schwarz 
1992). Such mechanisms hide power relations, commonly embedded 
in the diffusion of anything. In the end, that was a session at a metro-
politan academic meeting. We know that science and art are also 
means to fixate colonial images and discourses (Said 1994: 12-13). 
In relation to exchanges between Latin America and the “North”, 
Nelly Richard considers that  
the transit of cultural signs between the peripheral practice (Latin Amer-
ica) and metropolitan theory (Latinamericanism), as well as the system of 
scholarly exchanges that administer these signs are responsible not only 
for the circulation of analytic tools but also for the criteria that regulate 
their value and reception according to the predominant trends established 
by certain discursive hegemonies (quoted by de la Campa 1999: vii).  
The production of labels that designate cultural dominants is not an 
innocuous fact, most noticeably when it is intertwined with the act of 
interpreting. The relations between global and local actors within aca-
demic power fields replicate other kinds of power relations, especially 
when the dissemination of cosmopolitics is at stake. In the domestica-
tion of the local by the global the direction of the vector of power 
accumulation favours global actors. When global actors name trends 
or paradigms they guarantee their prominence and the affiliation of 
local actors to discursive universes that they, the global actors, have 
constructed. Spurr (1999: 4), in her work on the “rhetoric of empire”, 
considers that: “the process through which a culture subordinates an-
other starts with the act of giving or not names”. The acritical accep-
tance of labels such as post-colonialism is problematic because it often 
implies categorizations that essentialize and homogenize the other 
from above. 
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If we need to consider the conditions of production, dissemination 
and reception of cosmopolitics in order to understand them, post-colo-
nialism needs to be placed within such frameworks of analysis. It is a 
diversified theoretical and political stance marked by the presence of 
writers of the English language who are mostly from former British 
colony countries. This is my starting point. The post-colonial situation 
it refers to is intimately related to the decolonization of the British 
empire after Second World War, notably in Asia, Africa and the Car-
ibbean. This was a very particular juncture of the world system for 
historical, cultural, economic and political reasons, especially if com-
pared to nineteenth century post-colonial Latin America. 
Post-colonialism started with “ethnic intellectuals” (to use 
Ahmad’s [1994: 167] expression in his critique of “Orientalism”, 
Said’s archaeological landmark in post-colonial studies) who opened 
political and professional space to substitute the literature of the 
Commonwealth for a “new object” that came into focus. According to 
Vijay Mishra and Bob Hodge  
As the British Empire broke up and attempted to sustain an illusion of 
unity under the euphemistic title of ‘Commonwealth’ a new object ap-
peared on the margins of departments of English Literature: ‘Common-
wealth literature’. The ambiguous politics of the term was inscribed in 
the field that it called into being. ‘Commonwealth literature’ did not in-
clude the literature of the centre, which acted as the impossible absent 
standard by which it should be judged. The term also occluded the cru-
cial differences between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ Commonwealth, be-
tween White settler colonies and Black nations that typically had a very 
different and more difficult route into a different kind of independence. 
The struggling enterprise of ‘Commonwealth literature’ was jeopardized 
from the start by the heavily ideological overtones of its name. […] Post-
colonial(ism) has many advantages over the former term. It foregrounds 
a politics of opposition and struggle, and problematizes the key relation-
ship between centre and periphery. It has helped to destabilize the barri-
ers around ‘English literature’ that protected the primacy of the canon 
and the self-evidence of its standards (Mishra/Hodge 1994: 276).  
The fact that the archaeology of post-colonialism is marked by its 
roots in literary fields brings up other issues. It draws my attention to 
the acritical use of literature and fiction (most often based on the her-
meneutical power of metaphors) as substitutes for social reality and 
for dense social science methodological and theoretical research. This 
raises the possibility of the existence of social sciences without social 
scientists, a complicated problematic that involves historical and epis-
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temological factors and power disputes within academia. There is no 
doubt that we are facing here one of the most difficult issues in social 
theory, especially in a time when inter- and transdisciplinarity assume 
ever more sophisticated dialogues. After the impact of the post-mod-
ernist wave new interpretations are needed to recast the relations be-
tween literature and the social sciences.  
I am neither advocating a chauvinist position nor a defense of any 
canonic disciplinary perspective; both would be untenable by them-
selves. It is evident that science, knowledge and academic life are 
international practices in which cross-fertilization is welcome. But it is 
never misplaced to recall that this realm too is traversed by power 
inequalities. The high global visibility of post-colonialism became 
possible only after its reception in the Anglo-American academic 
world. If colonial discourse analysis and post-colonial theory are “cri-
tiques of the process of production of knowledge about the Other” 
(Williams/Chrisman 1994: 8), it would be at least ironic that post-
colonialism – with its trajectory marked by its growth and prolifera-
tion in English-speaking academia – colonizes – if you will excuse the 
wordplay – the empty space left by the absence of Latin American 
cosmopolitics and becomes a discourse about producing knowledge 
about the Latin American Other. In Latin America post-colonialism 
would amount to what which it condemns, a foreign discourse on the 
Other that arrives through the hands of a metropolitan power. Post-
colonialists would be, unwittingly, doing what they criticized.  
Obviously, post-colonialism’s dissemination cannot be reduced to 
the force of the Anglo-American hegemony behind it. Similar to other 
critical cosmopolitics, post-colonialism has contributions to make in 
the analysis of social, cultural and political realities anywhere, espe-
cially when power asymmetries are at stake. The issue is not to deny 
post-colonialism but to assert the production of critical narratives in 
tune with Latin American subject positions, in a heteroglossic dia-
logue with cosmopolitics from other glocalities. 
 
4. Post-imperialism 
The nineteenth century was the post-colonial century properly speak-
ing in Latin America. It coincided with a period of nation-building 
both in Europe and in the Americas. But the nineteenth century was 
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also the century of classic modern imperialism that transformed many 
Asian and African countries into colonies that covered almost the 
whole world.3 Two apparently paradoxical movements existed side by 
side and flourished under the force of monopolist capitalism (Lenin 
1984): the consolidation of Nation-States within their own territories 
and the expansion of the most powerful states out of their territories 
incorporating other nations into their domains. In this period, post-
colonialist ideologies in Latin America were highly marked by nation-
building processes. Direct rule was almost absent on the continent, 
with the exception, in South America, of the French, Dutch and Brit-
ish Guyanas.4 At the same time, in Asia and Africa colonialism would 
last until the second half of the 20th century. In these areas, anti-
colonial struggles would reach their goals after World War Two when 
the United States would substitute the British Empire and others and a 
new global hegemony, mostly independent of direct-rule, would be 
established.  
The political and ideological post-colonialist struggles in African 
and Asian countries had to face the task, as did Latin Americans in the 
19th century, of creating/consolidating independent nation-states. The 
wave of decolonization in the 1970’s meant at the same time the clo-
sure of the nation-state system within the world system and the last 
cry of modern imperialism. But the closure of a system triggers the 
opening of another. In this new juncture of a world basically organ-
ized under the model of the European, republican nation-state, nation-
alism started to feel the presence of ever stronger transnational trends. 
Especially in the period 1980-2000, transnational corporations, flexi-
ble capitalism and neoliberal recipes generated new forms that sur-
passed national control. This is a kind of transnationalism marked by 
an intense time-space compression (Harvey 1989), i.e. by a techno-
logical command of space and time that distances itself more and 
more from the political and administrative forms of exerting power 
                                                     
3  Based on the geographer A. Supan, Lenin (1984) shows the following variation 
of territories that were under American or European colonial rule between 1876 
and 1900: Africa, from 10.8 to 90.4%; Polynesia from 56.8 to 98.9%; Asia, from 
51.5 to 56.6%; Australia 100% in both years and the Americas from 27.5 to 
27.2%. 
4  We should not forget Cuba, the U.S. expansion over Mexican territory and the 
interventions that, at the beginning of the 20th century, led to the construction of 
the Panama canal. 
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associated with modern imperialism and from the colony in its strict 
sense of occupation of a foreign land. The relative climax of the na-
tion-state goes hand-in-hand with the relative decadence of its control-
ling power set in motion by transnational capitalism.  
In order to exert their power, transnational corporations do not  
require direct territorial control by a metropolitan State. Post-imperial-
ism is what I call this juncture in which nation-states have to deal with 
transnationalism, a superior level of integration. Already in the 
1970’s, Samir Amin (1976: 191) called post-imperialism the most 
advanced phase of capitalism, characterized by the concentration of 
power in transnational corporations and by their control of the “tech-
nological revolution” (p. 189).  
But post-imperialism does not exhaust all possible forms of orga-
nizing economic and political life and constructing cosmopolitics. It 
exists together with other forms. Those new nation-states that since 
World War Two have had to cope with the post-colonial situation may 
find in post-colonialism a useful cosmopolitics to situate their strug-
gles in the present moment of the world system. Furthermore, after 
9/11, imperialism has resurged in Afghanistan and Iraq, a fact that 
shows, once again, that history does not move in a straight line and 
that the conservative military-industrial complex has known very well 
how to maintain its power and take advantage of certain political op-
portunities in the United States. However, in Latin American nation-
states, post-imperialism predominates over other dynamics. It informs 
the contents of political, economic and cultural contemporaneity as 
well as imposes certain interpretative and research needs.  
The prefix “post” is surely emblematic of the anxieties of our 
time. There is, as Anne McClintock (1994: 292) suggests in her texts 
on the traps of the term post-colonialism, an “almost ritualistic ubiq-
uity” of post words. Indeed “post” has many slippery qualities not the 
least of them being the confusion between continuity and disconti-
nuity, change and permanence. Yet, it may be exactly because of its 
tricky qualities that – in a time full of uncertainties and ambiguities – 
“post” is such a popular prefix. Its use avoids the risk of making per-
emptory statements, a stance that has characterized triumphalist trends 
in the social sciences (including Marxism). 
If the prefix “post” may be problematic, why use an expression 
such as post-imperialism? For the following reasons: a) currently the 
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world system is characterized by unipolarity, the euphemism for the 
climax of American supremacy; b) military interventions are made by 
a globalized war machine with unprecedented power; c) I want to 
make use of the political reverberations of the term “imperialism” in a 
time when anodyne terms such as “globalization” are diffuse; d) char-
acteristics of imperialism, such as the control of the world system by 
powerful economic conglomerates are still with us; e) I also want to 
make use of the critical reverberations already associated with the 
expression “post-colonialism”; f) finally, the ambiguity of the prefix 
“post” is not entirely negative and it is possible to make it work in the 
direction of other subject positions.  
I want to advance the idea that post-imperialism is the Latin 
American side of the coin on which post-colonialism is found. It 
should be clear that I use the term ironically. Furthermore, as a cos-
mopolitics, post-imperialism mixes utopian horizons (a moment be-
yond imperialism in which, nonetheless, imperialism remains an is-
sue) and descriptions of specific characteristics of our times. It thus 
combines programmatic and sociological visions. 
Like the term colonialism, imperialism has many meanings and 
definitions. It is well-known that colonialism and imperialism are 
different sides of the same coin. Williams and Chrisman start their 
anthology on post-colonialism by pointing out the equivalence of both 
terms. For them, colonialism is  
a particular phase in the history of imperialism, which is now best under-
stood as the globalization of the capitalist mode of production (1994: 2).  
Said relates imperialism to colonialism: imperialism is  
the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan 
centre ruling a distant territory; “colonialism”, which is almost always a 
consequence of imperialism, is the implanting of settlements on distant 
territory (1994: 9).  
This definition shows that “classic imperialism” is not common any-
more in today’s world since, with a few exceptions, it is no longer 
necessary to rule distant territories but to retain the means to exert 
hegemony at a distance – often flexible and mobile means (such as 
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transnational political and economic networks; military vigilance and 
rapid military capacity of intervention).5 
Post-imperialism supposes the hegemony of transnational, post-
Fordist, flexible capitalism, with its impact on the redefinition of rela-
tions of dependency and the establishment of new interdependencies 
within the world capitalist system made possible by the existence of 
“global fragmented productive spaces” and satellite integration of 
financial capital. After the end of the Cold War, it also supposes the 
military, economic and politic hegemony of the United States as well 
as the control and concentration of scientific production and techno-
logical knowledge, especially in cutting-edge sectors such as informa-
tion technology, electronics and biotechnology. We should not over-
look the control of space and of the production of “mediascapes”. 
Hollywood, Silicon Valley, Wall Street, NASA and the Pentagon are 
icons of a political economy based on production, dissemination and 
reproduction of images, high technology, financial capital and military 
power. This triumphant capitalism, in a one-system world, does not 
need to divide the planet in “spheres of influence” the way the classic 
modern European imperialist powers did (Lenin 1984: 9) in a pro-
grammed division of the globe. 
Modern imperialism was organically linked to Fordist capitalism. 
It relied on major socio-political-economic actors; economic verticali-
zation; the creation of a periphery through the unequal exchange of 
raw materials and manufactured or industrial goods; metallurgy’s 
hegemony, especially by means of the expansion of railroads which 
gave access to natural resources, important for the central economies. 
For Lenin (1984: 10), “coal, iron and steel” were the “basic capitalist 
industries”. Rosa Luxemburg (1976: 366) also underscores the impor-
tance of railroads for imperialist expansion. Time-space compression 
caused by trains and telegraphs implied a much less intense shrinking 
of the world than what we witness today in the era of jets, the Internet, 
on-line time, and CNN.  
It is not a coincidence that when Said (1994: xii) addresses the is-
sue of “cultural forms”, “immensely important in the formation of 
                                                     
5  “Few exceptions” here refer to Afghanistan and Iraq which were invaded by mul-
tinational forces. Interestingly enough, these are allegedly temporary invasions to 
restore “order” and implant “democracy”. 
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imperial attitudes, references and experiences” to the “modern West-
ern empires of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries”, he chooses the 
novel as his object. It is no surprise either that the study of the “rheto-
ric of empire” (Spurr 1999) follows the same path. Both are studies 
marked by the post-colonialist debate that focus on the kind of media 
that existed in the time of modern empires. For the post-imperial cri-
tique the main object would be the cosmopolitics embedded in “me-
diascapes” (Appadurai 1990), especially those “cultural forms” shown 
on television or in movies that fixate exoticizing and essentializing 
narratives about hegemonic and non-hegemonic practices. The con-
temporary “structures of feelings” (as Raymond Williams called them) 
are currently much more based on the mass media, which prepare and 
reinforce the “practice of the empire”, more than through any other 
media. Observe, for instance, what happens with the diffusion of Eng-
lish in Latin America and elsewhere. International pop culture (Ortiz 
1994), hegemonized by U.S. production, plays a key role in the trans-
formation of English into the créole of the world system and into a 
status symbol.  
Under the conditions of transnational flexible capitalism, corpora-
tions may operate free from strong links with nation-states, through 
the planetary integration of financial markets and the fragmentation of 
productive processes on a global scale. Hence the neoliberal program 
for state downsizing and the consolidation of multilateral agencies’ 
power (the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the 
World Trade Organization, etc.). Multilateralism ends up in multina-
tional military alliances. Today many members of the national elites 
are transnationalized, a situation that has diminished hopes over the 
role that “national bourgeoisies” could play in national development – 
a typical 1950-1970’s mindset. The practices of segments of elites in 
several Latin American countries have not been studied nor theorized. 
From drug dealers to entrepreneurs, these social agents have already 
been operating in post-imperial ways, laundering their money in fiscal 
heavens in the Caribbean or in conspicuous consumption in cities such 
as Miami.  
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5. Post-imperialist research  
A post-imperialist research program calls for understanding a) the 
nature of connections that Latin American capitalists keep with ad-
vanced capitalism, with diverse transnational elites and with formula-
tors of multilateral agencies’ development policies; b) the insertion of 
national elites in globalization processes, in neoliberal adjustment 
programs; c) relations of the consolidated and “emergent” middle 
classes with globalization processes; d) different flows of information, 
capital and people from and to the region; e) the use that different 
segments of the Latin American lower classes are making of glob-
alization processes through the sizable expansion of sales of global 
gadgets in popular markets globalized by “smuggling” or by the “pi-
racy” of cultural industry products (all forms related to computer and 
electronic capitalism); f) resistance to the nation-state via Internet, a 
fact well epitomized by the Zapatista Army of National Liberation; 
g) the new migratory waves of indigenous peoples, peasants and lower 
urban middle class that colonize vast urban and rural areas and eco-
nomic spaces in the United States. In the same vein, it would be im-
portant to redefine, in specific national contexts, the place and identi-
ties assigned to ethnic segments and other minority groups. At the 
same time, the issue of mestizaje cannot be overlooked and needs to 
be re-examined, given the impact of Anglo-Saxon interethnic ideolo-
gies such as multiculturalism.  
At the symbolic, cultural and political levels the post-imperialist 
critique has many tasks ahead. First, the struggle against hegemonic 
mediascapes and ideascapes circulating within the world system is a 
priority for two reasons: it is a basic task of any social scientific effort 
and it has a strategic meaning given the sensibility of global financial 
capital to information. It is not the case of once again taking on the 
struggle against cultural imperialism since the latter may make too 
strong a call for stressing particularities which, in turn, may help to 
create unviable chauvinisms in a world of globalized markets as well 
as undesired political consequences that may reach the form of exac-
erbated and politically active racisms. What we need is to increase 
both pluralism and the circulation of heteroglossic narratives and dis-
cursive matrices through the apparatuses that dominate the global 
communication networks and the international circuits of academic 
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production. The absence, for instance, of horizontal relations among 
Latin American researchers is a central problem even today (Cardoso 
de Oliveira 1999/2000). The fact that several Latin American anthro-
pologists, for instance, are leading figures in initiatives such as the 
World Anthropologies Network (www.ram-wan.org) and the World 
Council of Anthropological Associations (www.wcaanet.org) shows 
that there are Latin American scholars already working towards a 
more heteroglossic and plural transnational academic community.  
Comparative research on Latin American migrants may show their 
relevance for the economy, politics and culture of our countries as 
well as their importance in the (re)production of new forms of hybrid-
ism. The existence of a “Latin American press in the United States” is 
another fundamental research topic. It creates, through linguistic 
means, a collectivity of participants belonging to the same symbolic 
universe. The growing relevance of the ethnic press in the United 
States shows that this terrain is not only politically and culturally sig-
nificant but also of economic importance. A 1997 survey of New 
York’s ethnic press indicated the existence of 143 newspapers and 
magazines, 22 TV and 12 radio stations, in more than 30 languages 
(Dugger 1997). The growth of a “latino” middle class, a market that, 
in the mid 1990’s was estimated at US$ 250 million, caught the atten-
tion of popular magazines such as People that started a Spanish edi-
tion and led to a noticeable increase in the “Hispanic” press (Arana-
Ward 1996). In New York City alone, it was estimated that the media 
in Spanish, one of the largest ones, is made up of at least 56 publica-
tions, two local TV stations (members of networks) and five radio 
stations (Ojito 1997). Arlene Dávila (2001) shows how the Spanish-
speaking TV networks are dominated by “Hispanics” and have finan-
cial and production ties with Latin America (mainly with Mexico and 
Venezuela). These networks create a “latina” transnation within the 
United States, unifying segments of immigrants of several nationali-
ties. The “Hispanic” press is also important for Brazilians, since many 
of them watch Spanish-speaking channels, some of which include 
Brazilian news and other materials in their programming. But Brazil-
ian TV is available on cable TV in many American cities, a recogni-
tion of the growing relevance of Brazilian migrants in that country 
(see Ribeiro 1999). As is well-known, technologies of communication 
create imagined communities (Anderson 1991) that often become 
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political actors. Language is also an important factor in the unification 
and creation of consumer and labour markets in a globalized world.  
Awareness of the growing importance of the “Latina” community 
in the United States has prompted conservative reactions in the aca-
demic world. Samuel Huntington (2004) considers that “Hispanics” 
represent a threat to the unity and territorial existence of the American 
nation-state. In a certain sense, Huntington recognised that the United 
States cannot exist without the “Hispanics”. What can the study of the 
Latin American imagined communities inserted in American intereth-
nic systems teach us about ourselves and about processes of globaliza-
tion and transnationalism? Who but the “undocumented” migrants win 
the daily wars, in a sort of microphysics of power from below, against 
the most powerful nation-state in the world?  
The impetus to study Latin American populations living in the 
United States should be complemented with other endeavours. If a 
post-colonialist working agenda is to “provincialize Europe” (Chakra-
barty 2000), for the post-imperialist critique the goal is to provincial-
ize the United States. There is, thus, an urgent need to conduct re-
search on American society from a Latin American standpoint, an 
inversion of a quasi-colonialist flow that prevails in academic and 
scientific life. Where are the systematic studies of American political, 
social, economic and cultural life from a Latin American perspective? 
Post-imperialism aims as one of its central goals at decolonizing the 
images that are held about the United States in Latin America. It 
should also make a profound critique of nationalist canons, the effi-
cacity of which can be noticed in the exercise of hegemony against the 
region’s subaltern segments.  
 
6. Final Comments: Heteroglossia, Transversal Politics and  
Political Bricolage 
Post-imperialism does not conceive of time in a unilinear fashion, in 
the sense of positing a new and more advanced time in history. The 
prefix “post” indicates the possibility of drawing other cognitive maps 
(Jameson 1984) that allow for the re(construction) of visions external 
to dominant orthodoxies. Post-imperialism’s main concern is with the 
power private and public corporations exert in shaping the futures of 
collective and individual social actors under the hegemony of flexible 
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capital in a globalized and transnationalized world. But it is also con-
cerned with the responses of these social actors to new power configu-
rations, responses that foster the maintenance and growth of heteroge-
neity in a world full of homogenizing forces. 
One of the aims of the post-imperialist critique is the struggle 
against all kinds of chauvinisms and the amplifying of voices present 
in the dialogues internal and external to the nation-state. Within a 
post-imperialist perspective, nativism and nationalism, in their exclud-
ing formulations, have no space. In reality, new activists of different 
types (environmental or indigenous causes, human rights, for instance) 
prove, with their affiliation to transnational networks of activism 
(Keck/Sikkink 1998; Mato 1999), that political practice in a global-
ized world requires broader horizons and alliances. A point calling for 
attention refers to the limits and dangers of “strategic essentialism” 
that often goes together with the politics of identity. Fragmentation 
without articulation results in vulnerability. A possible working solu-
tion for these dilemmas may lie in the acceptance of hybridism as the 
political force underlying all possible coalitions of different actors. 
Nonetheless, hybridism is also fraught with difficulties. It supposes 
subjects aware that their places in the world are much more the result 
of many fusions and con-fusions over time than of any foundational 
ideology, clearly and coherently defined, based on history, ethnicity 
and nation. The size of this kind of political subject is still small as a 
consequence of the ways that institutional politics, the media and the 
educational system operate. 
Perhaps all this leads to the conclusion that intellectuals and activ-
ists need to keep a critical attitude towards essentialism and to pro-
mote plural, decentered and democratic coalitions that keep negotiated 
universalist programs in common. However, one should never forget a 
central tension that animates the particular/universal relationship: if 
the distorted limit of universalism is the arrogance of empire coloniz-
ing all other perspectives, the distorted limit of particularism is the 
arrogance of a unique perspective that believes to be above all others. 
In their distorted limits, each pole of the universal/particular tension 
considered exclusively in itself and canonized is equivalent to other 
present and insurmountable difficulties that mark an underlying resis-
tance to democratic heteroglossic dialogues. 
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“Cyborg politics” (an expression associated with Donna Hara-
way’s work) or “transversal politics” seem to formulate relations be-
tween difference and democracy in a manner appropriate for consider-
ing a transnational and post-imperialist democracy. I repeat what 
Werbner (1997: 8) wrote about this:  
Cyborg politics – or ‘transversal’ politics, as Nira Yuval-Davis calls 
them – are about opening up and sustaining dialogues across differences 
of ideologies, culture, identity and social positioning. The recognition of 
the right to be different animates and sustains such exchanges, despite 
conflictual perceptions and partial agreements. What is accepted, in other 
words, is the enormous potentiality of imperfect communication. Trans-
versal politics thus organise and give shape to heteroglossia, without de-
nying or eliminating it. 
Transversal politics also calls for spotlighting Alcida Rita Ramos’ 
insight on political bricolage (1998: 192), a way of bringing together 
different actors in the struggle for political representation. In order to 
contribute to the construction of political communities where hete-
roglossia and uniformity can coexist as a paradox and not as a contra-
diction, we need to think and act more like bricoleurs would in the 
face of the multiple forms of reproducing politics and culture in the 
contemporary world.  
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Jean Daudelin 
Joining the Club:  
Lula and the End of Periphery for Brazil* 
1. Introduction 
Brazil’s insertion in the global political economy has usually been 
painted as a situation of “periphery”, perhaps most vividly, although 
he was not writing exclusively about Brazil, by Samuel Pinheiro  
Guimarães, who is now Secretary General of Itamaraty and whose 
“500 years of periphery” is now required reading for incoming Brazil-
ian diplomats (Guimarães 2001). From that standpoint, Brazil’s pe-
ripheral international status is not understood as a situation of “mere” 
marginality but instead as the continuing result of a dynamic relation-
ship between a centre that benefits from its asymmetric character and 
works at perpetuating it. In that perspective, Brazil’s foreign policy is 
primarily reactive and essentially defensive. 
My starting point is different. Brazil’s peripheral status in the 
world for most of its history, and for the purpose of this paper, spe-
cifically since WWII, is accepted. It is understood, however, as a 
situation of mutual irrelevance: Brazil has had a superficial insertion 
in the global political economy and in the global strategic landscape. 
This has meant that, all the talk about dependency notwithstanding, 
the world has had relatively little bearing on Brazil. Its political and 
economic disasters as well as its successes have been essentially of its 
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own making. Domestic factors, in other words, have been the main 
determinant of Brazilian foreign policy, they have had the most influ-
ence on the definition of the interests that were defended and pro-
moted, on the resources mobilized for that purpose, and on the way in 
which that policy was implemented. Brazil’s insertion in the world is 
now changing because Brazil is.  
The argument of this paper is straightforward: Brazil’s peripheral 
status is ending, in part because the world is becoming more relevant 
to its fate, but mostly because Brazil has become more appealing to 
the world, particularly to its dominant powers, as a result of its con-
solidation as a stable, democratic and liberal power. While the coun-
try’s diplomacy has always been extremely competent and while it has 
also been increasingly assertive, particularly since the mid-1980s, a 
number of domestic factors had severely constrained it. Chief among 
those, Brazil’s political system remained in transition, the fundamental 
direction of its economic policy and the fate of its economic adjust-
ment were still uncertain and its international image was still marred 
by dramatic social inequities. On all three counts, the elections and the 
months that followed changed the equation. 
This domestic dynamic is outlined in the following section. An 
overview of Lula’s foreign policies follows, and their impact are as-
sessed in a third part.  
 
2. The Election of Lula and Brazilian Foreign Policy 
2.1 Democratic Consolidation 
A classic test of democratic consolidation is a real change in govern-
ing authorities. This is one of the reason why political scientists for a 
long time questioned the depth of democratic roots in Japan where one 
party, the LDP, ruled essentially unopposed for some forty years. The 
test is particularly significant when a large ideological distance has 
traditionally separated contending forces, for instance when conserva-
tive or liberal parties are replaced by socialist or communist ones. 
When such a change takes place without significant upheaval, there 
are extremely sound reasons to conclude that a political consensus 
exists regarding the legitimacy of the political institutions of the coun-
try. This is why the return of the Peronists to power was so important 
in Argentina, and why the electoral success of the FMLN and the vic-
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tories of the Liberals, of the PAN and of the Frente Amplio were so 
significant in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Mexico and Uruguay. This is 
also why doubts will be justified about Guatemala until the Left wins 
something significant, and about Venezuela until Chavez and his party 
lose one election, if only to win the next one.  
Such a fundamental change is the huge step forward that Brazil 
took in 2002. The victory of Lula and the spectacular success of the 
PT in congressional elections clearly demonstrated that Brazil’s de-
mocracy was sound and that its various political forces, its military, 
and its economic elites were willing to let clean elections rule the day. 
Obviously, the process was well under way and in fact, the commit-
ment of Brazilian elites to democratic arrangements had been success-
fully tested a number of times, beginning with the smooth passage to 
José Sarney, following the death of Tancredo Neves, and particularly 
on the occasion of the resignation of Fernando Collor de Mello. The 
test of ideological alternance, however, was still to be passed as the 
same political coalition, the Centrão, had basically been in power 
since the return to civilian rule, in 1985.  
The institutional soundness demonstrated in 2002 has a number of 
meanings that are relevant for Brazil’s foreign policy. Some are abso-
lute: the country’s foreign policy can claim a degree of legitimacy, 
both domestic and international, that were simply out of reach during 
the authoritarian period. In addition, the democratic consensus ensures 
a degree of political stability that gives credibility to the country’s 
international commitment. Other implications are relative: in South 
America, and more broadly, in Latin America and the Caribbean, this 
kind of political stability is increasingly uncommon, and the fact that 
it is to be found in the largest and most powerful country of the region 
readily confers to Brazil the status of a political and strategic anchor.  
 
2.2 (Neo-)Liberal Consolidation 
In its specifics, the liberal economic cookbook remains highly conten-
tious (Naim 2000). Feminist, post-colonial and post-Marxist academ-
ics have raised numerous and sometimes compelling doubts about its 
assumptions and theoretical claims, while in the streets, during inter-
national meetings and People’s Summits, thousands have denounced 
its practical implications. In global policy circles, however, and in 
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national central banks and finance departments the world over, there is 
little debate about the broad contours of a “sound” economic policy, 
and these contours are unmistakably liberal or, more precisely, neo-
liberal: fiscal equilibrium, low inflation, open markets, secure prop-
erty rights and an independent central bank – formally if possible, 
informally if necessary (Yusuf/Stiglitz 2001; Bhalla 2002). It is not 
that all the governments in the world are abiding by these rules and 
requirements, but few of the “delinquents” present their current poli-
cies as anything but a “state of exception”, promising to correct their 
faults as soon as the conditions permit. 
The liberal “grammar” also dominates global trade regimes and 
multilateral institutions, and a credible commitment to broadly respect 
its rules is a sine qua non to joining those regimes or to engaging with 
its major players. The global economic game, in other words, is gov-
erned according to a liberal rules book, and the only way to join it is to 
accept its dictates.  
This clearly was the previous government’s view. Cardoso, ever 
since he introduced the Real Plan as Itamar Franco’s finance minister, 
played the game and he was widely praised for doing so. In many 
ways, he was also very successful, launching the first period of eco-
nomic stability that Brazil had known in a generation.  
Brazil’s long-term commitment to this outlook remained in doubt, 
however, both domestically and internationally, for very simple rea-
sons: the most powerful and prestigious left-wing party in Latin 
America, the PT, was a strong critic of the neo-liberal consensus, eve-
rybody knew that it would be a very credible contender to the Presi-
dency and, undoubtedly, that it would remain a powerful player in the 
Brazilian congress. Logically, as the electoral campaign progressed in 
the summer and fall of 2002, and as Lula stayed ahead in the polls, a 
mild panic set in, capital started flowing out, and the Real went into a 
minor tailspin (Williamson 2002).  
Lula’s team was quick to present itself as a credible player, assur-
ing private and multilateral bankers that a PT government would ser-
vice its debt, guaranteeing the domestic private sector of its commit-
ment to fiscal discipline and “moderation” and, as further proof of 
“credibility”, supporting publicly the Cardoso government’s agree-
ment with the International Monetary Fund. In the end Lula won, the 
PT became even more powerful in Congress, but the first two years of 
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the new regime have been the story of the consolidation of economic 
orthodoxy. An analysis of that policy lies beyond the scope of this 
paper, but a few landmarks are worth mentioning: in the first session 
of the new Congress, the government successfully articulated a coali-
tion to block an – admittedly demagogic – attempt to raise the mini-
mum salary; the IMF agreement was renewed by the government and 
monetary and fiscal policies remain to this day extremely restrictive; a 
well-known international banker and card-carrying member of Car-
doso’s PSDB, Henrique Meireles, was chosen to head the Central 
Bank; the Fiscal Responsibility Law, which heavily constrains the 
government’s spending ability, was maintained; and, in the face of 
growing restiveness on the part of the Left of the Workers’ Party, 
radical members of its deputation in Congress were condemned as 
irresponsible and then expelled altogether from the party.  
If there is a consensus in the public and academic discussion about 
Brazil, in fact, it regards the surprising conversion of the PT in power 
to neo-liberalism. The agreement is universal: from the sad musings of 
Fernando Gabeira about his “having dreamed the wrong dream”, to 
the accolades of the IMF (2005);1 from the spite of the PT’s Left, of 
the Movimento dos Sem Terras, and of North American radical aca-
demics about Lula’s treason (Petras 2005; Chossudovsky 2003), to the 
Financial Times Group’s Direct Investment magazine’s selection of 
Lula as its “Personality of the Year” for 2004. Wherever one looks, 
moreover, there is nothing in the country’s economic policy to chal-
lenge the Right’s praise or, for that matter, the Left’s curses.  
This “turn” of the PT, and this non-turn of the government’s eco-
nomic policy, has a number of significant implications for Brazil’s 
foreign policy. The first one is that the country’s economic stability 
has been bolstered, with the fall 2002 panic quickly evaporating as the 
country went from moderate growth but total macro-economic stabil-
ity in 2003, to remarkable growth and continuing stability in 2004. If 
anything, the initial lack of growth further contributed to the credibil-
ity of the government’s commitment to fiscal discipline. In the context 
                                                     
1  “Directors welcomed Brazil’s impressive economic achievements over the last 
two years, and the remarkable track record of performance under the Stand-By 
Arrangement, which reflected the authorities’ continued pursuit of strong macro-
economic policies and steady progress with structural reforms” (IMF 2005: 2). 
Italics are mine. 
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of the crisis in Argentina and Uruguay and of the continuing uncer-
tainty in Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, this makes Brazil a 
haven of tranquillity. The global prestige of the PT and of Lula, in 
particular, also confer a massive credibility to the “TINA” (“There Is 
No Alternative”) crowd, which quickly reacted by bringing Brazil on 
board, from Davos to Washington. The doubts about Brazil’s com-
mitment to the neo-liberal recipe book have disappeared as the policy, 
but also the message, became as clear as could be: in an article written 
barely one year into Lula’s mandate, Paulo Roberto de Almeida, refer-
ring to the competing World Social and World Economic fora, wrote 
“Porto Alegre Sim; Davos Não” (Almeida 2004), although Lula was 
the first world leader to go to both summits. The year after, Lula chose 
Davos and skipped Porto Alegre and, a year later, he did not show up 
either in Mumbai, where the social summit had moved. What message 
could be crisper?  
 
2.3 The “right” (Left) Image 
The third impact of Lula’s election is more immaterial. It has to do 
with the credibility in the North of Brazil’s claim to be a voice for the 
global South and the promoter of a more equitable international distri-
bution of wealth and power. Traditionally, it must be emphasized, 
Brazil has been somewhat lukewarm about assuming such a stand. 
Neither in the 1950s nor later did the country join the Non-Aligned 
Movement and its traditionally independent foreign policy was meant 
to be so in relations both to the superpowers and to the so-called Third 
Word. This “autonomous insertion” (Vigevani/Cepaluni 2007) was 
perhaps most vivid under Fernando Collor de Melo who, at the begin-
ning of the 1990s, explicitly sought to symbolically attach Brazil to 
the First World (Hirst/Pinheiro 1995; Cervo 2005).  
Collor’s resounding failure, both political and economic, some-
what discredited that “First World” stand. Yet the project of Brazil’s 
reinventing itself as a “Southern” voice – the “Third world” having 
disappeared along with the Second – needed to overcome a number of 
obstacles. Under Cardoso, and even leaving aside the shallow histori-
cal roots of such an identity, the sophisticated diplomat-intellectuals of 
Itamaraty and their multilingual, PhD-holding aristocratic President 
could hardly pose as the embodiment of the wretched of the earth. 
This was especially problematic given the massive social and racial 
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inequities that plague Brazil and make their worldly, wealthy and 
white foreign service poorly representative of a country that remains 
largely poor and mulato. 
From that standpoint, the election of Lula and his strong involve-
ment in foreign policy effectively opened up a whole new symbolic 
repertoire for Brazil (Burges 2005). Progressive global social stands 
were natural for him and he looked the part. His waging the “Fome 
Zero” (“Zero Hunger”) campaign both domestically and globally is 
the best expression of Brazil’s claim to speak and work for the poor 
and for the South. The fact that Lula set up a double-headed foreign 
policy machinery, imposing Marco Aurelio Garcia, a party activist, on 
the Itamaraty establishment, only reinforced the credibility of a pro-
gressive global agenda that the latter had scarcely identified with in 
the past.  
The stage was set, in sum, for a vastly different diplomacy.  
 
3. Lula’s Foreign Policies 
This overview organizes Brazil’s activities in three broad categories: 
trade, security and, for lack of a better word, “politics”, by which I 
mean that part of Brazilian foreign policy that is directed to global 
governance. The issues I will discuss under that heading regard pri-
marily but not exclusively the UN. 
A huge caveat is in order before starting this overview. As Paulo 
Roberto de Almeida recently pointed out (Almeida 2004), to charac-
terize Lula’s foreign policy after barely two years is a perilous exer-
cise and if the descriptive part of what follows is pretty sound, the 
interpretations I propose must be considered tentative.  
 
3.1 Trade: Playing the Game and Winning 
It is certainly on the trade front that Brazil has made its most spectacu-
lar gains in recent years. These were made both within existing re-
gimes (the WTO) and in the negotiations to expand those (the Doha 
Round) or to establish significant new ones (FTAA, EU-Mercosur). 
In its trade policy, Brazil’s current objectives are quite straight-
forward: getting as much as possible in the areas where the country is 
already most competitive (i.e. primarily agriculture), and giving as 
little as possible in those where the cost of adaptation – short, medium 
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or long-term – would be most severe, i.e. primarily in agriculture and 
possibly in services. In its general contours, this strategy is no differ-
ent from that of the vast majority of WTO members: in the liberal age, 
paradoxically, mercantilism rules trade policy.  
These objectives have been pursued extremely effectively and, by 
any standards, Brazil’s performance on the global trade scene over the 
last few years has been extraordinary and has made the country a cen-
tral and highly visible player, out of all proportion to its still limited 
weight in global trade.  
Two of the highest points of recent years involved the use of the 
regime itself against those who had designed and, until now, ruled it, 
namely the US and the EU. Brazil’s challenge of the US government’s 
subsidies to cotton production and of the European Union’s support 
for its sugar producers were received and accepted by the World 
Trade Organization’s dispute resolution mechanism and they survived 
appeals (WTO 2005a; 2005b). While the ultimate outcome of the dis-
putes, which are now in the hands of the US and the EU, is uncertain, 
the decisions represent a massive victory for agricultural exporters 
from Southern countries, on substance and on principles, and for the 
WTO itself, on legitimacy. 
In addition to these clear victories, Brazil has also made effective 
use of the WTO in its ongoing dispute with Canada regarding subsi-
dies to their respective aircraft manufacturers. While the outcome, in 
this case, is less clear cut, as both countries’ programs were faulted 
and as both were also allowed to impose tariff compensations (Gold-
stein/McGuire 2004), the process as such showed that Brazil could 
exploit existing rules very much to its advantage.  
Such effective use of the WTO by Brazil has not been limited to 
disputes with rich northern countries. In fact, most of Brazil’s requests 
to the WTO, which concerned anti-dumping investigations, involved 
products from developing countries, overwhelmingly China and to a 
lesser extent India, but also South Africa and even Mexico and Vene-
zuela (WTO 2004: 64). These are not introduced by the government, 
arising instead from private companies’ complaints, but they imply 
that the Brazilian private sector is now also able to fully exploit the 
regime. The frequency of those complaints has changed little under 
the new government as the latter, except recently and somewhat indi-
rectly in the very peculiar case of China – which is discussed below – 
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does not seem to be discouraging these practices, even when they are 
directed to Southern partners.  
While Brazil has on the one hand done quite well under the “old” 
regime, it has nonetheless contested some of its dispositions, particu-
larly in two broad areas. The first is intellectual property rights, where 
the TRIPS agreement has enshrined a distribution of guarantees that 
puts low-tech countries in an extremely disadvantageous position. The 
other is agriculture, where protectionism and subsidies dominate exist-
ing policies. 
Brazil’s strategy on both these cases, which has not changed fun-
damentally with the new government, has been primarily political. On 
property rights, the government has challenged the very legitimacy of 
the existing regime and its impact on the poorest countries, particu-
larly regarding anti-retroviral drugs. In concrete terms, Brazil has been 
a key player, along with South Africa, in the ultimately successful 
fight against brand name drug companies’ attempts to limit the rights 
of governments to impose compulsory licensing, something Brazil has 
done under Cardoso, and something it continues to do (CIPR 2002: 
11-56).  
On agriculture, aside from the full use of the prerogatives en-
shrined in the Marrakech agreement, Brazil has set up and led, alone 
or with key allies, such as India, a range of veto coalitions that were 
able to basically disable trade negotiation processes that did not in-
volve substantive concessions on protection or subsidies from the 
United States or the EU. Given the unwillingness of the latter – or 
their political inability – to make such concessions, this strategy has 
contributed to the failure of the Cancun meeting of the WTO and to 
the paralysis of the Doha Round of global trade negotiations (Jank/ 
Monteiro Jales 2004). It has also led to the stalling of the FTAA proc-
ess, and to the postponement of any agreement between Mercosur and 
the European Union.  
On substance, it is difficult to see much difference in Brazil’s ne-
gotiating position between this administration and the previous one. 
All the major challenges at the WTO had been launched under Car-
doso and Brazil’s stand has not changed substantially. The strategy 
adopted, however, particularly at the WTO, has been distinct, involv-
ing the establishment of coalitions meant to transcend the specific 
negotiation sessions. These coalitions, in this case, were distinctly 
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South-South, and they were explicitly given a broader political sig-
nificance, primarily by Brazil, but also by India and South Africa. The 
two main outcomes of this strategy, the G-20 and the India–Brazil–
South Africa (IBSA) initiative, have in fact become somewhat institu-
tionalized, the first through formal meetings, and the second through a 
formal declaration and a program of action.  
In addition, to these broad multilateral initiatives, a number of 
smaller arrangements have been promoted involving Mercosur with 
various countries. None of these agreements involve major economies 
or even major economic partners of Brazil, most have not advanced 
beyond expression of interest and none has yet implied the liberaliza-
tion of significant sectors of the Brazilian economy or access for its 
exporters to significant markets.  
Another issue, very recent, also merits mention. On the occasion 
of the prolonged state visit by China’s President along with a large 
and high-level delegation, the Brazilian government accepted China’s 
request to be formally considered a market economy in the framework 
of the WTO. Given the overwhelming prominence of China as a target 
of dumping accusations by Brazilian companies, this is extremely 
significant: it means that Brazil recognizes that the price of products 
in China is not determined by state intervention, and thus that the 
dumping assessment procedure must involve very complex, time-
consuming and ultimately expensive investigations in China itself. In 
practice, it means that anti-dumping has now become much less effec-
tive as a defensive weapon against China’s cheap exports to Brazil. 
Given the broadly recognized challenges the latter represent for Latin 
American manufacturers as a group (Moreira 2004), it is no wonder 
that private sector organizations have complained bitterly (OESP 
2005a).  
Up to this point, and perhaps surprisingly, little mention has been 
made of Mercosur. Over the last two years and in part because of the 
economic crisis in Argentina, the regional agreement has been going 
through one of its periodic bouts of crisis and mutual criticism. In 
addition to a succession of “wars” between the two countries – from 
fridge and washing machines to shoes and salter flour –Argentina is 
now asking for the formalization of mechanisms meant to balance 
trade between the two countries and to authoritatively allocate FDI 
among Mercosur members. Brazilian business organizations have in 
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turn accused Argentina of impeding progress on a number of trade 
agreements. The problems are not limited to relations with Argentina, 
moreover: Brazil and Uruguay have been fighting bitterly for the posi-
tion of director general of the WTO – which both lost, incidently – 
and even Paraguay has been less than helpful from a Brazilian stand-
point as, for instance, its close relationship with Taiwan is developing 
into a significant stumbling block for any attempts at formalizing a 
trade agreement with Beijing (Ming 2004).  
A formidable amount of writing has been produced to show how 
much trade has grown between the two countries, how much Merco-
sur has become part and parcel of the trade policies of its four mem-
bers, how it is now developing into a major trading block through 
association agreements with basically all of Brazil’s neighbours on the 
continent, how useful it has been as a core negotiation bloc in global 
multilateral fora and how different it is to the other neo-liberal models 
existing or being promoted in the hemisphere (Thorstensen 2002). In 
addition, one could also point to the manifold political ramifications 
of the agreement and to an expanding institutional framework that 
now includes a dispute resolution mechanism to which a “Mercosur 
Parliament” could even be added. Beyond the recent proliferation of 
pitched battles and tensions, however, a growing number of analysts 
point to the challenges confronting the regional regime (Pinheiro 
Guimarães 2003; Souza 2003) and even to its crisis, progressive decay 
and growing dysfunctionalities (Costa Vaz 2004: 248; Lambert 2004). 
From the standpoint of Brazil’s trade policy and especially in broad 
economic terms, moreover, it appears that Mercosur remains utterly 
marginal: in 2003, after more than a decade of integration, total manu-
facturing trade between Brazil and its three partners, at US$ 11.7bn, 
represented less than 2.5% of Brazil’s GDP (WTO 2004: 3, 187, 189). 
Notwithstanding the continuing economic problems of its three junior 
partners and the tensions with Argentina, fast growing trade with 
China is quickly leading to the marginalization of the bloc as a trading 
partner for Brazil. From the standpoint of the current trade negotiation 
processes, finally, the cooperation with South Africa, India and espe-
cially China clearly dwarf the contribution of the Brazil’s Mercosur 
partners. This does not necessarily mean that Mercosur’s survival is at 
stake, but suggest that there is little economic reason for Brazil to 
consider it a priority. 
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3.2 Security: Pragmatic Assertiveness 
Ever since WWII, Brazil has had a very low profile on international 
security issues and in fact, with a few exceptions – its formal leader-
ship of the Inter-American expeditionary force in the Dominican Re-
public in 1965, in particular – it has been essentially absent from the 
global and even from the regional security picture. As a slightly trou-
bled, self-centred and benign non-interventionist giant, and through a 
professional and effective diplomacy, it has certainly contributed to 
the remarkably low conflictivity of international relations in South 
America. There is little open debate in the political establishment 
about the basic tenets of the country’s international security policy: 
pacifism, multilateralism, non-intervention, respect for sovereignty 
and non-proliferation have been little contested since civilian rule was 
re-established in the 1980s. The new government, far from challeng-
ing these principles, has in fact loudly reaffirmed them in the face of 
the US-pushed war on terror, of its challenges to multilateralism, of its 
aggressive interventionism and of its challenges to sovereignty 
(Almeida 2004).  
While the rhetoric has been consistent and even insistent, the new 
government’s commitment to those principles appears to be less solid 
or at least more complex. Brazil’s policy seems in fact to have been 
guided much less by such abstract principles than by a very pragmatic 
attitude structured around, on the one hand, the consolidation of its 
autonomy and influence in the hemisphere and, on the other, by the 
Brazilian government’s quest for a larger and more visible role at the 
global level, in part through its accession to a permanent seat on the 
UN Security Council. 
The most visible and perhaps most surprising foreign policy initia-
tive of the new government has been its involvement in Haiti. On the 
face of it, and also in the official story, Brazil is only doing there what 
it has done efficiently and with honour in more than twenty other 
countries over the last thirty years: keeping the peace and helping 
stabilise, following a request by the UN, a country reeling from a re-
cent conflict, or riven by political tensions and threatened by violence 
(Lula da Silva 2004; Amorim 2005). As was clear from the very be-
ginning, however, Haiti is a somewhat peculiar case. Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide, whose regime had admittedly little to recommend it, was 
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nonetheless broadly recognized as the legitimate President of his 
country. The circumstances under which he left his post remain mud-
dled, but it is very clear that America’s and France’s pressure, and 
possibly their soldiers’ presence and attitude, led to his leaving the 
Presidency and the country altogether in the midst of a civil war (ICG 
2004: 11). The formalities were respected, with the Security Council 
adopting the required resolution authorizing the deployment of mostly 
French and American troops (1542), and with most UN State mem-
bers recognizing the new government of Gérard Latortue. This nice 
international consensus, however, was strongly challenged by a num-
ber of states whose democratic credentials are, for the most part, 
pretty sound: CARICOM countries strongly denounced the interven-
tion and even South Africa refrained for quite some time from recog-
nizing the new government. While these governments have by now 
fallen back in the global fold, Venezuela is still holding firm, with 
Chavez vocally denouncing the new regime as illegitimate during the 
October 2004 Rio Group meeting (OESP 2004f). 
The Franco-American intervention risked becoming increasingly 
expensive politically in the face of the forceful mobilization of Aris-
tide’s Lavallas partisans, incensed at his departure, and bolstered by 
the former President’s rabid denunciation of the coup, from his South 
African exile. The search was therefore on for an international force 
that could maintain a degree of stability while giving a more neutral 
face to the foreign presence. Lula’s Brazil volunteered to lead the 
mission and to provide the largest contingent. In a situation eerily 
reminiscent of the 1965 coup in the Dominican Republic, Brazilian 
soldiers under a multilateral flag were giving a political cover to a US 
initiative which even The Economist has called “a coup” (The Econo-
mist 2004). Given that context, the Brazilian mission has received a 
surprisingly warm welcome in the country and, in spite of the lan-
guage barrier, of the delays in other countries’ contribution of soldiers 
and money, and through the most deadly hurricane to hit the island in 
a century, they appear to be doing a reasonable job (ICG 2004; 2005). 
Much noise was admittedly generated by a critical report published by 
students from Harvard Law School and the Centro de Justiça Global 
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(HLSAHR/CJG 2005), but the latter wildly inflated expectations2 
simply cannot be used as a template to assess. Still, the situation re-
mains extremely tense and confused, hundreds of people have been 
assassinated, and a real stabilization of the situation is clearly not in 
sight. For Brazil, moreover, it is somewhat of a stretch to reconcile the 
provision of a cover to such a blunt external intervention with a hard 
commitment to sovereignty and non-intervention. Most analysts have 
not even tried, linking instead Brazil’s involvement with its campaign 
for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (Sader 2004; The 
Economist 2004). And indeed, when Colin Powell visited Brazil in 
October 2004, he made a point of emphasizing the country’s contribu-
tion of hemispheric stability, “particularly in Haiti” (OESP 2004d; 
2004e). 
Such a pragmatic attachment to principles also appears to domi-
nate Brazil’s commitment to multilateralism, under this government as 
under its predecessors. Indeed, Brazil appears to be quite selective 
regarding the level at which multilateralism is to be sought. Specifi-
cally, Brazilian diplomacy pursues the consolidation of multilateral 
institutions at the global and sub-hemispheric levels, but emphatically 
not hemispheric ones. The logic of such a preference is quite straight-
forward: for a country that globally ranks only as a middle power, 
global multilateralism offers the promise of great power management 
through balancing coalitions; in a hemisphere shared with the world’s 
largest power, this simply is not an option as no coalition can truly 
hope to balance the hegemony; at the regional level, conversely, the 
crystallization of power relationships in multilateral institutions cre-
ates constraints that are much stronger for the large number of little 
players than for the dominant one. What Brazil seeks at the global 
level – balancing coalitions – is out of question for its competitors in 
South America, and what it denies the US at the hemispheric level  
                                                     
2  One wonders what recent multilateral peace mission, including passed ones in 
Haiti, could satisfy the lofty hopes of those critics: “Armed with a robust man-
date, MINUSTAH has the potential to end Haiti’s cucles of violence, develop fair 
and democratic institutions, and nurture a culture that honors and promotes hu-
man rights” (HLSAHR/CJG 2005: 48). MINUSTAH, in other words, “has the 
potential” to radically change centuries of political decay, authoritarianism and 
corruption in a matter of months... 
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– the institutionalization of regional dominance – it seeks in South 
America.  
While this general “model” of selective – or tactical – multilateral-
ism also appears to be followed in its trade policy, Brazil’s behaviour 
in regional security fora since Lula’s election certainly expresses it 
most vividly. In recent hemispheric summits on security and defence, 
in Mexico (2003) and Quito (2004), the US and its Canadian ally have 
promoted a number of propositions that sought to consolidate hemi-
spheric security institutions (OAS/CHS 2003; 2004). The most ambi-
tious ones regarded the reform of the Inter-American Defence Board, 
the formalization of continental cooperation on terrorism and the in-
volvement of the military in the fight against organized crime. On all 
these counts, Brazil was one of the main voices of opposition and, 
given the general scepticism of most American states in the face of 
arrangements that would simply enshrine the massive military asym-
metry that prevails in the hemisphere, all the relevant proposals were 
defeated. Ironically, given that the Quito meeting took place while 
Brazil was committing to staying one more year in Haiti, the debate 
was won to a large extent in the name of national sovereignty and 
non-intervention (OCSD 2004a; 2004b). Conversely, Brazil has been 
keen, at the annual reunions of the Rio Group and at the founding 
meeting of the South American Community of Nations, on proposals 
for military cooperation at the sub-hemispheric level.  
The third security dimension touches again the issue of multilater-
alism, but it regards something that had become a kind of taboo in 
Brazilian foreign policy circles: non-proliferation. Ever since the Sar-
ney government and its followers launched and then sealed the rap-
prochement with Argentina around the burial of their respective mili-
tary nuclear programs, a turn was taken regarding proliferation that 
appeared to be co-substantive with democratization itself: the social 
consensus that had existed regarding the need for the country not to 
abide by such an asymmetrical regime as the NPR appeared to morph 
in a few years into its opposite, with non-proliferation becoming a 
core principle of the country’s foreign policy. While this appeared to 
gel under Cardoso’s international strategy of “participatory inclusion” 
(Vigevani/Cepaluni 2007), a number of incidents suggest that Lula 
himself and quite a few people around him partake of the older out-
look (Goldemberg 2004).  
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The first incident took place during the electoral campaign, when 
Lula, addressing a military audience, complained that “the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, signed by Brazil, only creates obligations for the 
weaker countries” (OESP 2002). Immediately, the possibility that a 
PT government would denounce the treaty were quickly dismissed as 
misrepresentations and support for the country’s commitment to the 
regime was strongly reaffirmed. Once Lula was elected, however, the 
theme kept popping up in declarations of his Minister of Science and 
Technology. Again, the implications of the latter were minimized and 
the general thrust of the country’s policy reaffirmed. More recently, 
however, a row developed between Brazil and the IAEA regarding 
inspections to the Resende nuclear facilities. That row was resolved to 
the satisfaction of the IAEA authorities, but not before doubts were 
raised, particularly in the US, albeit not mainly from the Bush admini-
stration, about Brazil’s commitment to the NPR (Aronson 2005; 
Deutch/Kanter et al. 2004: 75-78).  
There are no grounds at this point to think that Brazil wants to de-
velop nuclear weapons. This series of events, however, suggest that 
the government wants to assert its ability to decide for itself how it is 
to deal with the issue, without interference from foreign countries, 
intrusions from international organizations, or abstract attachment to 
principles. This attitude, stronger with this government although not 
new, expresses again a degree of pragmatism towards multilateral 
institutions and even a growing scepticism about those regimes that 
are felt to unfairly limit the ability of the country to pursue its own 
objectives and to defend its own interests. Such a stand on nuclear 
energy, along with those that regard intervention and multilateralism, 
must be understood as part of the broader, less abstractly principled 
outlook of this government’s foreign policy. 
 
3.3 Political Diplomacy: Seeking Recognition and Getting it 
Brazil’s foreign policy under this government, or for that matter most 
previous ones, cannot easily be subsumed under the defence and pro-
motion of economic or security interests. Lots of efforts and resources 
have been devoted to endeavours whose concrete material and politi-
cal implications are ambiguous and even sometimes contradictory. 
There is something else at stake that simply cannot be reduced to nar-
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rowly defined interests and one must consider that power and prestige 
as such, independently of their potential “use”, are a central objective 
of that policy. In the case of the current government, the most impor-
tant manifestation of these meta-endeavours is certainly Brazil’s in-
tense and even aggressive quest for a permanent seat on the UN Secu-
rity Council. 
In September 2004, an article in the Estado de São Paulo stated 
bluntly that Foreign Minister Celso Amorim had convinced “Lula to 
make the country’s aspiration to a permanent seat in the Security 
Council the main objective of Brazilian diplomacy” (OESP 2004d). 
While the primacy of the objective might be disputed, it is impossible 
not to see that references to this goal are now standard in foreign pol-
icy statements and in analyses of foreign policy (Guimarães 2001; 
Saraiva 2005). 
Yet, both Brazil’s rhetoric and its international behaviour force 
one to look beyond that objective and focus instead on its meaning. 
For what is sought in fact is a broad and belated – from Brazilian el-
ites’ standpoint – recognition of Brazil’s importance in the world. 
That famous permanent seat should thus be seen essentially as a sym-
bol of that recognition, a symbol that is now being sought with in-
creasing energy. And indeed, Brazil’s claim to that seat has been a 
constant in the country’s diplomacy and a sine qua non in Lula’s nu-
merous meetings with foreign leaders, from Omar Bongo to Vladimir 
Putin. It cannot have escaped Brazilian diplomacy, however, that in 
practice, a permanent seat on the Security Council, especially as part 
of a significantly expanded council, could make the latter even less 
responsive and relevant to the management of global security issues.  
Along with most proponents of an expanded Council, however, 
Brazil and the other contenders – Germany, Japan, South Africa, In-
dia, and perhaps also Egypt or even Indonesia – argue that the height-
ened legitimacy of an expanded structure would ipso facto make it 
more effective, an argument that was also supported by an independ-
ent commission on UN reform, and by Kofi Annan himself (OESP 
2004c). Given the insistence of the seat-seekers on their own individ-
ual candidacy, however, one is left with the strong impression that 
none of them would withdraw its claim, even if it were shown that an 
expanded council would be less effective. For all of them, in sum, the 
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whole issue appears to be primarily symbolic, with UN legitimacy and 
effectiveness a lesser if not a marginal preoccupation.  
In the case of Brazil for instance, the claim is presented above all 
as a matter or realism and justice, not in terms of what Brazil’s pres-
ence would concretely add. “Representation” strictly speaking, i.e. the 
diplomatic construction of a major international power identity ap-
pears to be the core driver of the campaign – something it arguably 
has been since the very beginning of that quest, shortly after WWII.  
The process through which Brazil promotes its candidacy, how-
ever, is possibly as revealing of the logic and ultimate motives as its 
quest for a permanent seat. It shows how much Brazil has now out-
grown the Americas, how effective it is at alliance- and coalition-
building, how pragmatic it is in its choice of partners and institutional 
basis, and finally how ready it is to pay a price for reaching for what 
are not by any means material or security gains.  
Brazil has explicitly and systematically sought support for its 
claim through bilateral contacts and visits, particularly with current 
permanent members. It has in fact received such support, more or less 
explicitly from, among others, Russia, France, the US, and China. It 
has also joined a formal coalition of potential joiners, the G-4, along 
with Germany, Japan, and India (OESP 2004b). In parallel, it has also 
formed, with India and South Africa, a multi-facetted quasi-alliance, 
now dubbed IBSA (Taylor 2004), whose members also present them-
selves as natural candidates to the Council. Brazil, finally, has also 
tried to enlist the support of Latin American state groupings, particu-
larly the Rio Group and now the South American Community of Na-
tions, albeit without convincing them of its exclusive claim to repre-
sent them at the Council (LAWR 2004). 
Aside from diplomatic pressure and work with self-interested 
groupings – the G-4 and IBSA – Brazil’s campaign has also implied 
costs and concrete commitments. Sometimes, as in the case of Gabon, 
it simply involved forgiving a debt of $30 million that would never 
have been paid. With the countries that count, however, i.e. primarily 
the Council’s permanent members (P-5), more apparently needed to 
be offered, and more was. Here, the question of Haiti for the US and 
France has to have played a role, and Colin Powell suggested as much 
when, visiting Brasília, he mentioned together Brazil’s possible mem-
bership in the Council and its significant contribution to the stability 
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of the region, particularly in Haiti. With China and Russia, commer-
cial concessions – China’s “market economy” status – and strategic 
collaboration, for instance around space initiatives, certainly have 
helped generate openness.  
That being said, it would probably be a mistake to make a narrow 
reading of these agreements between Brazil and current permanent 
members of the Council. Clearly, the latter are open to Brazil’s grow-
ing involvement in the world or at least they see it as something nor-
mal. The Club, in other words, appears to be interested and the recent 
intensification of collaboration must probably be seen less as instances 
of short term bargaining than as points in a much broader pattern of 
collaboration.  
Brazil in sum, appears to be increasingly successful in its claim to 
“big powerdom”. In political diplomacy, as in trade and security, Bra-
zil’s commitment to current multilateral arrangements, in this case the 
UN system, goes hand in hand with a challenge to their legitimacy and 
effective diplomacy and coalition-building geared at challenging their 
existing make-up.  
 
4. Success? The Prize and its Price 
In general terms, there is little doubt that Lula’s foreign policy has 
been a success: the visibility, prestige and influence of Brazil in the 
world have never been greater. Not only has Lula’s hyper-active di-
plomacy taken him all over the planet, but conversely, at this point in 
time, Brazil appears to be the most popular partner or the preferred 
guest in the whole world: at the G-3, G-4, G-7, G-8, G-20, G-22 and 
L-20; in New York, Davos, Libreville, Luanda or Delhi; or of Bush, 
Chirac or Putin. Brazil, its President, its foreign minister and its dip-
lomats are becoming “normal” and a sought after presence in fora 
where significant trade, political and even security issues are dis-
cussed. To the extent that such a recognition of Brazil’s influence and 
prestige is a fundamental goal of the country’s diplomacy and a keen 
desire of its elites since at least the beginning of the century, the for-
eign policy of this government is a resounding success.  
Moreover, and although it is much more difficult to assess, the 
progress made looks unlikely to be undone, for two main reasons. The 
first is Brazil’s sheer demographic and economic weight in the world. 
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As much of the Western world – except the US – is shrinking demog-
raphically, as prospects for rapid growth in fast-greying Europe and 
Japan appear to be disappearing for good, as Russia’s institutional 
weaknesses look increasingly intractable, and as Africa looks set for 
many more decades of misery, a stable and liberal Brazil looks con-
vincingly, after China and India, like one of the few significant major 
players in the new century’s global game (NIC 2004; Boyer/Truman 
2005: 147-1483). Brazil’s massive and unchallengeable prominence in 
South America is the second basis of its definitive claim to global 
relevance. The economic and political consolidation that followed 
Lula’s election crystallizes that prominence in a region blighted by 
seemingly intractable problems. While Brazil’s explicit claim to re-
gional prominence remains contentious politically, contenders such as 
Argentina and Venezuela, however noisy, will simply never be able to 
challenge it.  
For both these reasons, what happens at the Security Council is, 
symbolism aside, irrelevant: Brazil has joined the Club and, as Ger-
many, Japan and now India have shown over the years, a permanent 
seat at the Council is not a requisite for membership. The foregoing 
analysis suggests in fact that Brazil’s global gains derive more from 
the changes that took place domestically than from the hectic activism 
that has characterized its foreign policy in recent years.  
Now, if Brazil’s diplomatic activism is not the fount of the coun-
try’s newly minted global prestige, what has it produced exactly? 
Well, the least one can say is that concrete results, while far from neg-
ligible, are not bountiful. 
Some political gains certainly have been made, especially in trade 
fora, as Brazil has established itself as a major power broker, contrib-
uting mightily to a redefinition of the politics of global trade policy, 
notably at the WTO, but also in the FTAA process. The extent to 
which this implies a democratization of the process is less clear. Bra-
zil, like every country involved, seeks less a change of the system than 
a change in the system, whereby its own ability to influence outcomes 
is maximized. The tensions with some African countries around agri-
                                                     
3  This is especially true from the US’ standpoint: in 2002, Brazil, with $91.8bn 
worth of US investment, was second only to Mexico (at $137.3), and signifi-
cantly more important than Korea ($75.4) and China ($28.0). Cf. Boyer/ Truman 
(2005, Table 5.1 and 5.2, respectively p. 148 and 150).  
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cultural subsidies and tariffs, which Brazil seeks, but about which 
former European colonies and net food importers are more ambigu-
ous, is a case in point (Panagariya 2004).4  
This particular problem points to the limits of the South-South 
agenda to which the government has committed itself and devoted so 
much jet fuel and rhetoric: beyond generalities about under-develop-
ment and “periphery”, the “South” simply does not define a general 
community of interest, a shared identity or a common outlook. As 
Brazil finds out on a daily basis, the closer the neighbours, the lesser 
the support for its global endeavours: Leaving aside the bitter fight 
that opposed Brazil and Uruguay about the position of secretary-
general of the WTO – which both countries ended up losing – no sig-
nificant Latin American country supports Brazil’s claim to a perma-
nent seat at the UN security council. Further abroad, one cannot but be 
sceptical of the long-term potential of IBSA, given India’s rigid stance 
on so central an issue as agricultural liberalization. South Africa’s 
very “independent” views on Haiti – whose exiled President has taken 
up residence in Nelson Mandela’s quarters – also promise less than 
automatic blessing for Brazil’s global endeavours. As to China, there 
is no indication that its policy will be any less cold-blooded towards 
Brazil than it is towards everybody else.  
The launch of the South American Community of Nations in 
Cuzco (December 2004) proved to be an anti-climax: only five Presi-
dents showed up, none from Brazil’s Mercosur partner countries; of 
those five, only three signed on a founding Protocol (Brazil, Chile, 
and Peru) that includes no specific target beyond an abstract commit-
ment to total integration in 15 years. The first South American and 
Arab Countries Summit, in Brasília (May 10-11, 2005), proved to be 
similarly disappointing: beyond the announcement of a still-to-be-
signed free-trade framework agreement between the Gulf Cooperation 
                                                     
4  These tensions came to the fore during the campaign for the general secretariat of 
the WTO, in which the candidate from Mauritius was seen as a threat for Brazil: 
“No ponto de vista do governo brasileiro, sob a condução do chanceler das Ilhas 
Maurício [Jaya Krishna Cuttaree], a OMC tenderia a concluir a Rodada Roha 
sem os avanços pretendidos na eliminação de subsídios e outros esquemas tortuo-
sos do comércio agrícola que, supostamente, favorecem os países africanos.” O 
Estado de São Paulo, April 19, 2005, “Brasil pode apoiar Lamy à OMC”. 
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Council and Mercosur – which barely trade at all at this point –5 not 
only were the Presidents of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, among others, 
absent, but the biggest event of the meeting was the very public snub 
of Nestor Kirchner, who left the event after one day, even though Ar-
gentina’s requested statement on the Malvinas had been included in 
the final declaration (OESP 2005b).6  
It appears in fact that relations with the North hold much more 
promise and are likely to be much easier to manage than with a frac-
tured, poor and unstable South. Security Council reform is a case in 
point as support for Brazil is much stronger among Northern powers 
than almost anywhere else in the world. The paradox is momentous 
but inescapable: it is only in the North that Brazil finds support for its 
claim to be a voice of the South... Which says a lot about the “suc-
cess” of the government’s South-South campaign. 
From a narrow economic standpoint the results are also extremely 
thin. At a time where constraining fiscal and monetary policy make its 
economy’s health more dependent than ever on exports, Brazil se-
cured significant market access … nowhere. Its diplomats were able to 
lead, organize or single-handedly man blocking coalitions in all the 
trade fora where concessions were asked, but little was offered: Doha, 
the FTAA, the EU-Mercosur negotiations. They were able to launch a 
plethora of smaller trade initiatives and to sign a variety of agreements 
with a multitude of partners: India and South Africa, the South-
American Community, Bolivia, the Andean Community, the South 
African Community Union (SACU), the Gulf Cooperation Council, 
and so on, but none of those agreements really has sizeable implica-
tions for the tenth biggest economy in the world. Admittedly, not 
much was on offer, but the results remain disappointing.  
On security issues, finally, the continuing inability of the US to 
consolidate a hemispheric regime that would reflect its priorities  
– terrorism and organized crime for now – is consistent with long-held 
and unchanged Brazilian priorities. However, Brazil’s foray in Haiti, 
                                                     
5  According to Brazil’s Minister of Development, Industry and Commerce, Luiz 
Fernando Furlan, South America’s exports represent only 1% of Arab countries’ 
total imports. 
6  See Cervo (2005) for a wildly favourable reading of the Brasília Summit, which 
the author compares, albeit with some reserves, to the Bandung conference in 
1956. 
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which gained its government much credit from Western powers, looks 
increasingly like a political swamp from which the country will soon 
want to extricate itself, leaving not much in its wake except resent-
ment among CARICOM countries and diffidence from every other 
small state in the Americas.  
This experience, however, in all its ambiguities, could well be the 
precursor of many more, especially if Brazil wants to keep its credit 
among big powers, particularly the US: as trouble expands among its 
neighbours, calls from Washington for Brazil to assume “its responsi-
bilities” will no doubt become more strident. Already, Condoleeza 
Rice has pointed to Brazil’s crucial role in containing Venezuela’s 
ambitions. Moreover, as the Andes sink ever deeper into crisis and 
instability, Brazil’s own interests are converging with those of the US: 
can Brasília really afford chaos and failed states in its immediate 
neighbourhood any more than Washington can thousands of kilome-
tres from its Southern border? Regional security is indeed developing 
into the area where Brazil’s claim to a global status will be tested the 
most acutely. It is also an area where the country’s options are quickly 
disappearing: regional “leadership”, however contested, is simply the 
only choice Brazil has, something that Lula, at least, seems ready to 
accept. Such a move has profound implications, in terms of diplomatic 
and military capabilities, but also, and perhaps more fundamentally, in 
symbolic terms. As China and India have discovered, after Russia, 
Japan and especially the US, membership to the Club comes with a 
price: hegemonies, global or regional, are not liked; they are at best 
tolerated, at worse deeply hated. As Brazil consolidates its position in 
South America, it will need to shed its self-image of a benign giant 
and see itself through others’ eyes: a self-interested power seeker, a 
member of the Club, resented and feared by outsiders, accepted and 
relied upon by its members.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Lula’s election, precisely because it led neither to significant policy 
changes nor to political instability, represents a major breakthrough 
for Brazilian foreign policy. It created the conditions for Brazil’s suc-
cessfully claiming of a place, for the first time, among the few domi-
nant global powers.  
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Beyond the specifics of an hyperactive foreign policy, one can de-
tect in Brazilian foreign policy patterns that are consistent with the 
behaviour of such powers. The most striking one is the opportunistic 
resort to international rules and regimes: when existing arrangements 
suit one, they are fully used; when they don’t, their rules and princi-
ples are strongly contested and if necessary, violated. International 
norms and regimes now appear purely as instruments to be used or 
ditched as befit circumstances. Long – apparently? – a principled re-
gionalist, multi-lateralist and non-interventionist, Brazil has now be-
come a tactical one. Mercosur is the right lever in some negotiations, 
the G-20 or IBSA in others, and the G-5 (with other Security Council 
hopefuls) in still others. China is the right ally on some issues, South 
Africa, Venezuela or Chile on others, and the United States, France 
and Russia on still others. Non-intervention is a fundamental principle 
one day at one place, a relative one the week after or somewhere else. 
Such calculating behaviour is not, as such, bad or good. It is the 
mark of those who can adopt it, and get away with it. It is the mark of 
a global power. Brazil’s full membership in the club might not yet be 
perfectly clear, especially to Brazil’s own political and diplomatic 
elites. This is why so much of its foreign policy remains wrapped in a 
South-centred, dependency-laced rhetoric. Soon enough, however, 
prodded in no small measure by denunciations from its closest 
neighbours, Brazil’s foreign policy will discover that its fate lies not in 
“leading” the periphery but, in more than one way, in leaving it.  
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Marcos Antonio Macedo Cintra 
Successes and Limits of Brazilian  
Macroeconomic Policy in the Period 1999-2004 
From January 1999 the Brazilian administration supported both by the 
international and the domestic financial community, together with the 
IMF, formulated a macroeconomic policy based on three pillars: a) a 
floating exchange rate and free capital mobility for the adjustment of 
external accounts; b) high real interest rates to ensure the achievement 
of inflation targets; c) increasing primary surplus to constrain public 
sector indebtedness. This macroeconomic model has proved to be able 
to bring forth economic cycles by following expansion and retraction 
movements in world trade and liquidity. However, it has not suc-
ceeded in putting the country back on a path to social and economic 
development. This path is meant as a consistent expansion of invest-
ments, especially higher and long-term ones (such as those in infra-
structure or heavy industry) or riskier ones (such as those with high 
technological content), along with employment increase, wage in-
creases and improved income distribution. 
This paper supports the thesis that exchange, monetary and fiscal 
policies with free capital mobility are contradictory and contribute to 
obstructing sustained growth, the elimination of external vulnerability, 
the tackling of infrastructure constraints, and the expansion of social 
expenditure. The paper is divided into four sections. The first part 
deals with the external account adjustment and the possible impacts of 
exchange rate valuation as from mid-2004 on. The second section 
analyses how inappropriate the inflation target policy is under domes-
tic pricing conditions. The third part describes the fiscal policy role, 
an adjustment variable of the macroeconomic model, since it bears the 
impacts of exchange rate and monetary policies. Final considerations 
outline possible alternative policies as an attempt to dismantle the 
vicious circle of the macroeconomic model with financial liberaliza-
tion. 
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1. Floating Exchange Rate and External Adjustment 
The three devaluation shocks of the Brazilian currency during this 
period (1999, 2001, and 2002) made possible a pronounced adjust-
ment of external accounts (see Chart 1 and 2). The balance of trade 
skyrocketed from a US$ 6.6 billion deficit in 1998 to a US$ 33.7 bil-
lion surplus in 2004. This resulted in a reversion in the current account 
balance from a US$ 33.4 billion deficit to an US$ 11.7 billion surplus. 
In 2004 the recovery in commodity prices – which rose by 17.5% on 
average – and the growth of 23.4% in manufacturing exports led to a 
higher trade balance despite an increase in imports. Encouraged by an 
extremely favorable international conjuncture, including 18% growth 
in world trade, low inflation rates, and near-zero or negative real in-
terest rates in major developed countries, Brazilian exports reached 
the level of US$ 96.5 billion. 
 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Time Series (Séries Temporais <http://www. 
bancocentral.gov.br>). 
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Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Time Series (Séries Temporais <http://www. 
bancocentral.gov.br>). 
The dynamism of the agribusiness (soya, meat, wood and its byprod-
ucts, sugar and alcohol, paper and cellulose etc.) along with the ex-
pansion of the agricultural frontier, genetic improvements sponsored 
by the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa), and 
world economic growth was one of the factors which most contrib-
uted for the export boom. The agribusiness trade surplus totaled 
US$ 34.1 billion in 2004. It corresponds to a 32.1% growth when 
compared to the figures from the previous year. Another relevant fac-
tor was a change in strategies adopted by foreign corporations in the 
country: either their direct participation in foreign trade by exporting 
higher technological content products and in faster growing areas, or 
their association to or acquisition of local companies which stimulated 
reaction from Brazilian corporations (Baer/Cintra 2004). 
Foreign direct investment reached US$ 32.8 billion in 2000. It 
played a relevant role in the consolidation of external accounts, espe-
cially at moments of high levels of risk aversion in the international 
financial markets (see Chart 2). First, foreign corporations attempted 
to explore the potential growth in the domestic market. Only a few 
export strategies went beyond regional integration. An example is the 
automotive industry, in view of the constitution of the Mercosur 
(Southern Cone Common Market). Faced with persistent frustration 
with the poor performance of the Brazilian economy and the exchange 
rate devaluation, foreign corporations started to adopt a more active 
export strategy through expansion to new markets and redistribution 
of production lines among transnational affiliates. In a few cases the 
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domestic market scale and/or specialization derived from the dynam-
ics of the domestic market also implied export activities, including the 
field of higher technological content products. Thus, there was sales 
expansion in higher aggregate value manufactures, such as automobile 
parts, chassis, vehicles, tractors, planes, machinery, furniture, electro-
electronic products, pumps etc.1 
In sum, exporting efforts were combined not only with the oppor-
tunity to use idle productive capacity, but also with economies of 
scale, productivity increase, and some sort of technological catch-up. 
In addition to synergic gains, access to new markets and improve-
ments in distribution systems, exports by (foreign and domestic) cor-
porations have resulted in higher revenue in foreign currency, repre-
senting a hedge mechanism able to guarantee parts and components 
imports and the payment of foreign debts, and to reduce dependence 
on new loans abroad, since it contributes to an improved risk rating 
and opens up external credit lines in more favorable conditions. Fi-
nally, exports have become strategic for foreign and domestic compa-
nies. 
The total foreign debt dropped from US$ 241.5 billion in 1999 to 
US$ 220.2 billion in December 2004 (see Table 1). This movement 
has been led by long- and short-term private debt which fell from 
US$ 140.8 billion to US$ 105.5 billion as a result of corporate deci-
sions to reduce liabilities in foreign currency. This posture, especially 
from those companies which do not manufacture tradable goods, is 
                                                     
1  Furtado (2004: 4) supports that: “it can be stated that the Brazilian industrial 
fortress rests on metal-mechanics, which ranges from natural resources (minera-
tion) to iron and steel industry (natural resources and scale), and then mechanics 
(and a broad range of electrical equipment which can be classified in this type) to 
which different manufacturing processes are joined. Brazil built up solid posi-
tions in these sectors. […] Brazil has demonstrated itself to be competitive in 
mechanical and electrical equipment segments, both at a large/small scale and 
manufactured to order. Many of these companies export production shares larger 
than those of leading companies in the agroindustrial complex. In the Brazilian 
metal-mechanics industry there is already an element which was previously un-
known in these activities and in most industries: an export-oriented plant”. 
Transport materials industries (US$ 16 billion, 16.6% out of the total) and metal-
lurgic products (US$ 10.3 billion, 10.7% out of the total) have been leading ex-
ports, followed by the soy bean complex (US$ 10 billion, 10.4% out of the total) 
and meat (US$ 6.2 billion, 6.4% out of the total). The signing of trade agree-
ments with Chile and Mexico also helped promote sales of trucks, buses, and  
agricultural machinery. 
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associated with the perception of higher instability in global financial 
markets, exchange rate volatility, and precariousness of exchange rate 
hedge as a result of the reduced offer of exchange rate indexed public 
bonds. As a counterpart, the external public debt rose from US$ 100 
billion to US$ 114.7 billion. The reduction in debt stock favored an 
improvement in different external indicators of the Brazilian econ-
omy, such as interest payments/exports, debt service/exports, foreign 
debt/GNP, foreign debt/exports etc. (Prates 2004). However, antici-
pated amortizations totalling US$ 41 billion in 2005 and US$ 31 bil-
lion in 2006 maintain the need for high external funding. This requires 
the continuity of a policy for reduced dependence from extremely 
volatile international capital flows, since they are subject to euphoric 
and depressive moods. 
 
Table 1: Total foreign debt by debtor (US$ millions) 
Description 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Medium- and long-run  
   debt 
199.001 189.500 182.276 187.316 194.736 182.630 
   Non financial public  
   sector 
97.364 87.780 92.755 110.310 119.785 114.712 
   Financial private and  
   public sector 
101.637 99.720 89.521 77.005 74.950 67.918 
Short-run debt 26.609 27.420 27.658 23.395 20.194 18.744 
   Non financial public  
   sector 
3.318 2.578 427 110 11 1 
   Financial private and  
   public sector 
23.291 24.842 27.231 23.285 20.183 18.743 
Total foreign debt (A)2/ 225.610 216.921 209.934 210.711 214.930 201.375 
Intercompanies loans (B) 15.859 19.236 16.133 16.978 20.484 18.808 
Total foreign debt plus 
intercompanies loans 
(C=A+B) 
241.468 236.156 226.067 227.689 235.414
 
220.183 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Press release – external Sector, January 2005. 
Note: 1/ Excludes principal stock relative to intercompanies loans. It considers a 
revision in indebtedness position as from March 2001. 
 
The domestic interest rate increase as from September 2004, along 
with open capital accounts and a floating exchange rate, triggered 
rapid short-term capital inflows, which sought to make arbitrage 
among interest rates – while the US federal funds rate was 2.25% per 
year in December 2004, the Selic rate reached 17.75% per year – by 
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appreciating the Brazilian currency (see Chart 1). On the one hand, the 
currency overvaluation acts as an auxiliary mechanism for inflation 
control. Thus, it helps to achieve the 2005 inflation target. On the 
other hand, it jeopardizes the consistent increase in both trade and 
current account surpluses which helps stabilize the balance of pay-
ments and constrains foreign vulnerability. The currency overvalua-
tion forced the Central Bank and the Treasury to buy international 
reserves at the spot market, as well as to intervene in the derivative 
market (Bolsa de Mercadorias & Futuros, BM&F). It is estimated that 
US$ 7 billion were purchased on the exchange market from December 
2004 to January 2005. Net international reserves (excluding IMF re-
sources) rose to US$ 29 billion in early February 2005. However, 
reserve purchasing has an impact on the public debt stock if the Cen-
tral Bank decides to sterilize them, and/or on domestic liquidity (and 
therefore the GNP growth rate), if it decides for a non-sterilization 
policy. The first alternative proves to be contradictory to one of the 
macroeconomic policy goals, i.e. to reduce the net public debt-GNP 
ratio; the second alternative is contradictory to the pursuit of an infla-
tion target. The Central Bank chose the sterilization of the domestic 
currency by partially reversing efforts for public debt reduction during 
2004 in order to limit an excessive valuation of the Real. 
Despite the successful exporting strategy, Brazilian exports are 
still concentrated on agricultural and industrial commodities charac-
terized by high price and volume volatility. This fact makes exports 
strongly dependent on the dynamics of the international economy. 
Under these circumstances, a real exchange rate favoring exports and 
import replacement becomes crucial for a sustainable path to the Bra-
zilian economy. The appreciation of the Real combined with excessive 
exchange rate volatility may jeopardize the creation of expectations 
favorable to productive investment, particularly the export-oriented 
one. Thus, the appreciation of the Real threatens the sustainability of 
the dynamic export sector in the forthcoming years and makes it diffi-
cult to consolidate external adjustment. The constraint of short-term 
inflationary pressures associated with the prolonged and expressive 
currency valuation does not seem to offset the risk of future external 
imbalance. 
 
Brazilian Macroeconomic Policy in the Period 1999-2004 85
2. Interest Rates and Inflation Targets 
In June 1999, after the currency crisis started on 13 January, an 
institutional framework was conceived for monetary policy: the 
inflation target regime. This policy aimed to replace the exchange rate 
as an anchor, which was effective during the first phase of the Real 
Plan (1994-1998) for a system which was able to affect the demand 
level and expectations of economic agents by means of simple and 
automatic interest rate management rules. The Brazilian inflation 
target regime was established as follows: 
– the Extended Consumer Price Index (IPCA) calculated by the 
IBGE Foundation has been selected as the price index to deter-
mine the achievement of an inflation target, not excluding more 
unstable prices; 
– the inflation target would bear a variable tolerance interval up- 
and downwards (initially 2%, then 2.5%, and again reduced to 2% 
in 2006); 
– targets and tolerance intervals would be set by the National Mone-
tary Council (CMN)2 a year and a half in advance, for instance, 
the target (4.5%) and the tolerance interval (2%) for 2006 were set 
in July 2004; 
– the chosen target should be achieved over a calendar year (twelve 
months); 
– the Central Bank conducts an opinion survey with market analysts 
(Boletim Focus released on the Central Bank homepage every 
Monday) to gain expectations of so-called “rational agents”. It 
represents one of the major parameters for monetary policy deci-
sion-making (see Chart 3). In this regime, the chief monetary pol-
icy tool is the short-term interest rate (Selic) – because of antici-
pated inflation and the output gap3 – in order to make the index 
price converge with the target previously set (Farhi 2004: 82). 
                                                     
2  Members of the CMN are the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Planning and 
the Central Bank President. 
3  A output gap is defined as the difference between the “potential output” and the 
economy’s actual output. The “potential output” would correspond to the achiev-
able production level without any mismatch between supply and demand, thus 
not causing any price raise. The inflation target “model” of the Central Bank 
would be supposedly based on a production function where the “potential output” 
could not exceed GDP growth limit of 3.5%. 
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Inflation remained within the tolerance limits in 1999 and 2000 and 
exceeded them in the following years, especially in 2002 and 2003.4 
The inflation acceleration was basically determined by the supply 
shock represented by the currency devaluation and its dissemination 
mechanisms. These implied higher price indexes in late 2002, during 
the election of President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva (see Chart 3 and 1). 
Indexed prices made it difficult to reduce the inflation rate. With the 
recovery of economic growth at international and domestic levels in 
2004, agricultural and industrial commodities experienced a price 
increase shock and profit margins of corporations had little relative 
room for recovery. Nonetheless, the inflation rate remained within the 
tolerance limits. 
Thus, the peculiar Brazilian framework of pricing caused the ex-
change rate devaluation and/or other exogenous supply shocks (agri-
cultural commodity prices, oil, iron etc.) to affect most prices of goods 
and services. The strict target regime became inadequate, since only 
non-controlled price behaviour proved to be sensitive to short-term 
interest rate movements. Tradable goods prices – comprising the ex-
ports – are directly impacted by exogenous shocks such as an increase 
in international prices of commodities and semi-manufactured goods. 
Some segments, especially commodities (soya or paper pulp), manage 
to adjust internal prices which are equivalent to the currency parity. 
These sectors became insensitive to the interest rate, for they can par-
tially reduce their production share of the domestic market or even 
export their whole production to foreign markets. 
Government-regulated prices (comprised by services in their ma-
jority) are also affected by the exchange rate, but not by the interest 
rate. For instance, agreements for privatization of telecommunications 
and electricity distribution companies define yearly tariff adjustments 
based on the General Price Index – Market (IGP-M). This index 
strongly influ ences wholesale prices and it is very sensitive to supply 
shocks.5 Therefore, the yearly adjustment scheme of administered 
                                                     
4  Core inflation targets were: 8% in 1999, 6% in 2000, 4% in 2001, 3.5% in 2002, 
4% in 2003 – however, it was later adjusted to 8.5% due to its unrealistic esti-
mate –, 5.5% in 2004, and finally 4.5% in 2005 (see Chart 3). 
5  This index is calculated by the Getulio Vargas Foundation. It is calculated from 
the weighted average of: the Wholesale Price Index (IPA-M) corresponding to 
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goods based on the IGP-M accrued in past twelve months created an 
important vector of inflationary inertia and a pass-through of currency 
devaluation, and other exogenous shocks, on domestic prices. Goods 
of which prices are government-monitored are also insensitive to in-
terest rates for their own adjustment mechanisms. 
 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Inflation Target System (Sistema de Metas para a 
Inflação <http://www.bancocentral.gov.br>). 
 
As to non-tradable goods prices (in the domestic market), they adjust 
themselves to the aggregate demand caused by the interest rates in-
crease by means of the reduction of (wage) costs and profit margins. 
Nevertheless, these prices account for just one third of IPCA – 
adopted as the reference index to determine and to calculate the infla-
tion target – whereas the aggregate share of tradable and administered 
goods reaches approx. 69%. Therefore, the monetary policy needs to 
be extremely restrictive to constrain the demand, so that a price reduc-
tion in the non-tradable goods sector and in a few segments of the 
tradable goods sector offsets the adjustments of government-regulated 
prices and some tradable goods insensitive to interest rate variations. 
During this period, the short-term real interest rate (Selic), less the 
accrued inflation of the previous twelve months, consistently re-
mained at a nearly 10% level except for the year 2003 (see Chart 4). 
A overly short-term horizon for the achievement of the target 
(twelve months) also contributed to maintaining a restrictive monetary 
policy. This fact had a negative impact on growth, employment, in-
                                                                                                                  
60%, the Consumer Price Index (IPC-M) corresponding to 30% and the National 
Cost-of-Construction Index (INCC-M) corresponding to 10%. 
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vestment recovery, as well as on the evolution of public debt stock, 
despite continuous and increasing fiscal surpluses. 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Inflation Target System (Sistema de Metas para a 
Inflação <http://www.bancocentral.gov.br>). 
 
In addition to these limitations of the inflation targeting regime as-
sociated with a peculiar pricing mechanism, the slight signs of recov-
ery of consumers’ purchasing power fostered the consumption-credit 
market in 2004 and reduced the efficacy of the high interest rate pol-
icy in the short run. First, the banking system extended loan terms as a 
result of increased confidence in debtors’ solvency (individuals or 
corporations). In this scenario, the gradual Selic rate increase is offset 
by a term extension of consumer loans which keeps instalments al-
most constant. Secondly, the securitization of receivables was con-
solidated with the economic expansion and sales growth, leading to 
increased corporate liquidity. Thirdly, credit expansion by means of 
payroll check discount made possible the entry of new consumers into 
the market, such as retirees and those who managed to refinance their 
debt (overdraft protection agreement, for instance) for this credit mo-
dality, and to later expand their consumption. Fourthly, the strategic 
partnership between retail corporations and the financial sector – Pão 
de Açúcar-Itaú, Panashop-HSBC, and Casas Bahia-Bradesco – in-
creased the potential commitment of retailers to consumption credit 
and stimulated sales (Barros/Baer 2004). In spite of these innovations 
in the consumption credit segment the Brazilian loans volume remains 
extremely low, i.e. approx. 26.3% of GDP in December 2004, marked 
Chart 4 - Reference Interest Rate (SELIC) and Inflation (IPCA)
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by short maturity and extremely high interest rates. This makes the 
current banking system unfit for economic development funding.6 
The inflation measured by IPCA should converge with the 5.1% 
adjusted target7 in 2005. Market analysts, however, still estimate an 
inflation rate of approx. 6%. Thus, the Monetary Policy Committee 
(Copom) of the Central Bank started to raise the short-term interest 
rate in September 2004 in order to slow down growth (from 5.2% in 
2004 to approx. 3.5% in 2005).8 This perpetuates the low and discon-
tinuous growth evidenced by the Brazilian economy since the 1980s 
(see Chart 5). In this scenario, the private sector continues to show 
low levels of investment rates (18% of GDP in 2003), especially in the  
Source: IBGE Foundation <http://www.ibge.gov.br>. 
 
domestic market-oriented industries, despite a relative amplification of 
the investment rate in 2004. Major obstacles to investments result 
from uncertainties regarding the economy’s prospects associated with 
                                                     
6  The credit-GDP ratio was 37% in 1995. See Cardim de Carvalho (2005). Accord-
ing to the Central Bank in December 2004 average interest rates on loans were 
31% per year to the corporate sector and 61.5% per year to individuals. 
7  In 23 September 2004 the Monetary Policy Committee (Copom) decided to adopt 
a 5.1% adjusted target for 2005 since it seemed unrealistic to pursue the 4.5% tar-
get. 
8  Such deceleration will not necessarily lead to a recession, although the GDP 
growth rate fell to 0.4% in the forth quarter of 2004. As the current levels of in-
ternational liquidity persist, along with low interest rates in major markets, and 
the world trade growth rate reaches approx. 21% per year, the dynamism of the 
Brazilian economy may proceed at approx. 3,5%, despite the macroeconomic 
policy and infrastructure bottlenecks. In this case, a longer cycle may prevail in 
the following two or three years, but with low growth rates. However, it is appar-
ently not enough to foster the social and economic development of the country. 
Chart 5 - GDP and Gross Domestic Investment Variation Rate
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structural factors (external vulnerability, high public debt stock, high 
interest rates), amplified by the excessively orthodox management of 
the macroeconomic policy. As long as there is no evidence of sus-
tained economic growth, chances for a new private investment cycle 
are apparently poor. Frustration with the domestic market expansion 
potential is still very strong in investors’ minds. Under these circum-
stances, investments have been determined by very solid comparative 
advantages, such as in the agribusiness (soya, meat, paper and cellu-
loses etc.); the competition dynamics which require continuous in-
vestment, for instance, in telecommunications and retailer distribution; 
international price behaviour (mining, iron metallurgy and petrochem-
icals). Furthermore, the squeezing of some production chains and the 
investment stagnation caused bottlenecks in the supply chain. These 
bottlenecks can only be solved through higher expenditures in the 
development of new capacities, which demand proper policies for 
credit provision, trade and technological innovation. The development 
of competitive advantages requires state policies which are able to 
sustain higher investment rates in relation to GDP and, simultane-
ously, to bypass balance-of-payment constraints through an acceler-
ated expansion of net exports (Resende 2004). Needless to say, these 
policies are antagonistic to the current policies based on inflation tar-
get, currency valuation, and fiscal surpluses. 
In sum, concentrated market structures capable of transferring in-
ternational price changes, high indexation levels, and a consumption-
oriented credit market forced significant relative price changes. These 
changes lead to higher inflation rates in an economy like the Brazilian 
one, without necessarily causing a price rise in every sector.9 Never-
theless, the inflation targeting system governing the monetary policy 
decision-making determines the maintenance of real interest rates at 
approx. 10% per year. This combination of inflation targeting regime 
and floating exchange rate subject to great fluctuations proved to be 
extremely perverse and led to recurrent stop and go cycles. It has also 
made sustainable growth difficult by discouraging investment, with 
negative impact on the public debt and the employment rate. 
                                                     
9  Cf. Fraga et al. (2003): “the volatility of all variables – inflation, exchange rate, 
output, and interest rate – and the inflation level are higher in emerging econo-
mies in comparison with those observed in developed economies”. 
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3. Fiscal Surplus and Reduction of Public Indebtedness 
In the beginning of the Real Plan the financial status of the Brazilian 
public sector was very good. The previous administration had con-
ducted a huge budget and public indebtedness adjustment. A primary 
surplus of 2.6% of the GDP was observed and the public sector net 
debt was relatively reduced in relation to GDP in 1993 (Belluzzo/ 
Almeida 2002). Nonetheless, during the first phase of the Real Plan 
(1994-1998), the federal administration unloaded the burden of the 
monetary policy and later that of the exchange devaluation on the 
public sector as a whole. The public debt stock and interest payment 
rose dramatically. In the period 1994-1997, the net capital inflow led 
to an expansion of foreign liabilities and of Central Bank reserves. 
The monetary sterilization policy implemented by the Central Bank 
led to a domestic public debt increase. During the phase of net capital 
outflow, the reserve dropdown was followed by an interest rate rise. 
This fact made debt service grow and determined a rapid increase in 
the net public debt-GDP ratio (see Chart 6). These factors were re-
sponsible for steadily feeding the net debt, and not excessive public 
expenditures. Therefore, the domestic public debt evolution bears a 
phenomenon of financial and monetary nature with certain serious 
fiscal implications.  
 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Time Series – (Séries Temporais <http://www. 
bancocentral.gov.br>). 
 
Chart 6 - Net Debt of the Public Sector (% GDP)
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Finally, monetary and exchange policies in a context of finance liber-
alization resulted in higher fiscal and financial fragilty in the public 
sector. Since a large amount of the debt was indexed to the short-term 
interest rate (Selic) and to the exchange rate, its stock was extremely 
volatile. The attempt to reduce the net public debt in relation to the 
GDP – converted into a goal together with the IMF – made fiscal pol-
icy implementation perverse. By means of high interest rates, low 
GDP growth rates, and a floating exchange rate, the strategy of reduc-
ing public debt started to require increasing primary surpluses10 and, 
therefore, a relative squeezing of social expenditures and an absolute 
squeezing of public infrastructure investments. 
After IMF resource inflow in November 1998 the primary balance 
of public accounts at three federative levels of government – federal, 
state, and local – became one of the macroeconomic policy priori-
ties.11 In order to establish a pattern of budget balance at all levels of 
government – Federation, States and municipalities – different pro-
grams were implemented: the Incentive Program for the Reduction of 
the State Public Sector in Banking Activities (Circular No 2.742 dd. 
1997 issued by the Central Bank), Program for Support and Restruc-
turing of State Fiscal Adjustment (Law Nº 9.496 dd. 11 September 
1997) followed by the Fiscal Responsibility Law (Supplementary 
Law No 101 dd. 4 May 2000) and the Law on Fiscal Crimes (Law 
No 10.028 dd. 19 October 2000). 
The fiscal adjustment aimed at increasing revenues and decreasing 
expenditures to save resources for the achievement of fiscal surplus 
and public debt reduction targets. The domestic tax burden rose from 
29.33% to 34.01% of GDP corresponding to a 4.68% increase in the 
period 1998-2003. Afonso/Araújo (2005: 7, 20) showed that the taxa-
tion increase “has not resulted in an equal variation in expenditures on 
goods and services by the public sector”. The government demand 
dropped from 21.93% in 1998 to 21.59% of GDP in 2003 and invest-
ment expenditures fell from 2.8% to 1.7% of GDP in this same period. 
Resources were partially allocated for payment of social benefits (in-
come transfers). However, its majority was allocated for payment of 
                                                     
10  Fiscal surplus targets were increased from 2.8% in 1999 to 3.5% in 2001; 3.75% 
in 2002; 4.25% in 2003; and 4.5% in 2004. 
11  Since then the Brazilian government has signed four agreements with the IMF 
totalling US$ 80.1 billion and has drawn US$ 58 billion (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Agreements signed between the Brazilian government and the IMF 
 1998 
(a) 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
(b) 
2006 
(b) 
2007 
(b) 
Total 
Loans 
US billion 19,9 - - 18,5 26,2 15,5 - - - - 80,1 
Drawn Value 
US$ billion 14,4 - - 17,4 26,2 0     58,0 
Drafts 
US$ millions 
5.212 6.783 0 8.044 18.709 19.260 0    58.000 
Paid interests  
US$ millions 
 517 389 159 550 1.189 1.244 1.196 627 279 6.150 
Source: International Monetary Fund 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/tre/tad/exfin2. cfm?memberKey1=90&date1Key=2005%2D01%2D31>. 
Notes: a) Brazil received funding from other international organisms along with IMF loans totalling US$ 41.5 billion;  
b) An estimate. 
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the public debt service of which interest rates rose from 5.19% to 
7.77% of GDP. 
In fact, since 1996 the Brazilian public sector has disbursed inter-
est payments of approx. 7% of GDP, except for 1997, when it dropped 
to 5% of GDP, and during crises in 1999 and early 2003 when it rose 
to 15% of GDP (see Chart 7). Not only exchange and monetary poli-
cies immobilized fiscal policy, but also implied a transfer of increas-
ing interests to creditors. This fact deteriorated domestic income dis-
tribution (the richest 10% population absorb 44% of the domestic 
income whereas the poorest 10% absorb just 1%). 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Time Series – (Séries Temporais <http://www. 
bancocentral.gov.br>. 
 
The Federation, States, municipalities, and state-run companies 
achieved a primary surplus (revenues less expenditures, excluding 
interest payments) of 81 billion Reals during 2004. This value corre-
sponds to 4.6% of GDP above the target set by the government (4.5%) 
and above that agreed with the IMF (4.25%). This primary result was 
enough to pay 63% of interests which reached 128.3 billion Reals that 
year corresponding to 7.3% of GDP (see Chart 7). Thus, the public 
sector nominal deficit was 47.1 billion Reals corresponding to 2.7% of 
GDP. The net debt stock of the public sector rose from R$ 913.1 bil-
lion in December 2003 to R$ 957 billion in December 2004. Nonethe-
less, the public debt-GDP ratio fell from 57.2% to 51.8% in this same 
period (see Chart 6). This 5.4 percentage point drop interrupted an 
uptrend observed since 1995. However, it implied neither any im-
provements in the funding framework of the Brazilian state, nor a 
route to public debt sustainability in the medium run (three to five 
Chart 7 - Interest Payments and Primary Result (accrued in 12 months, as a 
percentage of the GDP)
-2
0
2 
4
6
8
10
12
14
16 
May-95 May-96 May-97 May-98 May-99 May-00 May-01 May-02 May-03 May-04
Interest Payments  Primary Result
Brazilian Macroeconomic Policy in the Period 1999-2004 95
years), despite the generation of high and increasing primary sur-
pluses. Crucial factors for explaining this performance were the eco-
nomic growth estimated at 5.25, a lower interest rate in the period 
April-August 2004 (stable at 16% per year), and the currency appre-
ciation along with fiscal restriction.12 
Some improvements have been observed in the debt management: 
exchange rate-indexed bonds declined from 20.5% of total in Decem-
ber 2003 to 9.3% in December 2004; Selic post-fixed bonds fell from 
55.5% to 54% in this same period; and pre-fixed bonds rose from 
11.4% to 19%. This facilitated the monetary policy management. 
Nevertheless, despite efforts made by authorities, the relationship 
between the Central Bank and the banking system has changed little 
concerning public bond liquidity and turnover.13 These assets kept 
their basic feature of a quasi-currency (transactions concentrated in 
extremely short terms) and the average maturation of bonds issued by 
the Central Bank was 15.8 months and that of bonds issued by the 
Treasury was 11.2 months in December 2004. Therefore, a flight risk 
against the Real resulting from any foreign disturbance remained la-
tent. 
In addition to the restricting character of the fiscal policy, an in-
creasing sacrifice in public investment is observed. Its lowest level 
since 1984 was recorded in the period 2003-2004. The Treasury – sup-
ported by “technical” arguments found in the IMF agreement – pur-
sues an increasing fiscal surplus and restricts infrastructure expendi-
tures. This represents a hindrance to tackling economic infrastructure 
bottlenecks: a precarious road network, insufficient railway capacity, 
port saturation, difficulties in expanding electricity generation and 
basic sanitation systems. However, infrastructure expansion represents 
one of the major requirements for ensuring sustained growth. Consid-
ering the sector nature – long maturation term and uncertain imple-
mentation costs, extensive capital requirements and amortization pe-
                                                     
12  Prospects for 2005 do not seem very optimistic. These factors shall be less favor-
able except for the exchange rate. The reference interest rate has been rising since 
September 2004 and a GDP deceleration is estimated at approx. 3.5%. A relevant 
discussion on the domestic public debt renegotiation (80% of the GDP) is beyond 
the scope of this paper. As an example see Carvalho (2005). 
13  It is still too early to evaluate impacts of a change in taxation rules of investment 
funds according to their maturation period effective since early 2005. 
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riod, low economic return, environmental risks – the expansion of 
these investments shall be conducted without the decisive participa-
tion of the public sector. This is a contradiction in view of the current 
magnitude of the interest rate and fiscal surplus.14 
The clearly regressive fiscal policy and successive fiscal adjust-
ments have not even allowed compensatory policies to struggle 
against unemployment, social scarcity (education, healthcare, land 
reform etc.) and to tackle poverty problems. Sustained economic 
growth emerges as a necessary condition for facing these matters by 
means of employment expansion, wage recovery, and further taxation 
(Salm 2005). In 2004 growth recovery led to a decrease in the unem-
ployment rate of the economically active population from 13.1% in 
April to 9.6% in December (see Chart 8). Precarious labor conditions 
increased in metropolitan areas despite this unemployment rate drop. 
The number of employees working 40 hours a week and earning less 
than a minimum wage was 2.7 million in December 2004 according to 
the Employment Monthly Survey by IBGE. This figure was 2 million 
in March 2002. Seven hundred and twenty thousand people were 
added to the number of underpaid employees corresponding to 36% 
(Soares 2005). Thus, the ratio between underpaid workers and total 
workers rose from 8.7% to 14% in the same period. This increase in 
underpaid employees represents the most perverse face of workers’ 
real average income decline. It dropped consecutively for the seventh 
year (see Chart 9). Accrued income losses reached 18.8% in the pe-
riod 1996-2003. 
 
 
                                                     
14  Some sectors support the participation of private capital in developing a physical 
infrastructure in the country in view of funding and fiscal restrictions in the pub-
lic sector which limits its investment capacity. Nevertheless, private capital re-
quires the establishment of a secure legal environment with reduced risks to per-
forming infrastructure investments. This is the reason behind the debate on the 
role of Regulatory Agencies, the Bankruptcy Law, and the Public-Private Sector 
Partnership. However, the existence of a stable legal environment does not ex-
clude the conflict between investments in limited or uncertain profitability fields 
and the high level of the real interest rate. It remains an obstacle to expanding  
infrastructure expenditures. The historic experience seems to suggest that the  
recovery of such investments, even in partnerships with the private sector, re-
quires the structuring of coordination and support mechanisms (credit, tax) as 
well as long-term economic prospects (Biasoto 2004). 
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Source: IBGE Foundation – Monthly Employment Survey (a new methodology since 
March 2002) <http://www.ibge.gov.br>. 
 
Source: IBGE Foundatin – National Household Sample Survey <http://www. 
ibge.gov.br>. 
Note: This survey was not conducted in the years of 1994 and 2000. 
 
Although the labor market has shown a recovery – new positions and 
formal employment –, the economic recovery did not reflect an aver-
age increase in purchasing power. This means that new positions paid 
lower wages. Moreover, more members of the same family had to find 
a job as an attempt to offset the income loss by the head of the family. 
This phenomenon helps explain the increase in underpaid workers, 
since these people tend to accept lower waged-jobs and frequently 
poorer work conditions. According to the IBGE survey the majority of 
this group is comprised of women, non-white workers and those with-
out a formal contract or self-employed ones (young and elderly peo-
ple). Unfortunately, this mismatch between the income and occupation 
evolution shall not be relieved, because the Central Bank promotes a 
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deceleration in productive activities by means of interest rate increase 
to achieve the inflation target. This restricts any prospects in increas-
ing workers’ employment and income. 
The persistent stop-and-go dynamics amplifies the obstacles to re-
versing the picture on social exclusion which is aggravated not only 
by poor economic growth, but also by changes imposed by the mod-
ernization of the productive structure itself as a consequence of the 
dismantling of institutions of the so-called “wage society” – increase 
in insecure work contracts, non-affiliation to trade unions, subcon-
tracting, employment deindustrialization, growth in personal ser-
vices –, as well as extremely low wages. Under these circumstances, 
poverty and social exclusion affect larger and larger portions of the 
working class. 
In conclusion, financial liberalization and IMF rules force an in-
creasing fiscal surplus to pay the public indebtedness (foreign and 
domestic) which perpetuates the financial fragility of the public sector 
and hinders infrastructure funding and expansion of social expendi-
tures. The macroeconomic model makes it very hard, if not impossi-
ble, for the implementation of an autonomous fiscal policy which 
characterizes a modern public sector able to sustain and foster an ex-
pansion in income, employment, physical infrastructure, universaliza-
tion of public policies, and income redistribution. 
 
4. Final Considerations 
There is an intense debate over the improvement of the macroeco-
nomic model in the country. The flexibilization of strict inflation tar-
gets is suggested by adopting stable targets and not declining ones 
over time, the extension of terms to achieve them, the pursue of a core 
target and not the full index, and so on. These changes would allow a 
lower real interest rate, and reduce the deleterious effects on produc-
tion, employment, investments, public debt stock, and exchange rate. 
As to the elevated fiscal surplus targets, the IMF itself signaled a 
US$ 1 billion-drop per year in the primary surplus for the period 
2005-2007 in order to make possible infrastructure investment pro-
jects (roads, ports etc.) approved by its supervisory team. Lower real 
interest rates and further public investments would sustain economic 
growth and meet expectations of public debt solvency (a drop in the 
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net public debt-GDP ratio over time). Finally, the debate on how to 
restrict currency overvaluation considers the introduction of a Finan-
cial Transactions Tax (IOF) on short-term foreign currency transac-
tions to restrict speculative capital inflow attracted by high interest 
rates. Reserve purchase and derivative transactions by the Treasury 
and the Central Bank would be insufficient to constrain the apprecia-
tion of the Brazilian currency with future impacts on the trade balance 
and external adjustment.15 
Finally, in the 1990s, capital account liberalization and financial 
deregulation were defended as policies capable of mitigating income 
and consumption fluctuations in developing countries. The assumption 
was that net foreign capital inflows would foster growth and employ-
ment. The reality proved to be totally different. The emerging econo-
mies – Mexico, Eastern Asia, Russia, Brazil, Turkey, Argentina and 
so on – faced several financial and currency crises since international 
financial markets were subject to liquidity constraint and expansion 
cycles. 
                                                     
15  A former president of the Central Bank, Affonso Celso Pastore, supports the idea 
that the Real has been appreciating with the short-term capital inflow. This may 
both reduce the current account balance and hinder the implementation of the 
monetary policy. Foreign investors amplify the demand for CDI (Interbanking 
Certificate of Deposit) contracts or 180 to 360-day swap contracts at the Futures 
and Goods Stock Exchange (BM&F) by raising their prices and reducing the 
long-term interest rates. Thus, capital movements introduce a distortion into the 
interest rate framework: although the Central Bank raises the short-term interest 
rate, capital inflows reduce the long-term interest rate and weaken the efficacy of 
the monetary policy. The use of the IOF on capital inflows was then suggested 
(Lamucci 2005). The introduction of the IOF does not initially seem enough to 
restrict the excessive valuation of the Real since the appreciation trend has been 
determined by derivative transactions abroad and at the BM&F, i.e. merely vir-
tual transactions, without any movement of net capital inflows. The interruption 
of this speculative movement would require more radical decisions such as: pro-
hibition of derivative transactions at the BM&F by foreign investors; margin rise 
in derivative transactions by reducing their leverage level; forcing banks to im-
pose higher capitalization in foreign currency transactions and derivatives; taxa-
tion of capital gains from speculation and arbitrage against the dollar etc. (Farhi 
2005; Guimarães 2005). Decisions announced by the Central Bank on the eve-
ning of 4th March 2005 signalled the opposite direction, i.e. the full convertibility 
of the Real. The deepening of the Brazilian currency market deregulation facili-
tates foreign currency transactions by domestic and international investors and 
increases safety and speculative and arbitrage movements, both in periods of high 
international liquidity and in periods of high risk aversion. See also Cardim de 
Carvalho/Sicsú (2004). 
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From 1999 on, developing countries started to show current ac-
count surpluses led by Asian and oil-producing countries. Experiences 
in Asian countries (China, Korea, Hong Kong, India, and Thailand) 
seem to show that the achievement of positive trade balances and re-
serve accumulation have enabled technological progress, as well as 
the implementation of laxer monetary policies favoring the expansion 
of domestic credit, production and employment. Reserve accumula-
tion – through high trade balances and non-borrowing of new loans – 
meets the demand for strong currency liquidity and ensures exchange 
rate stability. Finally, the defense of a devaluated exchange rate, cur-
rent account surpluses, and high reserve accumulation has become 
crucial in a world of high capital mobility and asymmetry between 
currencies (Belluzzo/Carneiro 2004). This seems to demonstrate that 
strong national states can accomplish development projects if they 
strengthen their autonomy, i.e. not depending on international finan-
cial markets. 
As a counterpart, developing countries have become net exporters 
of financial resources to developed economies (Cintra/Farhi 2003). 
Developing economies transferred US$ 1.23 trillion in the period 
1998-2004, according to the IMF (2004). Because of risk asymmetry, 
foreign fundraising by these countries pay 3%-4% interest on their 
reserve stocks (invested in T-bonds or in bonds of developed coun-
tries’ corporations). 
Under these circumstances, preventive controls on capital inflows 
and outflows need to return to the economic agenda in order to allow 
more room for manoeuvre in the conduct of domestic macroeconomic 
policies. As pointed out by The Economist (May 3, 2003: 4):  
[…] the global capital market is a turbulent and dangerous place, espe-
cially for poorly developed economies that may be ill-equipped to navi-
gate it. […] for some countries, imposing certain kinds of control on 
capital will be wiser than making no preparations at all.  
This stance survives even in surprising corners. Some IMF representa-
tives came to the conclusion that “there is little evidence that the fi-
nancial integration has helped developing countries stabilize fluctua-
tions in consumption growth” (Prasad et al. 2003). Only industrial 
countries with large domestic financial markets and convertible cur-
rencies benefited from this situation. 
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Other studies, such as that conducted by Epstein et al. (2003) show 
that the countries which continued to control capital flows and the 
exchange rate succeeded in achieving higher growth rates, lower pro-
duction and income fluctuation, and reduced vulnerability in external 
accounts. The most successful countries were Chile, India, Singapore, 
Taiwan, Malaysia, and China. By pursuing this path, the Argentinean 
and Colombian administrations implemented preventive controls on 
short-term capital flows. Capital that was not assigned for direct in-
vestment in companies or foreign trade will have to remain at least 
180 days within the country. The purpose is to prevent an excessive 
appreciation of the domestic currency which jeopardizes exports. 
An IMF report acknowledges that liberalizing reforms imple-
mented by Latin American countries – trade and capital account liber-
alization, deregulation of domestic financial systems, and state reform 
– did not achieve their goals in terms of growth in their gross domestic 
product, their balance of payment, and their public sector. As Singh 
et al. (2005) remark:  
Few countries succeeded in managing the transition – from current ac-
count deficit with fixed exchange rate – , especially in an environment of 
high international capital mobility. [...] The imposition of controls on ca-
pital inflows may have played a role in Chile. 
The Brazilian macroeconomic framework – floating exchange rates, 
high real interest rate, along with decreasing quantitative targets for 
inflation and fiscal surpluses – ensured monetary stability, a tempo-
rary adjustment of external accounts, a relative reduction of the public 
debt, and preservation of financial wealth in the domestic currency 
though in the short term. It is responsible for triggering expansion and 
contraction cycles. However, it does not seem able to foster social and 
economic development by expanding employment, raising real wages, 
and improving income distribution. Based on the Brazilian macroeco-
nomic equation, up to the present moment, there is no historic experi-
ence of sustained development.16 Contrary to common beliefs of con-
ventional theory, the floating exchange rate does not lead to higher 
autonomy in fiscal and monetary policies under conditions of financial 
                                                     
16  The Brazilian experience is not unique. For a criticism of the Chilean model, see 
Valdivia (2004) and Carcanholo (2004); for the Mexican model, see Palma 
(2003). 
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liberalization, high external liabilities and low international reserves. 
Even when the current account deficit is reduced, the floating ex-
change rate does not exclude an exchange risk and the Central Bank is 
still forced to intervene (for appreciation or devaluation). This fact has 
an impact on the public debt stock and requires increasing fiscal sur-
pluses (Carneiro 2004). The use of a restrictive monetary policy to 
mitigate the effects of the floating exchange rate on domestic prices 
also increases the required funding by the public sector. In addition, it 
also increases the opportunity cost for private investments. Finally, the 
perverse relationship between exchange, monetary, and fiscal policies 
govern the stop-and-go behaviour of the GDP and have deleterious 
impacts on employment and income distribution. 
Contrary to the statement by the Minister of Finance Antonio 
Palocci, that “experiments failed in Brazil”, boldness would be re-
quired to interrupt the vicious circle of the “light failure” of the Brazil-
ian economy: even if it does not enter into default, it does not create 
development either. This seems to demand the build-up of an alterna-
tive political coalition – founded on production and labor interests – in 
order to overcome the alliance of creditors which is the basis of the 
Brazilian current political and economic power. 
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Alberto J. Olvera 
The Discourses of Participation and Accountability  
in the International Context  
at the End of the Twentieth Century1 
1. Introduction 
The recent crisis of legitimacy experienced in several Latin American 
democratic countries reflects a transformation of politics (Lechner 
1998) that is the result of the new historical context in which social 
action takes place in the region. First of all, it is necessary to recog-
nize the complex phenomenon of the “decentering of the State”: the 
reduction of the role of the State in the economy and in public life in 
general. Of course, this process is relative, and varies from country to 
country, but it is certain that the spaces the State left vacant are occu-
pied both by the market and by uncivil social actors (interest groups 
with the ability to control economic, social and political spaces), as 
the extreme case of Colombia demonstrates. The process affects many 
countries. It involves a relative separation of the logics of the eco-
nomic, political, social, cultural and legal subsystems. This differen-
tiation is, in the international sphere, a product of globalization and 
neoliberalism and in national spaces, of the maturity and specializa-
tion of markets and of the debilitation of corporativism and of the 
State intervention in the economy. This separation has also resulted in 
the fragmentation of the spaces of social action, both public and 
private. 
                                                     
1  This text is based on research supported by the Ford Foundation by means of the 
project “Programa de Investigación Comparativa y de Formación sobre la Socie-
dad Civil y los Espacios Públicos en América Latina y de Profundización de una 
Agenda de Investigación sobre la Sociedad Civil en México”. In addition, a 
number of the ideas presented here are the result of numerous debates with my 
colleagues Evelina Dagnino and Aldo Panfichi, so the focus, central arguments 
and some of the conclusions should be considered the result of collective work. 
Nevertheless I have sole responsibility for any deficiencies the reader may find in 
this chapter.  
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 Certainly, the social, cultural and moral plurality of society has 
increased at an unprecedented pace, in such a way that multiple identi-
ties are emerging. This greater social pluralization may be accompa-
nied by a relative strengthening of certain sectors of civil society, 
since the new context implies the weakening of certain authoritarian 
social relations and the unfolding of processes of secularization, 
detraditionalization and recognition of differences that give space to 
new types of civil associationism.2 Nevertheless, civil society devel-
ops unequally, with the organization of popular sectors experiencing 
an increasing weakness. In the political sphere, the consequence of 
this situation is what Lechner calls the “decentering and informaliza-
tion” of politics itself. This means that politics as a space for the 
constitution of the state and of the economy, that is to say, as the 
producer of order, is fading and turning into a subsystem that is in-
creasingly self-referring, incapable of recognizing and expressing at 
its core the enormous diversity of the emerging social, cultural and 
political options. In addition, the old ties between social groups, 
parties and governments no longer exist, given the fluidity and multi-
plicity of the groups, the nomadic character of identities and the short-
term strategies of the parties. Politics is also becoming increasingly 
informal, that is to say, it operates outside the institutional realm. 
Paradoxically, it is in this context that discourses, projects and 
practices are emerging that propose a greater participation of society 
in public life, as well as new projects for the emancipation of society 
that address the political and economic subjection provoked by an 
unjust economic system and a political system increasingly closed 
within itself.3 These aspirations and practices lack an integral and 
common project. We are living in a time of searching for new ideas 
and concepts. In recent years, actors as heterogeneous as international 
financial agencies, NGO’s that work on a global scale, Latin Ameri-
can governments, international foundations and a large variety of 
social actors are building a surprisingly common language that hides a 
plurality of meanings and projects. This is the case of the concepts of 
civil society, citizen participation, social capital and others. The 
                                                     
2  I would like to thank Sérgio Costa for having me take note of this process. See 
Costa (2002); Olvera (2003). 
3  About the idea of emancipation, see Santos (2000). 
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different uses of these words establish a wide variety of symbolic and 
conceptual relations with the rights of citizenship and create multiple 
imaginaries about the character of public life.  
In this chapter I take a first look at a type of political project,4 the 
one that emanates from the multilateral development agencies such as 
the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and 
some global NGOs, which has been adopted, at least in discourse, 
bymost Latin American governments. This project is the most visible 
face of the discursive globalization we are experiencing today (Mato 
2004). It does not involve a coherent set of principles and programs, 
but the co-existence of very diverse ideas and theories that in their 
contradictory unity constitute a good example of the reigning confu-
sion.  
The chapter will present the diversity, heterogeneity and juxtaposi-
tion of the discourses that lie at the very heart of the complex and 
diverse international political society, albeit only the main subjects 
will be addressed. It also includes some brief final considerations that 
analyze the connections between projects of international institutions, 
national governments and social actors.  
 
2. Programs of International Agencies and Governments for 
Civil Society and Participation in Latin America 
The historical process we are analyzing is situated within the frame-
work of the surprising historic coincidence of two opposing processes. 
On one hand, the last decades of the twentieth century were marked 
by the “Third Wave of Democratization” (Huntington 1991), includ-
ing the fall of communism and the adoption of democratic institutions 
and markets in most Eastern European countries, while in the eighties 
the same process had taken place in Latin America. Certainly, the 
spread throughout the world of formal democratic institutions does not 
imply an authentic adoption of democratic cultures and practices nor 
the democratization of social relations (Avritzer/Santos 2002). To the 
contrary, we experience a sort of “depletion” of democracy that weak-
                                                     
4  The concept of political project, used with many meanings in the sociological 
literature, has been redefined by Evelina Dagnino (2004) as a heuristic tool that 
allows the analysis of the meaning of political action, of the collective imaginary 
and of the normative expectations that guide the political process of the actors.  
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ens social rights, increases social inequality and limits the political 
game to a mere struggle for positions between political parties that are 
increasingly distanced from the citizens (Oxhorn 2006). On the other 
hand, this same historical period has been the time in which the most 
recent phase of globalization developed, under the political protection 
of the “Washington Consensus”5 a sort of international political ac-
cord concerning the “desirability” and “inevitability” of globalization. 
This process was promoted by means of relatively open markets, that 
is, the breaking of barriers to trade and investment, coupled with the 
reduction or complete elimination of most national regulations and in 
nearly all types of markets.  
Both new and old democracies had to execute, whether by convic-
tion or by need, the economic liberalization program. At the beginning 
of the process, the turn to neoliberal policies enjoyed legitimacy. It 
was a political decision that appeared to be a plausible means to get 
rid of the corrupt and inefficient state companies and of inter-elite 
agreements and pacts that allowed the reproduction of populist and 
dictatorial regimes. The “external factor” was seen as a modernizing 
element, a way to break with deeply rooted interests that impeded the 
economic development of most countries. This at least was the view 
of conservative technocrats and politicians, international development 
agencies and educated national elites.6 In addition, under this light, 
democracy was seen by these same actors as a means to create some 
sort of citizen control over corrupt bureaucracies capable of appropri-
ating State revenues. This understanding of change during this period 
helped to legitimate the private sector, particularly in those countries 
with a “statist” or Socialist past. International development organiza-
tions such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, 
the International Monetary Fund and various U.N. agencies promoted 
this process with determination. 
                                                     
5  If the Washington Consensus originally supposed a global accord in the simulta-
neous desirability of development and democracy at the world level, in practice, 
the emphasis on the market as the cornerstone of the project ended up making the 
“Consensus” a program that promoted economic liberalization, without real in-
terest in democracy. See Drache (2001). 
6  A paradigmatic case is that of Mexico, where President Carlos Salinas de Gortari 
came to enjoy enormous popularity by waving the flag of modernization and in-
tegration with the world. See Olvera (2003, chap. 1). 
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The State was no longer seen as the central actor of the economy, 
and interestingly this lack of centrality was extended to the field of 
social regulation as well. In contrast to the omnipresent and inclusive 
concept of the populist State – which in one variation or another had 
been dominant in the most important countries of Latin America in the 
post World War II period (with the exceptions of Colombia, Paraguay, 
Uruguay and the Central American countries)7 – a new principle is 
created: society itself has a capacity of self-organization and manage-
ment that allows it to establish a relationship of “joint responsibility” 
with the State in the design and execution of public policies. This 
“decentering” of the State pointed to the heart of the hegemonic forms 
of state legitimacy until the mid 1980’s in Latin America (Haggard/ 
Kaufman 1995). 
Meanwhile, another form of globalization developed: the growing 
internationalization of certain segments of civil society such as human 
rights groups and the ecologist, pacifist and feminist movements, 
whose struggles created a previously non-existing front of civil pres-
sure against some international agencies (Fox/Brown 2000; Mato 
2004). From this dynamic emerged, since the end of the 1980’s, a 
symbolic revaluation of civil society, which closely followed the 
recovery of this concept that various social actors had promoted in the 
1970’s and 1980’s, particularly in Eastern Europe and Latin America 
(Cohen/Arato 1992). 
The concept of civil society became a substantive element of the 
lexicon of the international development agencies, national govern-
ments and international foundations, but with a specific meaning: the 
participation of citizens’ organizations in public affairs as a way of 
forcing the government to be more efficient (Tussie 2000). Here the 
idea of civil society is limited to a network of associations whose 
objectives, object of action and form of constitution have no analytic 
relevance, insofar as they are only valued for their potential for coop-
eration with the government in the implementation of public policies. 
The heterogeneity of the sector was plainly ignored. For this reason 
international financial agencies tended to equate the idea of civil 
society with the non-governmental organizations (Mato 2004), not 
                                                     
7  See Larraín (2004) and Malloy (1987). 
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recognizing the fact that civil society is much more complex and 
heterogeneous than NGOs (Olvera 2003). 
By the end of the 1990’s, the debate about the democratic poten-
tial of civil society in Latin America seemed over. The surprising 
consensus shared by political parties, governments, multilateral devel-
opment agencies and most civil actors was the result of a hegemonic 
vision that attributed considerable value to the contributions of civil 
society to democracy. Nevertheless, behind the apparent unity of 
concepts and proposals a diversity of projects and a weak idea of civil 
society were hidden. Civil society was reduced to an amorphous 
“Third Sector” understood as a set of private entities oriented to the 
production of public services. In this way, the critical profile that the 
idea of civil society carried in the 1980’s and the early 1990’s was 
discarded (Olvera 2004). The jump from a notion based on the opposi-
tion of civil society and state to an idea of full collaboration between 
them was surprisingly fast. This relationship became surrreptitiously 
depolitiziced.  
Meanwhile, in the international public arena a language of citizen 
participation was simultaneously developed (Rivera 1998; Cunill 
1997). Participation was understood as a type of cooperation between 
citizens and government in the implementation of public policies. 
Multiple governments around the world adopted the discourse of 
participation and even instituted some mechanisms that appeared to 
meet this claim (Hevia 2005).  
Nevertheless, the historic coincidence between the neoliberal im-
plantation and the processes of redemocratization in most of Latin 
America also opened space to reconsider the themes of civil society 
and citizen participation in a distinct manner (Calderón, Assies y 
Salman 2002). The analysis of transition to democracy included an 
evaluation of civil society as the promoter of the struggle for political 
rights and as a moral opponent to authoritarianisms of all types (Av-
ritzer/Olvera 1992). The role of civil society in the transition had 
indeed a liberal reading, grounded on the opposition between a virtu-
ous civil society and an evil State, but also a republican reading that 
stressed the participative and co-generating dimension of a new de-
mocratic power that emanated from below. The republican discourse 
was articulated as an explicit political project in Brazil, where the idea 
of participation was the platform for a program oriented to the “so-
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cialization of power”, that is to say, a “sharing of power between 
society and the political system” (Alvarez/Dagnino/Escobar 1998). In 
this case the notion of participation pointed out to a type of political 
co-management, whose moral and legal principles were molded into 
the Constitution of 1988. This legal framework allowed the unfolding 
of innovative experiments such as the management councils (Dagnino 
2002), participative budgets (Avritzer 2002b) and other forums and 
institutionalized public spaces.  
The participative project is also present, to a lesser degree and 
with less ambition, in the Colombian constitution of 1991, and with 
much greater rigor and clarity in the Venezuelan Constitution of 1999. 
It should be noted that the Peruvian Constitution of 1993 also contains 
this class of precepts, as does, in a certain form, the Bolivian Constitu-
tion of 1994. Nevertheless, it should be noted that only in Brazil the 
participative project as co-management went all the way from the 
Constitution to operative institutions that now have more than ten 
years of experience. As shown by Hevia (2005), in other countries 
secondary laws were never enacted and the scarce new institutions had 
no capacity to promote effective citizen participation, and therefore 
the experiences are more ambivalent than in Brazil.  
In most countries, the participative project coexists both at the 
constitutional level and in political practice with pluralistic and neo-
corporatist devices of representation of interests that have a long 
tradition, some of them having roots in the corporatist regimes. For 
example, the history of the Economic and Social Council go back to 
the Vargas’ government in Brazil, but recently, under the Lula gov-
ernment, the Council came to adopt a pluralist and neocorporativist 
content, that is, a consultative and plural character, stressing the 
symbolic unity of diverse and conflictive political and social actors in 
support of a national project. In Colombia the “grand peace accord” 
expressed the shared aspiration of political and social actors about the 
need to put an end to the internal armed conflict and to extend the rule 
of law to the entire nation. This pluralist matrix took as well the form 
of “representative” councils, more or less recognized publicly, which 
discuss specific public policies. This model is based on the principle 
that the interests represented in it are organized interests, those of the 
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economically, socially and politically powerful social groups.8 Their 
recognition and legitimacy are based on the relative strength of each 
sector. Certainly, this kind of fora cannot, by their own nature, address 
moral or legal dilemmas. But the issue of representation is very easy 
to resolve: the stronger, more visible, more influential actors must 
have a place in the councils. 
It is worth mentioning that there is another version of the liberal 
project: the citizen seen as a user of services, that is, as a client of 
public services. This line has been encouraged since the early 1990’s 
by the World Bank. It is related to the introduction in Latin America 
of the “New Public Management” school, which insisted on the need 
of a State’s administrative reform to make it more sensitive to citi-
zens’ demands and more efficient (Cunill 1997).9 The nodal principle 
of this school of thought is to consider public management as an 
extension of private management, and to force the former to function 
under the latter’s principles. Thus, citizens come to be understood as 
“clients” and government as a “service provider”. As a consequence, 
the rights of citizenship are of no concern for this school of thought. 
There is no talk of rights and obligations, but only a liberal-corporate 
vision of the functions of the State. The institutions that under this 
scheme are promoted in Latin America (committees of users of ser-
vices, committees of beneficiaries of subsidies, etc.), are a sort of 
equivalent to consumer associations, thus representing the insertion of 
a mercantile logic in the relationships between the state and its sub-
jects.10  
Both liberal perspectives share a problem: neither is grounded on 
rights. Pluralist participation and the satisfaction of clients are con-
cepts that have no legal way of enforcement. Subjects depend on the 
good will of the government or on the ad-hoc pacts between social 
actors and government officials. This is a theme of great political 
transcendence, because in the absence of rights to which citizens can 
                                                     
8  For a broad vision of these processes, see Haggard/Kaufman (1995); Maxfield 
(1990). 
9  See the website of the Consejo Latinoamericano para la Administración del 
Desarrollo (CLAD) for the most complete presentation of these and other in-
fluences on Latin American public administration <www.clad.org.ve>. 
10  The World Bank has encouraged most of these mechanisms. For a review and a 
summary see the bank’s site <www.worldbank.org>. 
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appeal, the final decision about which spaces to open and to whom, 
falls unilaterally into the hands of government.  
The neoliberal project for the participation of citizens, in its vari-
ous versions, lacks a suitable legal and institutional anchor and is 
based explicitly on the depolitization of the relationships between the 
government and the citizens. The schemes of participation that emerge 
out of this model serve first of all the efficiency and the effectiveness 
of state action, guiding the interaction through a cooperative practice 
in which conflict is conceptual and symbolically absent. 
Coherent with this approach is the use of the concept of social 
capital, also promoted by the World Bank, which supposedly explains 
the sociological substrate of the social relations of cooperation be-
tween civil actors and government.11 Certainly, the concept of social 
capital describes the ties of mutual trust and the trajectories of knowl-
edge that allow generalized confidence in the institutions, a reasonable 
expectation that the agreements reached will be complied with and 
that conflicts will be discarded while cooperation is established. The 
merit of the concept of social capital is that it concentrates on the 
cultural factors of social action, transcending the narrow horizons of 
mere institutional design. Nevertheless, the main problem with this 
concept is that it is not able to clarify how ties of trust can be created 
in political contexts in which laws are not respected, the social and 
cultural inequality among the actors is abysmal and the legitimacy of 
the state institutions is very fragile. Moreover, the theory of social 
capital was never able to explain how interpersonal trust can turn into 
trust in institutions (Offe 1999). Despite all this, the notion of social 
capital still informs much of the direction and objectives of public 
policies in Mexico12 as well as in other countries of Latin America. 
In this context emerges the new discourse of accountability. It is 
understandable that the disenchantment and frustration with limited 
concepts and practices of participation would give birth to strong 
                                                     
11  Reintroduced by Robert Putnam (1993) into the contemporary sociological dis-
cussion, the concept of social capital launched a broad international debate. For a 
review, see Edwards/Foley/Diani (2001); for a substantive theoretical debate see 
Warren (2001). 
12  As of 2005, the best examples are the web sites of the Secretaría de Desarrollo 
Social (www.sedesol.gob.mx) and of the Instituto Nacional de Desarrollo Social 
<www.indesol.gob.mx>.  
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demands for real citizen control over the exercise of government. The 
idea of accountability literally refers to the presentation of accounts 
and therefore, to the transparency and disclosure of state activities. It 
does not involve cooperation in the definition of public policies, but 
requiring the government to explain its actions to the citizens. This 
discourse was adopted by international development agencies in order 
to attain the desired effectiveness of their own actions in favor of 
development and democracy.13  
The accountability discourse is also a reaction of civil society ac-
tors to the continuity of generalized practices of corruption that char-
acterize the majority of governments and the preservation of the 
bureaucratic secretiveness on which the discretional power of the 
politicians and bureaucrats is based (Peruzzotti/Smulovitz 2002). In 
other words, this new discourse and practice of society is a response to 
the inability of governments to reform themselves, to create a profes-
sional and responsible bureaucracy, and to open their accounts to 
public scrutiny (Olvera/Isunza 2006). Thus, the struggle for account-
ability can also be understood, at least in some of its cases, as a social 
movement that defends the broadening of the concept of human rights 
as to include the rights of information and participation.  
In sum, the hegemonic neoliberal discourse in Latin America has 
sought to depoliticize the relations between the State and civil society, 
to symbolically annul the existence of social conflict, to conceive of 
social capital as an undifferentiated cooperation between citizens and 
government, all without reference to the rights of citizenship. This 
conceptual effort is coherent with and complementary to the neolib-
eral project in the economic field.  
The participative project developed by the Brazilian left and by 
certain social movements in other South American countries is groun-
ded on the defense of rights, recognizes the existence of social con-
flict, postulates the need to institutionalize spaces for dialog and 
negotiation between society and the State and recognizes the plurality 
of society. Nevertheless, the two projects use the same language and 
the same concepts, which is precisely what Dagnino (2002), calls the 
                                                     
13  Once again the World Bank has given emphasis and visibility to this concept in 
recent years. See its website. 
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“perverse confluence”, a situation that has created a tremendous 
conceptual, political and ideological confusion  
 
3. Final Remarks 
The countries of Latin America suffer, to a greater or lesser degree, 
and in various forms, a crisis of legitimacy of democratic institutions 
and are experiencing a condition of political confusion characterized 
by the overlapping of political discourses and projects. If the origin of 
the problem there is a complex set of historic circumstances that 
configure a new space for politics that eliminates the centrality of the 
State and leads to the informalization and mediatization of the politi-
cal system. It is also true that the multiplicity of voices pronouncing 
the same words with different meanings, both in the State and in 
society, contributes to the confusion, diminishes the critical capacity 
of civil society, makes it more difficult to distinguish the political 
projects in struggle and to recognize the democratic innovations with 
greater potential for transformation.  
The contradictions and paradoxes of contemporary politics are 
condensed within the State. Perhaps the main contradiction, from the 
point of view of the relations between the State and civil society, is the 
“perverse confluence” (Dagnino 2002) of the neoliberal project with 
the initiatives for change coming both from a sector of civil society as 
well as from some leftist parties. In practice, this fundamental dichot-
omy is complicated by the multiple combinations and connections 
between these two projects and by the form in which the multilateral 
development agencies intervene in the political debate and practice in 
Latin America. Unique combinations of participative discourses, 
glorifications of civil society and convocations to co-responsibility are 
presented in each Nation-State.  
This situation is even more complicated by the fragmentation of 
the State in horizontal, vertical and spatial terms. Each State agency 
applies distinct participative policies. Frequently, state and municipal 
governments understand and use participation in different manners. 
Thus, within a single country we can observe both notable experiences 
of an authentic democratization of public life as well as the worst 
authoritarian fictions, both supported by the same language and by the 
same legal and institutional foundations. 
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This cacophony of discourse and practice makes it difficult to 
clearly distinguish the nature of the projects in play and to evaluate the 
quality of the democratic innovation underway, the depth of the cul-
tural transformations that are being produced and the relative strength 
of the trends of change that are being experienced in the region. Nota-
ble confluences of language among political and social actors are 
produced that follow distinct projects. Frequently, potential alliances 
are not created because of lack of trust and political confrontation, or 
to the contrary, political alliances are formed on the basis of appar-
ently common discourses that are soon perceived to be fictitious.  
The fact that Latin America is subsumed by the conditions im-
posed by globalization, and that the State has lost centrality in the 
entire region, does not eliminate spaces for democratic innovation. 
The great paradox of our time is that despite the context of political 
crisis found in some countries, a democratic imaginary has emerged 
that far transcends a simple electoral democracy (with greater or lesser 
force in each country). The discourse about rights, citizenship, partici-
pation and accountability is firmly established on the normative hori-
zon of public life. It still needs to be translated into projects that are 
even more broad and shared, the bases of which already exist in 
concrete practices and institutions that are available in the collective 
experience, but that remain somewhat hidden in the reigning confu-
sion of discourses and in the mixture of social practices that combine 
distinct projects and interests. 
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Bila Sorj/Aparecida Fonseca Moraes 
Paradoxes of the Expansion of  
Women’s Rights in Brazil 
In the last few decades, the processes of universalisation of human 
rights, as an expression of the expansion of values associated with 
western modernity to the rest of the world, has generated a debate in 
which at times the universalist vision is exalted as allowing a superior 
form of social coexistence, and at others is condemned for dissolving 
local habits and customs. Thus the heated sociological discussions of 
globalisation are almost always charged with robust normative and 
prescriptive content that limits the analytical potentialities of this phe-
nomenon. 
The recent debate about globalisation and cultural systems seems 
to have revived an old dispute in sociology between the theory of 
modernisation and the currents of culturalist inspiration. In the first 
case, the theory of modernisation, which had an important impact on 
the Latin American social sciences, considers that the surpassing of 
traditional values prevalent in these societies would come about 
through, among other factors, the emergence of modernised elites. 
Such elites would be responsible for the introduction of a set of insti-
tutions, such as the market, education, the legal system etc., that 
would substitute traditional motivation and patterns of behaviour 
(Germani 1969).  
Contrary to this theory, the culturalist and historicist currents em-
phasize the processes of resistance to the structural and cultural 
changes introduced by modernisation. The strengthening of communi-
tary cultures, the vigour of religious adhesion and practices, and the 
production of popular cultural manifestations would be interpreted as 
movements expressing resistance to modernity (Berger/Berger/Kellner 
1974). 
This work seeks to escape from the antinomy between modernity 
and resistance, in order to approach the complexity of the phenome-
non of the local reception of universalist discourses through analysis 
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of feminist practices aimed at expanding the global agenda of 
women’s rights in Brazil.  
We intend to show that the feminist agenda inspired by individual-
ist, egalitarian and universalising values is transformed, and, at times, 
shifts away from the original intention. This occurs by virtue of the 
process of appropriation and transformation of this agenda, as well as 
of the institutions inspired by it, by local social players inserted into 
specific socio-cultural contexts. It does not constitute, however, a 
simple game of acceptance or rejection of modern values by local 
players, but a tense and sometimes paradoxical articulation between 
institutions based on human rights and rules of sociability present in 
significant portions of the Brazilian population.  
It has already become commonplace in the international literature 
of the social sciences to recognize that the post-60s feminist move-
ment had an overwhelming impact on the ways contemporary socie-
ties think of and question themselves. Today, it seems impossible to 
think of democracy, citizenship, social inequalities, changes in family 
organisation, forms of work, among so many other dimensions of 
social life, without taking into account as a reference the constitution 
of a new social subject, women, and a form of domination, that of 
gender, created by feminist discourse.  
As is well-known, the feminist movement in the developed coun-
tries arose and constructed its principal formulations, practices and 
institutions, in creative dialogue with values and principles built into 
the Western tradition of liberal democracy and citizenship.  
It is evident to any social scientist that Brazil is very far from prac-
tising a democracy that fulfils developed country standards. Neverthe-
less, the social, economic and political transformations undergone by 
Brazilian society in the last few decades, the political democratisation, 
the expansion of higher education, the development of means of 
communication, have caused the emergence of social groups bearing 
democratic values and expectations.  
The feminist movement that re-emerged in Brazil in the mid-70s 
is a product of the modernisation in the country. The social origin of 
its activists is found in highly educated middle class professionals and 
who, therefore, are more exposed and sensitive to the developments of 
international feminism.  
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In fact, the typical path followed by feminists of that time included 
passage through the experience of militancy in left-wing organisations 
in Brazil or in exile, followed by passage through feminist groups in 
the country or abroad and through action in the broad movement 
against the dictatorship during the long years of the “democratic open-
ing” which extended into the 1980s.  
The active participation of feminists in the country’s movement 
for democratisation brought them into closer contact with feminists 
from other social groups, diversifying their experience beyond the 
existential and political world of the middle classes. In fact, the resis-
tance movement to the dictatorship aggregated social forces, until then  
isolated from each other, popular groups from the outskirts of large 
cities, middle class professionals, trade union leaders, housewives, 
businessmen, clergy and priests, to cite just a few components of the 
great coalition that rose up against the military dictatorship.  
The consequence in Brazil of the historical experience of partici-
pation of feminists in a broad political alliance was the creation of a 
feminism much more sensitive to the questions of social inequalities, 
unlike what occurred in other countries in North America and Europe. 
This historical experience is also reflected in the focus of the feminist 
movement on the problems that women from the working and poorer 
classes had greatest difficulties in facing: health, violence and work.  
The construction of an agenda of claims to the State concentrated 
the efforts of the Brazilian feminist movement during the democratic 
period. The creation of public institutions specialised in attending to 
women in these matters was the result of a long process of pressure 
and negotiation with the State.  
We must recognize, however, that local social practices – values, 
political culture and traditional forms of domination – attribute new 
meanings to the social institutions inspired by feminism. Instead of 
adopting a linear perspective that aims at measuring the distance be-
tween the feminist utopia and social reality, in the style of the old 
theories of modernisation, we intend to analyse the interactions be-
tween the feminist agenda and current social practices. It is therefore a 
matter of recognizing that the Brazilian historical and social context 
operates a complex process of (re)elaboration of the discourse and the 
social institutions inspired by feminist ideals, despite its universalising 
aspiration.  
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We would like to illustrate the complexity of the process of diffu-
sion of the feminist agenda in the Brazilian context with two exam-
ples. The first refers to the specificities of the form of utilisation of the 
police apparatus of the Delegacias Especializadas de Atendimento à 
Mulher – DEAMs [Special Police Stations for Women] by the victims 
of conjugal violence, and the second identifies some unintentional 
consequences of the frequency of women rape victims using the health 
services recently created to help them. 
 
1. Conjugal Violence: Crime or Misbehaviour?  
According to what has already been affirmed, reception of the femi-
nist values in Brazil has not been linear, but has implied conflicts and 
settlements. In countries with a liberal, democratic tradition, the po-
litical language prevalent in the feminist movement was that of the 
individual rights of women to decide over their own bodies, enshrined 
in the slogan “our body belongs to us”.  
In Brazil, it is the social rights that provide legitimacy to the femi-
nist discourse, as the validation of sexual rights as an exercise of 
women’s individual rights met with strong resistance. On the one 
hand, the conservative sectors, in general linked to the Catholic 
Church, managed to mobilize a powerful anti-liberal discourse. On the 
other hand, sectors of the left-wing and also some of feminism, mani-
fested intense discomfort with the formulation that espouses individ-
ual liberty. In fact, for these segments, the recognition of the profound 
privations marking the living conditions of the majority of Brazilian 
women seems more important than the affirmation of their free will 
regarding their bodies. From this formulation there arose a set of so-
cial policies that aimed, above all, at the guarantee of access to public 
services in the area of violence and reproductive rights, like pre-natal 
accompaniment, access to contraception methods – indeed a full range 
of female health services. 
Regarding the emergence of the theme of conjugal violence, the 
contrast with the reality in developed countries is great. Here this 
theme has become a political issue and has been seen as a social prob-
lem since the beginning of the 80s. The great repercussion in the press 
of the murder of women from middle class families by their husbands, 
was the deflagrating event upon entry of this theme into the public 
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agenda (Sorj/Montero 1985). In France and the United States, as 
Machado (2002: 3) stressed, while the question of conjugal violence 
comes to the surface from women’s quotidian experiences and from 
denunciation of masculine control over their bodies, in Brazil, it was 
the exposure of some extreme cases of men’s power over the lives of 
women that was the element capable of arousing public opinion. The 
consequence of this fact was the delimitation of the perception of con-
jugal violence in its most extreme and threshold expression, which 
favoured a vision of the aggressor as deviant, sick, perverse, passional 
etc. Thus, conjugal violence was not understood as a behaviour in-
scribed within the field of possibilities of unequal gender relations, but 
as an exceptional event in the man-woman relationship. The under-
standing of conjugal violence as an exceptional fact in family relations 
was subjacent to all the institutional initiatives to combat violence in 
the country.  
At the end of the 1970s, the women’s movement began to de-
nounce on a broad front the acquittal, by court juries, of wife murder-
ers on the allegation of “legitimate defence of honour”. At the start of 
the 1980s, feminist groups arose in various cities all over the country, 
called SOS-Mulher [SOS-Women], which provided legal, social and 
psychological services to women who were victims of violence. The 
then strong and successful politicisation of the theme of gender vio-
lence by SOS-Mulher gave rise to prioritisation of this theme in 1983, 
in São Paulo, with the establishment of the Conselho Estadual da 
Condição Feminina [State Council for the Female Condition], created 
under the Franco Montoro government. The first police station of this 
type arose in 1985 in the city of São Paulo, but while today there are 
over 350, they cover only 10% of the Brazilian municipalities, São 
Paulo representing around one third of them. 
The DEAMs constitute the principal public policy for combat and 
prevention of violence against women in Brazil, especially conjugal 
violence. They are considered the most important Brazilian institu-
tional innovation in the area of violence, with an important repercus-
sion in other Latin American countries, above all for having intro-
duced the world of law, justice and impersonality into the private 
sphere, into the realm of conjugal intimacy. Its legal function is to 
detect legal offences, investigate their source and criminalise domestic 
violence. 
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However, some years after establishing the DEAMs, feminists 
were surprised by the behaviour presented by a large number of 
women who resorted to the service provided by the special police 
stations. This behavioural pattern on the part of the victims, which 
may reach 70% of cases, is that the woman seeks out the police sta-
tion, presents a denunciation or complaint against her aggressor, but 
then desists from proceeding with the police inquiry. In Brazil, sig-
nificant discrepancies are identified between the number of complaint 
registrations and the number of police inquiries, the latter always be-
ing much less.  
Researches (Soares 1996; Brandão 1997) reveal that the use of the 
DEAMs by women seem to follow a diverse logic of the police insti-
tution and inspiration of the feminist movement, given that the most 
frequent motivation for women in going to the specialised police sta-
tions consists of using police power to renegotiate the conjugal pact 
and not to criminalise the partner.  
If in other contexts of liberal tradition, the police are as a rule a  
legal institution activated every time rights to privacy and to life are at 
stake, in Brazil the police are called in predominantly as a form of 
extra-official arbitration, with the aim of renegotiating domestic pacts. 
The police officers, in general female, end up intervening in the con-
flicts brought to the police station, calling the parties to a meeting in 
which they seek to mediate the conflicting interests. These interven-
tions, reportedly at 93% of the police stations in the country (Machado 
2002), often seem to have a certain impact on the solution of conjugal 
quarrels.  
Besides the mediating function, the police are activated for extra-
judicial punitive intervention. When the accused are called to make a 
statement, they are reprimanded, receive a “telling off” or “advice” 
from a policewoman to contain the conjugal violence. In this case, 
police power acts as coercion of the aggressor if he persists with his 
violent conduct. It constitutes therefore a game in which the victims 
seek to take some advantage from the effect of police authority over 
the aggressive spouse. 
In comparing the women’s police station in João Pessoa, Paraíba 
State, with the Canadian experiences in the field of “conjugal vio-
lence”, Rifiotis (2003) identified that, despite the great differences 
among the Brazilian and Canadian policies, there is in both cases on 
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the part of the players in the institutions, a significant degree of dissat-
isfaction with the results achieved in the development of these ser-
vices. For the author, the research conducted in Montreal attracted 
attention, as, “despite the multiplicity of public, state and non-govern-
mental means available, the evaluation of the results is that they al-
ways seem to remain below the desired level” (Rifiotis 2003: 17). 
On the one hand, this finding stimulates reflection on aspects that 
may be intrinsic to any public policy linked to the dimensions of inti-
macy and the private world, in which modern public institutionality of 
conjugal violence is a significant mark. On the other hand, the affir-
mation of the author reinforces the need to underline content peculiar 
to the Brazilian case. Here, everything indicates that the victim, gen-
erally from the lower classes, is not interested in entry to the universal, 
impersonal world of law. She takes advantage of the police apparatus 
in a peculiar manner for mediation of a private conflict, which does 
not correspond to the primary function of punitive police, which is to 
verify and investigate the crime. Without doubt, this was an absolutely 
unforeseeable result of the policies to combat gender violence in force 
then.  
From the point of view of the feminist agenda, even more unex-
pected was the institutionalisation of the Juizados Especiais Criminais 
(JECRINs) [Petty Crime Courts], regulated through approval of Lei 
Federal 9.099 and established as of 1995, which ended up decriminal-
ising conjugal violence.1 These courts were conceived to promote 
mediation between the parties involved in interpersonal conflicts, fa-
cilitating agreements between victims and aggressors. As of the prom-
ulgation of this law, police stations were expected to forward denun-
ciations of conjugal violence with women victims to these courts, 
even though in many Brazilian states there still prevailed the practice 
described in the paragraphs above. Thus, conjugal violence was con-
sidered a crime of lesser gravity, in which punishment of the aggres-
sor, in general, was limited to supplying baskets of basic food, ser-
vices rendered to the community, participation in therapeutic groups 
etc. 
                                                     
1  This institution, which seems to exist only in Brazil has as its guiding principles, 
orality, simplicity, informality, celerity, procedural economy, conciliation and 
transaction (see Burgos 2001). 
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This case points out another facet of the complex relation that ex-
ists between the feminist movement, the State and women victims. On 
the one hand, the feminist movement inaugurated a new perception 
that conjugal violence should be considered as a crime and the aggres-
sor penalised. For such, it fought for the implementation of police 
stations specialised in attending women in the expectation that the 
theme of conjugal violence could be treated in the criminal sphere. 
Once the DEAMs had come into action, the experience of the users 
showed that women used the police stations much more as a space for 
mediation of conflicts and re-establishment of conjugal and family 
relations, with the aim of freeing themselves from violence. In other 
words, their objective was not to penalise the aggressor, but to reform 
him under the threat or counselling of a police authority. If it is true 
that women were making this type of use of the police institution, the 
Juizados Especiais Criminais (courts) meet the expectations of the 
victims, expectations that, in turn, oppose the perceptions of feminists 
about the way conjugal violence should be handled by the State.  
Thus, we can consider that the JECRIMs convey in a peculiar 
manner the combination between the criminalising perspective of 
conjugal violence and the conciliatory perspective manifested by 
women, as shown by the experiences at the police stations. Obviously, 
conjugal violence has entered the legal world, but its institutionalisa-
tion has acquired local content where the family and conjugality con-
stitute important values in gender identities.  
The difficulty in imposing universal legal norms, founded on a in-
dividualist, egalitarian and universalising sociability, on the settlement 
of conflict, poses serious challenges to the expansion of the feminist 
agenda in the local context and indicates the complexity of reception 
of the ideology and the institutions inspired by feminism in Brazil.  
 
2. Sexual Violence: Vices and Virtues of Denunciation 
The second example of the paradoxes of the expansion of human and 
women’s rights in the country refers to the services provided to vic-
tims of sexual violence by public health units. 
In this case too, the feminist debate was responsible for the formu-
lation that became defined as “sexual violence”, a specific type of 
violence directed at women and inscribed in the ambit of gender rela-
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tions (Sorj/Montero 1985). The category, sexual violence, has thus 
become a central component of feminism, mobilising public policies.3 
These initiatives had the important objective of going beyond mere 
police or legal action, thus avoiding accusatory visions of the victim.  
In 1999, fulfilling the goals of the women’s rights agenda, the 
Ministério da Saúde [Ministry of Health] created a technical norm to 
orientate and regulate prevention, and provide treatment for sexual 
violence in the Brazilian public hospital network.  
Such regulation not only extended this practice to all health units 
that provide gynaecological and obstetric services, defined as thera-
peutic support and social assistance, including medical care and nurs-
ing services related to the collection of material for the identification 
of aggression, emergency contraception, prevention of sexually trans-
mitted disease (STDs), but also systematic service for women with 
pregnancy arising from rape, with provision being made for the victim 
to opt for a legal abortion.  
The institutionalisation of the problem of sexual violence in the 
ambit of public health has provided many victims with the possibility 
of going beyond the exclusively police, legal and stigmatising vision 
of their experiences. 
The passage of such women through the hospital service allows al-
teration of the public image and of her self-image, by endowing her 
with the genuine condition of a victim. While the denunciation made 
at the police station maintains the veracity of the report under suspi-
cion, medical treatment confers accreditation to the statute of victimi-
sation, giving credibility to the event. This new practice of medical 
and therapeutic care has ended up strengthening the assumption of 
rape in the minds of family members, friends, neighbours, work col-
leagues and acquaintances.  
In a society influenced by the idea that rape is an individual prob-
lem of women and where this occurrence is seen in a moral dimen-
sion, which often ends up blaming them, the frequency of the victim’s 
visits to the hospital to be cared for/treated/protected potentialises in 
                                                     
3  Such as the creation of PAISM (Programa de Assistência Integral à Saúde da 
Mulher), forms of government and political representation (state and national 
councils of women’s rights, advisors, co-ordinators etc.) and, later, police stations 
specialised in attending women (Camargo 2000; Barsted 2002). 
Bila Sorj/Aparecida Fonseca Moraes 130
several ways the publicity of the event, with a significant reduction in 
the weight of the accusatory system.  
The establishment of norms for the service provided by the hospi-
tals includes respect for the victim’s right to decide not to make a de-
nunciation. Therefore, treatment is not conditional upon a need to 
publicly assume the event. However, the new situations women ex-
perience in using these services (therapy, face-to-face interaction with 
professionals often encouraging reports to the police, informative 
posters distributed throughout hospital premises inciting denunciation 
of crimes, etc.) have encouraged a significant number of victims to 
reveal the incidences to their relationship circles.  
The assumption of rape before family members, acquaintances, 
neighbours and other relationships has nevertheless reinforced an old 
social practice of the defense of codes of honour and personal initia-
tives for the solution of violence, producing absolutely unexpected 
situations for those in the spectrum of the human rights agenda and the 
feminist ideal. When the event of rape becomes public knowledge in 
places of residence and in the family and friendship circles of the vic-
tims, the expression of support and solidarity assumes a violent char-
acter.  
The mistrust in police institutions, in the legal system and the re-
volt provoked by the belief that rape injures masculine honour, moti-
vates the private action of investigation and punishment of the rapist 
by the men in the community. This occurs, principally, when the 
woman is attacked near her home.  
Women sexually attacked in public streets are approached, princi-
pally during the night or in early hours, often when returning from or 
setting off for work. As a rule, these victims reside in urban areas in 
the outskirts lacking public services, which inevitably contributes to 
placing certain groups of women at risk. These are eerie places, with-
out police patrols or street lighting, waste land covered by thick bush, 
abandoned constructions etc. In these areas, there prevails the idea that 
the rape victim, especially if young, must have her “honour” and mat-
rimonial “future” preserved by capture, or even death, of the rapist. 
Groups of friends, acquaintances and people from the neighbourhood 
are mobilised to generate strategic action for “protection” of the image 
of the victim and to prevent other residents from being attacked and 
similarly tarnished. These protective strategies include vigils organ-
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ised by the residents, who start to control entry and exit of the people 
in their residential area and to institute rotas among the men to escort 
young women, waiting, for example, at bus stops or other places. The 
capture and avenging of aggressors may also involve criminals who 
have control of the local power, or even police known to be willing to 
act under the logic of informality and illegality.  
The objective of identifying and punishing the aggressor in order 
to deter repetition of the event in the area may assume more or less 
violent forms that range from capture and delivery of the aggressor to 
the police to removal of the aggressor from police power to impose 
justice via torture or death. The torture to which the rapist is submitted 
depends partly on the circumstances and extent of his acts in the eyes 
of his “judges”, but, principally on the profile of the avenging agent 
(criminal, father of the family, etc.) and the degree of revolt and anger 
of the community. 
These violent responses and the seeking of private solutions may 
be restricted to the family circle and/or a partner in a loving relation-
ship, without involving the community. In this case, the victimisation 
by sexual violence starts to be taken as a “problem” that also affects 
the players with whom the victim lives. The male members of the 
family (father, husband, brothers, even brothers-in-law, uncles etc.) 
may also manifest their support for the victim by organising parallel 
tactics of investigation and location of the aggressor. The feeling of 
revenge and the need to “clear” the name of the woman and/or her 
family motivate these actions. 
Thus, it can be observed how the expansion of a new right leads to 
violation of the legal system, as justice against the aggressor is carried 
out with one’s own hands. The public services to attend to victims 
that, in the feminist banners, had the idea of removing sexual violence 
from the cover of silence and the private domain, stumbles upon unex-
pected results that create new forms of violence. 
In Brazil, the presence of drug traffic in communities seems to 
impinge directly on the phenomenon of sexual violence. Taking as an 
example the municipality of Rio de Janeiro, it is noteworthy that in the 
period 2001 to 2003 the greatest number of reported sex crimes, in 
absolute terms, was found in administrative regions that did not corre-
spond exclusively to areas suffering the direct influence of domination 
by drug traffic (Moraes/Soares/Conceição 2005). In the period men-
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tioned, in regions corresponding exclusively to shantytowns with a 
recognized presence of drug traffic, there was practically no report of 
sex crime.  
These data may be approached from two perspectives. The first re-
inforces the notion that in these communities the victims avoid police 
involvement in solving this type of problem. Residents of areas under 
the control of the traffickers know that a police raid, resulting from 
denunciation, may cost the denouncers embarrassing or even irre-
versible predicaments. The second concludes that in fact cases of rape 
in areas with these characteristics are rare, and that probably one of 
the reasons for this is the moral control exercised by the parallel 
power perceiving rape as the most condemnable and despicable of 
offences, hardly tolerated even among traffickers. In this case, it con-
stitutes control and a moralisation of the community performed by 
vigilantes related to the drug traffic. And paradoxically it also refers to 
the imposition of a sexual moral that may result in the reduction of 
sexual aggression targeting women.  
It is necessary here to stress that a good number of women avoid 
publicising rape in the areas where they recognize the reaction to it is 
inscribed in a logic of revenge, of personal and illegal solutions. Even 
in situations in which public assumption of rape is inevitable, they 
reinforce their will to follow the legal procedure, await the official 
investigation, and, when consulted by these “private agents of justice” 
about the outcome they desire for the rapist, they manifest imperatives 
of legality. Most often this behaviour is aimed at protecting members 
of the family or community, given that, in the near future, these will 
be called to make statements to a justice official. 
These situations illustrate, in summarised form, the unintentional, 
and even paradoxical, consequences of the policy to expand human 
rights and feminist principles and values. If the publicity of sexual 
violence is encouraged due to its citizenship nature, in doing so, the 
victim may promote a set of actions of solidarity with the family and 
the community that are supported by traditional moral, hierarchical 
and extra-legal codes.  
The selected examples show that the various facets of Brazilian 
society, such as hierarchy and equality, or tradition and modernity, are 
not dichotomous dimensions of reality, nor are they even found in a 
linear process of evolution from one pole to the other. On the contrary, 
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our social identity and political culture articulate and transform both 
terms, producing a peculiar modernity worth unveiling.  
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Patricia Pinho 
Brazil in the Map of Africanness: Examining Roots 
Tourism and International Black Relations1 
1. African-American Tourism to Brazil: 
Brief History and Main Aspects 
African-American roots tourism can be situated in the long history of 
the search for Africa by Afro-descendants in the New World which 
includes such important events as the actual migration of Afro-de-
scendants to the African continent during the foundation of Liberia in 
1822, as well as the influential Pan-African congresses which ac-
knowledged the commonality between Africans and the world’s dis-
persed blacks. It was only in the early 1970s, however, that African-
American roots tourism to Africa started to operate as such. The 1976 
publication of Alex Haley’s bestseller Roots greatly inspired African-
American culture and politics in a period marked by a growing aware-
ness by diasporic blacks of the need to recover – or, according to  
Stuart Hall (1998), produce – both their links with Africa and their 
                                                     
1  This article is part of a wider, ongoing research project which analyzes a very 
specific kind of tourism carried out by U.S. African-Americans who travel to 
Brazil, among other destinations within the African diaspora, seeking what they 
consider to be their African roots. In addition to other reasons, African-American 
roots tourism is stimulated by the belief that there is a dispersed black sibling-
hood – the African diaspora itself – waiting to be reconnected. The novelty 
brought by this kind of tourism is that it inverts (although not completely) the 
secondary position occupied by Brazil in a context marked by the hegemony of 
US-centric conceptions of blackness, thus promoting cultural expressions devel-
oped in the southern hemisphere as important references of blackness and Afri-
canness for northern blacks. On the other hand, these tourists travel with the pur-
pose of exchanging their “modernity” for the “traditions” of the local black com-
munities with whom they interact. Therefore, this study takes into account the 
asymmetry which permeates the relations between blacks located in the North 
and the South of the American continent, focusing on their cultural and political 
consonances and dissonances, and their unequal access to global currents of 
power. The concept of the “map of Africanness” is herein developed to assist in 
the analysis of the significance of Brazil for African-American tourism as well as 
in the broader black Atlantic world. 
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own Africanness. Before that, Richard Wright’s influential book Black 
Power, published in 1954, had also contributed to increasing the im-
age of Africa among African-Americans. By the late 1970s African-
American roots tourists expanded their routes to include non-African 
countries. These countries were, nonetheless, inhabited by significant 
Afro-descendant populations, and known for having a legacy of well 
preserved African cultures.  
The African-American roots tourists focused on here represent a 
very specific kind of tourist, not just because they are searching for 
what they believe to be their roots, but most of all because, in contrast 
to common tourists who are usually interested in finding the exoticism 
of the “other”, African-American roots tourists crisscross the Atlantic 
hoping to find the “same” represented by their “black brothers and 
sisters”. In this sense, African-American roots tourism represents a 
way of re-connecting the fragmented transnational African affiliation. 
Thus, I prefer to call this phenomenon “roots tourism” rather than, for 
example, “ethnic tourism”, even though this term could certainly be 
employed to describe “roots tourism”, as I have done on other occa-
sions (Pinho 2002/2003). Roots tourism is indeed a kind of ethnic 
tourism because it sets in motion people who are searching for ele-
ments that can be used to compose their black ethnic identities. How-
ever, there are two reasons why I am opting for the term “roots tour-
ism”. First, “ethnic tourism” has been employed by authors such as 
Dean MacCannel (1992) and Pierre van den Berghe (1994) to describe 
the process by which people from overdeveloped countries travel to 
poor areas to cohabit with the “exotic cultures” of the “other”, some-
times even aiming to “go native”. In roots tourism, the primary goal is 
to find the “same”, even though this “same” is usually not quite as 
“similar” as most tourists would like it to be. In fact, the frustrations 
and disenchantments of the roots tourists in Brazil are important out-
comes of their visits, even if not as much as their satisfaction with the 
“Africanness” of the people and the “authenticity” of the culture they 
encounter in their trips.  
The second reason for the use of the term “roots tourism” is the 
magnitude of African roots in African-American popular culture in 
general, and in African-American tourism specifically. Among the 
most important motivations for visiting Brazil, African-Americans 
view the country as a place where they can gain access to their roots. 
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By roots I mean mainly two aspects: first, the cultural roots, the 
abundant “African traditions” that African-Americans believe they 
have lost but which are considered to have been preserved among 
Brazilian blacks. The second notion of roots is the idea of family 
roots, of course not in the sense of encountering blood relatives like in 
Alex Haley’s quest for Kunta Kinté; but family roots in the sense of 
the diasporic family that has been dispersed by slavery and colonial-
ism.  
Due to their search for cultural roots or preserved African culture, 
roots tourists elect the Brazilian state of Bahia, especially its cities of 
Salvador and Cachoeira, as the main historical place where they be-
lieve African traditions have been more carefully maintained. The 
most important “pilgrimage site” is clearly the town of Cachoeira, 
where the tourists participate in the annual event held in August by 
the black Sisterhood of the Good Death (Irmandade da Boa Morte). 
Founded in 1823, the Sisterhood is composed exclusively of older 
black women, who are both Catholics and practitioners of Can-
domblé.2 Like most of the syncretic Afro-Brazilian parties, the Festi-
val of the Good Death begins as a sacred ceremony, with secret rituals 
held indoors for the sisters only, and ends as a profane one, with a 
public samba-de-roda3 and a generous Afro-Brazilian feast prepared 
by the sisters and offered to all visitors. 
Besides Cachoeira, the lost and therefore sought out African tradi-
tions that are so valued by the roots tourists can be found also in Sal-
vador, in the many places where Afro-Bahian cultural events take 
place, like the rehearsals of the blocos afro4, in the houses of Can-
domblé, and in the schools of capoeira. Bahian Africanness can be 
relished even in the trays of the baianas, women street vendors who 
dress in traditional white African clothing and sell African-derived 
                                                     
2  Candomblé is the most well known Afro-Brazilian religion. 
3  Samba de roda is a traditional form of dancing samba in a circle. 
4  The blocos afro are black cultural organizations that emerged in Bahia the 1970s 
seeking to overcome racism within the sphere of Carnival. Responding to racial-
aesthetic discrimination, which excluded blacks from participating in carnival 
groups (blocos), a group of black activists founded their own bloco, called Ilê 
Aiyê, one in which only people with very dark skin would be allowed to partici-
pate. At present, the blocos afro surpass the boundaries of Carnival and enter-
tainment, producing new references of blackness and involving themselves in the 
dynamics of political culture.  
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delicacies such as acarajés and abarás. African-American scholar 
Rachel J. Christmas describes the “African flavor” that Bahia offers to 
its African-American visitors: 
We felt the African pulse in the beat of samba, known as semba in An-
gola; swallowed it with the spicy food, made with nuts, coconut milk, 
ginger and okra also used in African cooking; witnessed it in Candomblé 
ceremonies, rooted in the religion of the Yorubas of Nigeria; heard it 
in the musical Yoruban accent of the Portuguese spoken in the state of 
Bahia. [...] Today Bahians seem far more aware of their origins than  
African-Americans are (Christmas 1992: 253-254). 
Bahia is described in this statement as a complete menu, in which the 
tourists can delight in the flavors of the various African origins of the 
traditions found in Brazil. Most of the African-American visitors I 
interviewed believe that Brazilian blacks enjoy the privilege of having 
better maintained the African culture of their ancestors. They also 
believe that as a consequence of their preserved African culture, Bra-
zilian blacks are “more aware” of their African origin than are Afri-
can-Americans.  
The search for African traditions is tied up with the tourists’ long-
ing to find “authenticity”. The desire to find “original black culture” 
has led them to deviate from the predominant route followed by inter-
national tourists in Brazil, one which usually takes them to the so--
called “post-cards of Rio de Janeiro” (the statue of Christ – Corco-
vado, the sugar loaf hills – Pão de Açúcar, the beach of Copacabana, 
etc.). Roots tourists prefer Bahia to Rio de Janeiro, because they argue 
that in Rio “African culture” has been disjointed from its origin, while 
in Bahia one can still find “more preserved” elements of the original 
culture brought by the African ancestors. Bahia is considered the pro-
ducer of black symbols labeled with the stamp of “African authentic-
ity”. In Rio de Janeiro, the syncretic presence of Umbanda, together 
with a carnival that has been transformed into a spectacle, point to a 
black culture that is believed to have become “too mixed” and “de-
tached from its origins”, while in Bahia, elements like Candomblé and 
samba-de-roda seem to provide proof of the “perpetuation of African-
isms” and therefore of a supposedly authentic (and purer) kind of 
black culture. The image of Bahia as the “blackest state of Brazil” 
results partially from scholarly work, such as its high position in Mel-
ville Herskovitz’s rank of Africanisms (1941), but it also has more 
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recent sources, among them the State Government’s efforts in promot-
ing Bahia as the “land of blackness” (Pinho 2004).  
Even within Bahia a specific cultural hierarchy is established, one 
that places more value on what is considered more “deeply African” 
among the cultural sets of Bahian “Africanness”. Instead of “capoeira 
regional”, which is considered “mixed”, the roots tourists prefer “ca-
poeira Angola” seen as “pure”. Rather than the younger houses of 
Candomblé, which are more explicitly influenced by Western Spirit-
ism, they favor the old “traditional” houses. In place of the bloco afro 
Olodum, which appears too modern, greater status is given to Ilê Aiyê 
because it is seen as more “faithful to its African traditions”. The 
blocos afro headquarters, the oldest of which is 30 years old, are gain-
ing a similar reputation of traditionality as the centenarian houses of 
Candomblé, also becoming “sacred places of pilgrimage” (Turner 
1969).5 I argue that the specific meanings of Brazil as a place to find 
“preserved African traditions” should be analyzed alongside the mean-
ings attributed to the other countries which compose the “map of Afri-
canness”. 
 
2. The Map of Africanness 
I am coining the term “map of Africanness” to refer to the group of 
countries visited by the African-American tourists. Evidently, I do not 
mean that African-Americans limit their tourism to these countries 
only. In fact, several of the tourists I interviewed are members of or-
ganizations such as the Travelers Century Club, which give awards to 
people who have visited 100 countries, 200 countries, and so on. This 
fact tells a great deal about who these tourists are since it indicates 
that many of them have a significant amount of disposable income to 
spend on leisure. Obviously not all African-Americans can afford to 
travel abroad. If there are so many differences – pertaining to age, 
religion, geographical origin, etc. – among African-American tourists, 
even greater discrepancies exist within the African-American popula-
tion as a whole. Heterogeneities among African-Americans are cer-
                                                     
5  It is important to notice that this notion of Bahia as a source of Africanness has 
also stimulated a yet incipient but growing internal cultural tourism in Brazil, in 
which black activists from Rio and Sao Paulo travel to Bahia to find the “source 
of Brazilian black culture”. 
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tainly taken into account in this research project, as well as the differ-
ent ways in which African-Americans from different social classes 
envisage Africa.6  
The “map of Africanness” that I am sketching here contains only 
those countries which the tourists visit with the explicit purpose of 
heightening their sense of black identity. One could correctly argue 
that visiting a European country would also be valuable for that effect. 
However, if I am to examine the tourists’ discourse, then the “map of 
Africanness” includes only those countries located in Africa and in the 
African diaspora. There is a hierarchy within this imaginary “map of 
Africanness”, in which each place is assigned a different meaning. 
Egypt is considered the “place of black pride”, the great proof of the 
existence of a magnificent black civilization prior to Rome or Greece, 
and therefore a reference to counter hegemonic Eurocentrism with an 
Afrocentrism based on the richness and great discoveries of the Nile. 
West African countries such as Ghana, Senegal, Nigeria and Benin are 
understood as the “place of origin”, the location from where the ances-
tors left to face the horrors of the Middle Passage; hence the dungeons 
and staging areas of the slave trade are the main attractions for the 
tourists in these countries. Brazil also has a specific meaning inside 
this map: it has become the “place to find preserved traditions”, hope-
fully the same traditions that are believed to have been lost among 
blacks in the United States.  
Consequently, the visitors sense the pride of visiting and connect-
ing with the sophisticated Egyptian and Ethiopian civilizations; they 
experience the suffering undergone by their ancestors when they go to 
the infamous “Doors of No Return” in West Africa; and they also feel 
the joy of attesting to the reality that descendants of slaves like them-
selves were able to maintain a rich African culture in the New World. 
Feelings of pain, joy, anger, and the jubilation of reconnection are 
inspired in each place visited in the “map of Africanness”.  
In Wonders of the African World, a pedagogical documentary cre-
ated to explain Africa to African-Americans, U.S. scholar Henry 
Louis Gates Jr. travels throughout the African continent, stopping at 
                                                     
6  The film Little Senegal, by Jean Bréhat and Rachid Bouchareb, offers a very 
interesting portrayal of the meanings of Africa and Africans for underprivileged 
African-Americans.  
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most of the countries that constitute what I am calling the map of Af-
ricanness. One of the reasons that stimulated Gates Jr. to make the 
documentary was that, in his own words: “like most African-Ameri-
cans of my generation, I’m obsessed with finding my roots”. While 
visiting Elmina Castle, Ghana, Gates Jr. affirms:  
We feel at home here because we are surrounded by black people. That’s 
why we come. But the memory of slavery and of what our ancestors 
must have gone through is always lurking. Even a pretty little harbor 
town like Elmina is dominated by a slave castle. And for us a slave castle 
is like Auschwitz.  
This is a strong statement and is obviously not the first to associate the 
horrors of African slavery to the terrors of the Jewish Holocaust. In-
deed, the comparison between African-American tourism to the slave 
dungeons in Africa and the so-called “holocaust tourism” carried out 
by Jews who visit the Nazi concentration camps is a very important -
one for both analytical and political reasons, and is examined in my 
work. However, as we can hear in Gates Jr.’s statement, African-
Americans visit Elmina and other slave sites in West Africa, not only 
to mourn the memory of the ancestors, but also “to be surrounded by 
black people”. Being among a black majority is undoubtedly one of 
the main reasons that attract African-American tourists to Brazil as 
well. The difference, nonetheless, is that in their visits to Brazil, the 
tourists don’t have to deal with the suffering attached to the fact that 
some Africans were themselves active slave owners and slave dealers, 
since in Brazil the “brothers and sisters” they reconnect with are per-
ceived as “siblings in destiny”, a term I am coining to represent the 
feeling of being among those who are marked by a similar trajectory.7 
Evidently, the idea that Afro-descendants in the diaspora form a spe-
cial kind of transnational “family” is not a new one. It can be traced 
back to the rhetoric of Pan-Africanism, and was of crucial importance 
for Marcus Garvey’s movement, and for the discourses of Négritude. 
African-American tourists in Brazil constantly comment that they 
could have been born there instead of in the United States. The unpre-
dictability of the destiny of their ancestors is conceived of together 
                                                     
7  There certainly were Brazilian Afro-descendants actively involved in the slave 
trade, however, this is not publicized by the Brazilian tourism industry. 
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with the certainty of their own common fate, marked by slavery, op-
pression, struggle and resistance.8 
African-American film maker Thomas Allen Harris describes his 
search for the African homeland outside of Africa: in Brazil. In his 
documentary, which carries the suggestive title That’s my Face (É a 
Minha Cara), Harris describes how his personal longings overlap with 
a wider African-American quest for a place where it is possible for a 
black person to feel comfortable. Revealingly, Harris finds “his face” 
in Bahia. “To find what I was looking for I had to go to Brazil”, we 
hear him declaring as if answering a whispering female voice that 
continuously sings in the background: “Go to Brazil: find the Orixás 
there…” Walking in the streets of Salvador on an ordinary hot after-
noon, Harris comes across another African-American visitor, who 
explains to him the reason for her visit:  
I needed to feel what it feels like to be part of the majority. I needed to be 
in a place where everyone else looked like me. I needed to be in a place 
that felt like home, not because I was born there, but because my spirit 
was at home there. 
Why has Brazil become an imagined home for African-Americans? 
How do we define “home-places” vis-à-vis “other people’s places”? 
How are these definitions related to how we conceive of the inhabi-
tants of the places we select, especially when we elect “home-places” 
in other countries? And how are these choices connected to our identi-
ties or to what we consider our identities to be? For Gillian Rose 
(1995), there are three ways in which emotions about places can be 
connected to the notion of identity: identifying with a place; identify-
ing against a place; or not identifying. When we identify with a place 
it is because, in some way, we feel that we belong to that place. We 
identify with places in which we feel comfortable, where we feel at 
home, because “part of how you define yourself is symbolized by 
certain qualities of that place” (Rose 1995: 89). Senses of place can 
                                                     
8  The statement of Congressman Charles Rangel upon the introduction of the 
House Concurrent Resolution 47 (2004) (that recognizes the connection between 
Afro-descendants in Latin America and the Caribbean and Afro-descendants in 
the US) reveals this feeling of kinship: “These people are our brothers and sisters 
through the slave trade and like us they are suffering from similar problems. The 
ships that brought us to the U.S. could have easily taken us to the Dominican Re-
public, Colombia or Brazil. I introduced this resolution as a reminder of our 
common history and need to work together to address our common problems.” 
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have different scales: local, regional, and national. What is novel 
about roots tourism is that it stimulates senses of place on a trans-
national scale, which goes beyond the boundaries of nations, and con-
ceives of dispersed people as part of a same group; in this case, the 
African diaspora: the black family. 
Having or wanting a place where we feel we belong is part of how 
we understand our own place in the world. The map of Africanness 
imagined by African-American tourists encompasses a number of 
different countries with different and specific meanings. Which are the 
places that African-Americans feel they belong to? Which are the 
different feelings they have for each of these places? I find the term 
“map” useful to reflect on these questions. Maps indicate a sense of 
shared connotations, a collective system of senses in the vein of what 
Stuart Hall has defined as “maps of meanings”: “the systems of shared 
meanings which people who belong to the same community, group, or 
nation use to help them interpret and make sense of the world” (Hall 
1995: 176). As Hall indicates, having a position within a set of shared 
meanings gives us a sense of who we are, and where we belong, in 
other words: a sense of our own identity.  
For Dolores Hayden (1995), we should think of places taking into 
account the many meanings of this word, and analyze them as cultural 
products. To “know someone’s place” implies spatial and political 
meanings. This expression has been widely used in Brazil in reference 
to black people. To say that “black people should know their place” is 
an obviously racist, but unfortunately still often heard statement, and 
implies at the same time physical location and social position. Since 
I am also interested in the impacts of African-American tourism on 
local people, it seems relevant to consider that the tourists have access 
to “places” (in both their spatial and political meanings) that Brazilian 
blacks many times do not. Expensive restaurants and fancy hotels, 
inaccessible for many Brazilian blacks, are easily accessed by black 
American tourists. On the other hand, even though black, they are still 
foreigners; they are still tourists, and are therefore seen as entitled to 
visiting expensive places. What does it mean for Brazilian blacks to 
see African-American visitors overcoming spatial barriers, if it indeed 
means something? This question is, as of yet, unanswered. 
Explaining the connections between power and place, Hayden 
(1995) asserts that one of the strategies used for disempowering cer-
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tain groups has been by limiting their access to space. Women and 
members of minority groups have been historically subjected to that 
kind of limitation. Gender and race can be mapped as a struggle over 
social reproduction, for which the production of place is essential. For 
Hayden, the expression “knowing one’s place” is revealing of the 
limitations imposed on these excluded groups. Consequently, the ef-
fort to regain places, or to establish new places as one’s own, is a 
struggle that occurs in the realm of power.  
Following Hayden, I argue that, by imagining their “physical” 
place as not just one but many places, African-Americans are strug-
gling to expand “their place” in US society, in the sense that they are 
not accepting the boundaries previously established on their social 
position. On the other hand, however, when choosing to visit places 
where they can find “African roots”, it seems to me that they are at the 
same time “knowing their place” since they are limiting the possibili-
ties to those places which are supposedly “African” or where one can 
find “African traditions”. For that reason, I argue that the map of Afri-
canness carries the contradiction of being at the same time broad and 
limited. It is broad for the reason that it includes a large number of 
countries and because it dares to envisage affiliations beyond national 
borders. On the other hand, the map of Africanness is limited because 
it upholds racial boundaries by restricting the imagined affiliation to 
specific countries and peoples considered to be holders of African 
roots. 
Traveling to places because we believe there are cultural traditions 
to be found there relates to a common and widely accepted notion that 
cultures – and, as a consequence, cultural identities – are embedded in 
places (Massey/Jess 1995). According to Stuart Hall (1995), we have 
a tendency to landscape cultural identities, to give them an imagined 
place or home. Diasporic affiliations, however, open up the possibility 
for contesting the way in which place has been traditionally connected 
to culture and identity.  
From the diaspora perspective, identity has many imagined “homes” (and 
therefore no one, single, original homeland); it has many different ways 
of “being at home” – since it conceives of individuals as capable of 
drawing on different maps of meaning, and of locating themselves in dif-
ferent imaginary geographies at one and the same time – but it is not tied 
to one particular place (Hall 1995: 207).  
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It seems to me, nonetheless, that there are interpretations of the dias-
pora which do not necessarily break with the notion of tradition as the 
element which links us to our origins in culture, place and time. In the 
case of roots tourism, the notion of diaspora is very much stimulated 
by a conservative conception of tradition9 which understands it “as a 
one-way transmission belt; an umbilical cord, which connects us to 
our culture of origin” (Hall 1995: 207). The map of Africanness, as 
imagined by the tourists, tries to fulfil the wish of a shared system of 
meanings among blacks in the diaspora but the more it is crisscrossed, 
the more it entails heterogeneity, especially in the ways in which 
blackness itself has been conceived. 
The concept of the map of Africanness is valuable because it indi-
cates that there is a correlation between the many places visited by the 
African-American tourists. The meanings attributed to one spot in the 
map are connected to meanings attributed to other places in the very 
same map. Consequently, it is a map built by complementariness and 
opposition. The uniqueness of a place in the map of Africanness is 
established in relation to what supposedly lacks in the other places, 
but most of all, within what African-American tourists believe lacks 
within themselves, or in the places where they live. The map of Afri-
canness is thus a diagram which traces the routes that are tracked in 
search of roots (Gilroy 1993).  
Although the many different places wandered by the tourists 
should be understood as complementary pieces of the same “map of 
Africanness”, there is, however, a fundamental distinction between the 
roots tourism developed in the West African countries and the one that 
is carried out on the “Diasporic side” of the Atlantic, and that distinc-
tion is one that involves pain and joy. The experience of visiting the 
dungeons and the menacing “Doors of No Return” evokes the horrors 
                                                     
9  David Harvey points to the limits of place-bounded identities: they have to rest at 
some point on the motivational power of tradition. However, it is difficult to 
maintain a sense of historical continuity in the face of the space-time compres-
sion of globalization. For Harvey, “the irony is that tradition is now often pre-
served by being commodified and marketed as such. The search for roots ends up 
at worst being produced and marketed as an image, as a simulacrum or pastiche 
(imitation communities constructed to evoke images of some folksy past […]. At 
best, historical tradition is reorganized as a museum culture […] of how things 
once upon a time were made, sold, consumed, and integrated into a long-lost and 
often romanticized daily life […]” (Harvey 1989: 304). 
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suffered by the ancestors, and many tourists are reported to have wept 
in silence or screamed out loud to express how deeply devastated they 
felt when visiting these places. Conversely, while visiting Brazil, the 
roots tourists don’t have to deal with the pains associated with the 
horrors of slavery. Instead, being in Brazil instils in them the joy of 
connecting with “a culture that was able to survive”, and with a people 
that managed to preserve the cultural connections with Africa. 
 
3. The Place of Brazil in the Map of Africanness 
The feeling of joy felt by the tourists in Brazil is mainly promoted by 
the tourist agencies that have little interest in publicizing the country’s 
enormous racial and social inequalities and the still very present leg-
acy of slavery. Although there are agencies in Brazil that specialize in 
exploring poverty and which carry out “favela-tours”, Bahia is still 
mostly rhymed with “alegria”,10 an image in which black culture plays 
the central role. A symptomatic example of this is the way in which 
Pelourinho is represented. The word pelourinho was used in the slav-
ery period to describe the public places where slaves were whipped 
(sometimes to death). Today, the term Pelourinho names the neighbor-
hood located in the most touristy area of Salvador. There is no monu-
ment there symbolizing the pain inflicted on the slaves. Instead, Pe-
lourinho is associated with pleasure. Its colorful streets are filled with 
souvenir stores and it is the place where the bloco afro Olodum holds 
its concerts for natives and tourists. Pelourinho is a must-visit place 
for anyone that comes to Bahia, and those who visit it ironically 
dance, drink and enjoy themselves while treading on the same cobble-
stoned streets in which African slaves were beaten and punished not 
much more than a hundred years ago. 
However, in spite of all the joy and excitement experienced during 
their visits to Brazil, African-American visitors also have to deal with 
their own frustrations, especially when they realize that Brazilian 
blacks have other ways of understanding blackness and Africanness. 
One of the most striking disappointments among the tourists revolves 
                                                     
10  The word “alegria” means joy, happiness, pleasure, bliss. Besides the constant 
rhyming of Bahia with “alegria” in songs and poems, the official slogan of the 
State Government tourism agency (Bahiatursa) is “Bahia: terra da felicidade” 
(“Bahia: land of happiness”). 
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around the fact that the black Sisterhood of the Good Death worships 
a white saint. The affiliation of the sisters to both Candomblé and 
Catholicism, already confusing and disappointing enough for the tour-
ists, is usually understood as a lack of “purity” and “authenticity”. For 
the Sisterhood, however, the cult of Our Lady of Glory is located 
within a context of religious syncretism that, in itself, represents a 
strategy of struggle and survival of African beliefs. Therefore, it is 
important to analyse the different ways in which black communities 
conceive of blackness and Africanness, recognizing that ready-made 
constituencies are many times frustrated and go un-corresponded. 
Roots tourism in Bahia can be analysed as part of the wider proc-
ess of international exchange of black symbols and objects throughout 
the diaspora, or what Paul Gilroy defined as the black Atlantic, where 
elements of black politics and aesthetics constantly travel among 
black communities, detaching from their local origins and becoming 
re-elaborated in new contexts. The novelty brought by black roots 
tourism is that it destabilizes the hegemony of US-centric conceptions 
of blackness by promoting locations previously seen as peripheral in 
the African diaspora. 
Nevertheless, roots tourism does not completely invert the hierar-
chy within the black Atlantic. First, there is an intrinsic inequality in 
tourism between those who have access to travel and those who do not 
(MacCannell 1992). And in the case of African-American roots tour-
ism, a second kind of inequality is propagated through the visitors’ 
belief that they will exchange their modernity – represented especially 
by the history of Black Power and the Civil Rights movement – for 
the traditions that Brazilian blacks are supposedly privileged to be 
able to maintain. This obviously unequal and hierarchical exchange 
between African-Americans and the local black communities they 
visit takes place not only in Brazil, but also on the African continent, 
as demonstrated by Paulla Ebron in Performing Africa:  
Indeed, the travelers expressed their worry that Africa unfortunately 
lagged behind in material ways. Luckily, they had a solution to the conti-
nent’s “problems”. As businessmen, with a consciousness of course, they 
would develop Africa (Ebron 2002: ix). 
Thus, at the same time that the process of roots tourism offers the 
possibility of challenging traditional North-South flows of cultural 
exchange, it also confirms the existing hierarchy within the black At-
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lantic. The most important poles remain firmly situated in the Anglo-
phone North, a fact which reflects the weak positions of African and 
Latin American countries in the context of the global configuration of 
power. The unequal distribution of power has terrible consequences 
not only for those located in the southern hemisphere but also affects 
those who inhabit the economic and political centers, especially by 
increasing their already sizeable unawareness toward the “rest of the 
world”. 
African-American tourists, earnestly interested in building trans-
national connections and, of course, favored by material resources, 
manage to transcend this generalized ignorance. Therefore an exami-
nation of roots tourism promises to reveal the ways in which Southern 
communities are creating new definitions of blackness and exporting 
their own symbols, objects, concepts, and ideas – all of which demon-
strate that new paths are being opened up and that international chan-
nels of communication and circulation can follow other directions. 
There certainly are alternative ways of understanding the African 
diaspora and the webs that connect and multiply dynamic, inter-
changeable and hybrid black cultures. More than mere repeaters of 
traditions, black cultures can be understood as cultures that are created 
through dynamic global fluxes of communications and exchanges, and 
that does not mean we must refute their African inheritance or their 
black particularity. My intention with this analysis is neither to evalu-
ate the purity of cultural claims, nor to measure their level of truth or 
falsity. Valuing imagination and invention, the notion of the map of 
Africanness assesses tourism as a space for the creation and struggle 
over discourses of identities, memories of Africanness and represen-
tations of blackness. As an open-ended search, roots tourism carries 
within it an immeasurable treasure: the possibility of overcoming the 
very geography of power which thus far has permeated the map of 
Africanness. 
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Marjo de Theije 
Migration and Religious Transnationalism: 
Recent Research and the Case of the Brazilians 
in Suriname 
The Brazilians have the same problems 
here as they have in Brazil 
(Female member of Deus é Amor church 
in Paramaribo, Surinam, March 2004) 
1. Introduction 
In Latour, a working-class neighbourhood on the outskirts of Para-
maribo, three Brazilian catholic priests run the parish. They are mem-
bers of the Congregação Missionária Redentorista and arrived in Su-
riname in 2001 to replace the Dutch Redemptorist friars that had 
served the Surinamese Catholics for many decades. In Combé, another 
part of the capital of Surinam, there is a Deus é Amor (God is Love) 
church, founded in 1998 and there are now already six other groups 
formed, four congregations in the town or nearby, and two in the 
woods, at the garimpos Benzdorp and Vila Brasil respectively, all 
founded by Brazilian missionaries. There is also an Assembléia de 
Deus (Assembly of God) church, linked to the Surinamese Gemeenten 
Gods (Surinamese Communities of God), but with a Brazilian pastor. 
And finally there is a Baptist mission with Brazilian missionaries in-
volved in it, as I was told.  
Next to these religious people an unknown number of lay Brazil-
ians is living in Paramaribo now, many of them in a part of the Tour-
tonne neighbourhood that is nicknamed Klein (i.e. small) Belem, or 
(in Portuguese) Belenzinho.1 These Brazilians came to Suriname in a 
very recent flow of migration: In the past few years tens of thousands 
of Brazilians have come to Suriname, and to British and French  
                                                     
1  Belem is the capital of the Northern Brazilian state Pará, connected directly to 
Paramaribo through six flights weekly. Klein Belem is located at the Anamou-
straat, in Tourtonne, Paramaribo-North.  
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Guyana. According to journalistic sources as many as 40.000 Brazil-
ians have found a home in Suriname since 1995, although other com-
mentators hold lower numbers, e.g. the vice-consul estimated that 
20.000-30.000 Brazilians live in Surinam in 2005. The census of 2005 
comes up with an estimation of almost 20.000 in the same year 
(Algemeen Bureau Voor De Statistiek 2006); in any case we are talk-
ing about a considerable population. Of these not even 3.000 were 
registered at the consulate in March 2004.2 Many of these Brazilian 
migrants arrive as gold prospectors or are involved in related activi-
ties, such as commerce or prostitution, and start their trans-border life 
in the woods, but increasingly they are settling in the country’s capi-
tal. 
Throughout its history, Brazil has experienced an intense move-
ment of internal migration, from the coastal zones to the interior states 
and from the northeastern countryside to the industrial urban areas in 
the Southeast. Millions of Brazilians moved in the past century, but 
they largely remained within the borders of the nation. Brazilians 
leaving the country only started to become large in numbers during 
the economic crisis of the 1980s. More than one million Brazilians 
lived outside the country in the 1990s, mainly in the USA, Japan and 
Paraguay.3 The movement of people between Brazil and its neigh-
bouring countries is quite stable, with Argentina both receiving and 
sending most migrants over the last decades (Hasenbalg/Frigerio 
1999). A specific type of migration is the trans-border movement, in 
the Amazon region, a movement that is relatively invisible, and in-
volves a constant come and go instead of a stream in one direction. 
It’s invisibility results from the fact that it concerns manual workers 
and peasants, and in the case of Suriname garimpeiros, who don’t 
have legal documents and who largely work outside the registered and 
monitored circuits of the urban centres. From the 1980s onward tens 
of thousands of Brazilians also migrated to French Guyana, to find a 
                                                     
2  Interview ambassador and vice-consul, March 11, 2005. 
3  Wilson Loria (1999) writes about 600,000 to one million Brazilians living in the 
U.S. alone. Major cities where there is a Brazilian agglomeration are Newark, 
New York, Miami, Boston, Framingham, Somerville, Los Angeles, Berkeley, 
and San Francisco. Beserra (2003: 6) mentions that almost 800.000 Brazilians 
live in the USA, 454.500 in Paraguay and 224.229 in Japan, according to Itama-
raty.  
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living in the construction works related to the Kourou space centre. 
30% of the Guyana population (total almost 200.000 2006) is Brazil-
ian now (Arouck 2000; 2002) and in the other neighbouring country, 
Guyana, Brazilians are active in (diamond) mining too. 
About the backgrounds of the Brazilian migrants in the Guyana’s 
little is known so far. Given their occupations in the new country, they 
do not come from the affluent part of Brazilian population. Most of 
these migrants had little schooling and come from the poorer areas of 
Brazil, and many already migrated in Brazil before they moved to 
Surinam, British Guyana or French Guyana. According to several 
people 95% of the women migrants are from Belem, and 95% of the 
men from the state of Maranhão, but these numbers are not based on 
systematic research.4 The vice-consul estimated that 90% of the Bra-
zilian migrants come from northern Brazil, and 70% of these from 
rural Maranhão, where poverty is most severe.5 Other sources state 
that the Brazilians come from Amapá mainly, where they already 
were engaged in gold mining (Hoogbergen et al. 2001). My observa-
tions and interviews with migrants confirm that most come from the 
Northern states: Pará and Maranhão, and in lesser numbers also Piauí, 
Tocantins, Amazonas.  
The emigration of such large numbers of Brazilians turned our at-
tention to the role of religion in the migration process. In Brazil relig-
ion takes such an important place in social and cultural life that the 
question arises as to what happens with the religious lives of transmi-
grants in the host countries. In Paramaribo the presence of Brazilian 
religion is visible and known by all in the form of the Pentecostal 
churches and the Catholic priests. But how is the involvement of the 
Brazilian migrants, the people who live in Paramaribo working in 
shops, restaurants, bars, nightclubs, and the prostitutes and garim-
peiros who come to town from the woods periodically, in the available 
religious options? In this paper I will explore the interconnection be-
tween religion, migration and transnationalism. Starting from the 
available material on transnational migration – of Brazilians but not 
alone – we will attempt an overview of contemporary research into the 
                                                     
4  Interview José Cardoso Neto, March 4, 2004. Cardoso is the president of the 
Cooperative of gold workers in Suriname (Cooperativa dos garimpeiros no Suri-
name – COGASUR). 
5  Interview March 8, 2004. 
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transnational socio-religious field. I will use this overview then, to 
formulate some first analyses of the data I gathered with respect to the 
religious aspects of the lives of the Brazilians in Paramaribo, Surinam. 
 
2. Transnationalism and Transnational Religion  
Scholars of transnationalism and transnational migration only recently 
started to pay attention to religion (although some authors have fur-
nished interesting overviews of the field already; cf. Levitt 2001b; 
Vertovec 2000). Slowly it is being acknowledged that religion plays 
an important role in the organisation of migration, community build-
ing by migrants and all kinds of transnational links between home and 
host countries. In the research on transnationalism much more atten-
tion has been given to questions concerning the role of the nation-
state, such as the redefinition of the boundaries, political organisation 
and the sending of remittances. But to understand transnational migra-
tion, the nation-state is no longer the correct entity. According to Ver-
tovec (2000: 13) we should understand transnationalism as the  
actual, ongoing exchanges of information, money and resources – as well 
as regular travel and communication – that members of a diaspora may 
undertake with others in the homeland or elsewhere within the globalised 
ethnic community. 
As Margolis also rightly puts it (following Basch et al. 1994): “immi-
grants become transmigrants by constructing social fields that ignore 
geographic, political and cultural boundaries”, thus making the home 
and host society a single field for action (Margolis 1995: 29). Of 
course migration is only one form of transnationalism, and there are 
many other “cross-border” activities that deserve attention, such as – 
with respect to religion – missionary activities. 
Contemporary study of migration uses the concept of transnation-
alism to emphasize the fluidity of space and place, the (imagined) 
communities created in the process, the permeability of borders, etc., 
concepts that express a shift from the ‘materialist economistic’ focus 
to attention on the subjective experiences of migration (Lewellen 
2002). Transnationalism then, is not so much a theory as a set of ideas 
and conceptual tools for analysis that are meant to do justice to the 
fluidity and movement involved. Some important aspects of analysis 
should be the rethinking of the ideas of space and place, and the power 
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processes involving identity politics connected to these notions (2002: 
136-137). Olwig (2003) argues transnational migration also means 
that migrants not only maintain a personal connection with their home 
country, but also “are pushed back to the country they have left by the 
receiving country because they are categorized and perceived in this 
country in terms of their origins in another nation-state”. This origin 
marks them as different and in many countries (e.g. in the US, which 
recognizes dual citizenship), allows them to be active in two different 
nations-states. “The immigrants, in other words, are perceived to be 
transnational” (Olwig 2003: 68). 
What does this mean for religion? It is safe to say that transna-
tional religion takes place in a much larger context: economic, politi-
cal, social and cultural. In a recent paper Levitt (2003) makes a use-
ful distinction between transnational religion and the religious prac-
tices of transnational migrants. Transnational religion as it appears in 
scholarly texts has not so much to do with migration, but instead 
points to the ways in which world religions create a transnational civil 
society that challenges the nation (Rudolph/Piscatori 1997). In this 
context several authors have addressed questions of the pluralisation 
of religion in relation to globalizing relations between peoples (Peter-
son et al. 2001b). Others have pointed to the role of religion in mi-
grant and diaspora communities (Brettell 2003; Levitt 2001a; 2003; 
Vertovec 2000).  
The religious beliefs and practices of migrants, their local organi-
sations and informal attachments to religious communities, the way 
they construct identities and notions of belonging within the religious 
context, are at another level of analysis and abstraction. The religious 
practices of transnational migrants are nevertheless often connected to 
transnational religion, “because transnational migration households, 
congregations and communities are sites where diasporic, global and 
transnational religions are created” (Levitt 2003: 849). The distinction 
is therefore mainly a question of focus; do we want to clarify the local 
community and the processes of identity formation, community or-
ganisation and religious meaning making? Or are we interested in the 
larger structures? In this paper I will concentrate on the first option. 
Several authors have designed descriptions for the concepts used 
in this context. According to Schiller transnational religion refers to 
the religious practices, discursive and non-discursive, and the institu-
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tional form of a religion, that are lived at different places, and in 
which the daily practice of both locations is part of the same social 
field. Religion is a social field just as kinship, friendship, business or 
politics, and the transnational social fields are the life world of the 
migrants that are part of daily life in two societies: their society of 
origin and their society of settlement (Levitt 2003; 2004; Menjívar 
1999; 2000; Peterson et al. 2001a; 2001b; Vásquez/Marquardt 2003). 
Transnational religion thus makes it possible for individuals to have 
their religious lives across international borders. 
It is not difficult to think of religion as an important element in 
immigrant communities. Religious institutions, international, have 
been important resources for migrant groups in which identities are 
reproduced and produced in new their environment, churches forming 
a basis enabling migrants to adapt to their new situation while main-
taining the connection with their cultural background (Yang/Ebaugh 
2001). Immigrants establish networks and relationships to survive in 
the new country, and regional and other identities clearly delineate 
groups and bring people together. Religious resources help migrants to 
adapt to the demands of the new society and answer to the challenges 
to survive in often very harsh circumstances. According to Guest 
(2003) religion is the principal organizer of the social networks Chi-
nese immigrants create in New York and of utmost importance, be-
cause the religious communities – Catholic, Protestant, Buddhist or 
Daoist – are the main field for the mobilization of the social capital 
that these immigrants need to survive in the US.  
Religion is particularly strong in constructing communities among 
adherents, offering security both connected to the world of God and 
gods, as to the here and now in the local group. In the case of migrant 
populations, the communities formed religiously easily include trans-
national links. The ties between the home community and the host 
community constructed through religion may be of various kinds and 
exist on various levels. They can be limited to individual and personal 
links of members of the religious groups, be they ordinary church-
goers or priests, pastors or other religious specialists. In her ethnogra-
phy of the ‘transnational villagers’ between Miraflores and Boston, 
Levitt (Levitt/Peggy 2001c) shows how migrants use religion to pro-
duce links of belonging transnationally, and maintain double alle-
giances. The ties can also be institutional ties, established between 
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local groups in home and host communities. Especially when people 
from the same hometown or village form migrant communities, it is 
likely that such institutional ties are created. Levitt mentions financial 
and material support of US Catholic parishes for particular Dominican 
parishes and exchange programs for seminarians between the two 
countries Levitt (2001c: 167). But also without clear institutional 
links, religious groups may be mobilized as a support network with 
great symbolic importance (Sandoval 2002).  
Religion may be primarily a local and localizing force in either 
home or host society, or in both. Levitt (2001c) asserts that Dominican 
Catholicism was largely a lay business until recently and therefore 
migrants are quite prepared to do things themselves. However, the 
Catholicism they knew in the Dominican Republic was very much 
connected to the territory in which it was lived out. Stripped of this 
territorial stage, it lost much of its validity in the new context in the 
host country USA. Therefore it is also logical that a special attraction 
may reside in the transnational character of many religious traditions. 
In its orientation to global and universal truths, religion may become a 
potent transnational force that makes sense in the new society without 
a direct reference to the home country. 
A case in point is Roman Catholicism, which can be considered an 
old transnational system, one of the most international institutions in 
the world. It has been part of a translocal and transcultural project 
from the start, and uses largely the same symbols and rituals world-
wide – making it easy for migrants to participate in the host commu-
nity. There is a large recognition and this creates a feeling of home in 
the host context. For Catholics this makes it relatively easy to partici-
pate in the services in other places, even in other languages. They 
need not put in much effort. This can be convenient, especially when 
people do not have the desire to spend much time and energy in it. 
People who live their lives across borders, earning money in one place 
to send it to another place, might not be very motivated to get in-
volved in church life altogether. 
Simultaneously, the Roman Catholic Church spreads its universals 
and adapts them to local cultures, developing practices and experi-
ences rooted in particular cultural contexts. Elsewhere, Mariz and I 
have discussed the contemporary tension between the “localizing” and 
“globalizing” elements for Brazilian lay groups (Mariz/Theije 2001; 
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see also Theije 2006a). In Brazil, as in other parts of the world, Ca-
tholicism to some extent also adopts localized appearances when it 
becomes the religion of the people. The representatives of the “offi-
cial”, or institutional, Church use the expression catolicismo popular 
(popular Catholicism, or religiosidade popular, popular religion) for 
the result of the translation into local culture. Several researchers have 
reported that the same happens in the host countries where migrants 
adapt to or develop specific forms of Catholicism.  
But other religions can rely on transnational networks too. In a 
very interesting comparison between Salvadoran street gangs and 
Pentecostal churches, Gómez/Vásquez (2001) show that in these Pen-
tecostal churches the cross-border activities include the monitoring of 
the youngsters from the gangs and helping them into another life, in 
the US or in Salvador. Pentecostals build on many, horizontal net-
works of transnational churches. Catholicism, with its history of uni-
versal and global organisation and mission, seems to be paradoxically 
less transnational, according to Peterson/Vasquez (2001) in their re-
search on Charismatic Salvadorans in El Salvador and in Washington, 
because in its organisation it emphases the localisation of beliefs and 
practices. Of course there are transnational links, but these are the 
result of individual initiatives and not part of an institutional strategy. 
Studies on migrants in North America show that religion is an im-
portant element in the reconfiguration of the migrants identity in the 
host society, also because US cultural policy promotes e sustains the 
religious expression of migrant groups (for example Hepner 2003 on 
migrants from Eritrea and Guest 2003 on Chinese migrants). Religion 
furnishes elements for the construction of a new identity, or is the 
main source for the maintenance of an identity linked to the home 
country. Religious identities and practices also enable migrants to 
sustain membership in multiple locations. In her study of Dominican 
migrants in the US, Levitt (2001a: 160) found that  
membership in the religious organizational system linking Boston and 
the Dominican Republic allows individuals to move almost seamlessly 
between these two settings, thereby facilitating their continued involve-
ment in their sending community at the same time that they are assimilat-
ing into the United States. 
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It goes without saying that in all these instances, religion can deeply 
influence the lives of migrants, and their relation to home and host 
community, religiously defined or not. 
 
3. Brazilian Emigration and Religion  
Just as the eye for religion within migration studies in general is rela-
tively new, so it is in studies on Brazilian migration. Quite some re-
search has been done, but what do these works say with respect to 
religion? Migration of Brazilian citizens is best documented in the 
case of the US (Beserra 1998; 2003; Fleischer 2002; Margolis 1994; 
1995; 1998; Martes 2000; Reis/Sales 1999; Ribeiro 1999; Sales 
1999a; 1999b). In one case, that of the Brazilian city Governador Va-
ladares, probably the best known case of en “emigrant town” religion 
might be the origin of the flux of people to the USA. In the 1930s and 
1940s several missionaries settled and founded churches in Gover-
nador Valadares, that later would offer the possibility to the Brazilian 
converts to travel or move to the USA (Goza 2003: 269).  
Sometimes religion can be seen as the main motivation for migra-
tion, as is the case with missionaries or when religious servants of the 
home community go to the host community to serve the religious 
needs of the migrants. Research among Brazilians in Los Angeles 
showed that the First Adventist Church of the Portuguese language is 
a very important organizer of migrant lives (Beserra 2003: 79-116). 
Beserra describes how in the case of these Brazilians in Los Angeles, 
their religious group functioned also as recruiting device, the core 
around which the social network of the migrant is constructed. In his 
study of Brazilian Nikkei in Japan, Linger (2001) found a missionary 
family of the Assembléia de Deus living in Toyota. The presence of 
the pastors of Deus é Amor in Paramaribo can be interpreted this way. 
Although missionaries often only stay for a limited number of years, 
they may open a route so to say that others can take afterwards. 
In Argentina religion seems to play no significant role in the so-
ciability of the Brazilian migrants (Hasenbalg/Frigerio 1999). Other 
research however, showed that churches are in fact the only institu-
tional structures in the Brazilian immigrant community in New York 
(Margolis 1995) and Boston (Martes 1999; 2000). Research in the 
USA highlights religion as an important factor in the lives of the mi-
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grants, not in the least because it is a chief provider of material and 
emotional support. It is not uncommon for churches to offer all kinds 
of services to the migrants, which is very important for many, espe-
cially those who recently arrived and don’t speak the language nor 
know ‘the way’ to resolve practical problems, as was showed in the 
research of Alves/Ribeiro (2002) in Florida. Next to personal contacts, 
pure necessity of help and assistance attracts people to the Brazilian 
churches. Research in Los Angeles showed that the First Adventist 
Church forms the centre of a social network for migrants from Brazil 
(Beserra 2003). Alves/Ribeiro (2002) underscore the social security 
aspect of religion. They found that the churches offered many kinds of 
social help to the migrants, ranging from financial donations to offer-
ing housing – or at least a bed to sleep in. In the absence of civil or-
ganisations, consular services were even offered through one of the 
protestant churches. In fact, among Brazilians in the US religious 
groups appear to be the only existing institutions, as was shown in 
research in New York (Margolis 1994) and Boston (Martes 1999; 
2000; Sales 1999a).6  
Researchers repeatedly find a lack of organization among Brazil-
ians in other countries. A lack of organization in the host country may 
point to the fact that these people are more oriented to their home 
country. Research in the USA also shows that Brazilian migrants  
develop less mutual help as compared to the Chinese migrant groups 
for example. Brazilians are more divided, to such an extent that Mar-
golis (2003: 60) even speaks of “the discourse of Brazilians speaking 
ill of one another”. Arouck (2000: 76) found in French Guyana that 
even the carnival parties were differentiated. He explains this differ-
ence by referring to class differences between the migrants, a sugges-
tion that is also found in the work of (Resende 2003) who compares 
two neighbourhoods in Miami.  
                                                     
6  Faist (2000) called attention to the political aspects of transnational spaces in 
which migrants move. With respect to the formation of transnational communi-
ties and what they call a “transnational public sphere”, Levitt/Dehesa (2003) 
point to the fact that the policies that countries adopt to incorporate emigrant 
communities are important. In their research, they found that the Brazilian state is 
not very successful in constructing a space for civic engagement because it has a 
top-down approach in the policies it develops. This might contribute to the im-
portance of religion in the Brazilian migrant communities. 
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The religious situation in societies of settlement is often quite dif-
ferent as compared to Brazil, but in most countries we find a religious 
field with as many options and as diverse as it is in Brazil. However, 
the circumstances of migrant life may also create other expectations 
and necessities as compared to the society of origin. This may make 
people chose adherence to other churches than to the home religious 
community. Research in the US showed that Brazilian migrants are 
more often members of evangelical churches than they are in Brazil 
(Martes 2000: 116). Furthermore, of this larger number of evangeli-
cals, more are men as compared to the churches in Brazil (Alves/ 
Ribeiro 2002: 68).  
A last point of interest is language. In the process of organizing 
their own religious groups, language skills seem to play a mayor role. 
Thus in New York there is a Brazilian parish, with Portuguese lan-
guage services that is very popular among the Brazilians (Margolis 
1998: 89). However, a much-reported characteristic of the new local 
forms is that they are less connected to a specific local context, and in 
most cases also less to a specific people. In fact, it is reported that the 
Catholic Church in the US helps to create a meaningful social field for 
Hispanic migrants, regardless of the country where they come from, 
and including the Brazilians. The Church thus helps to “[…] shape 
migrants’ political relationship with the broader receiving context by 
encouraging […] either a pan-Latino solidarity of resistance or a His-
panic multiculturalism” (Vásquez/Marquardt 2003: 166). 
Several authors suggest that the transnational character of many 
religions may be attractive to migrants because they than feel they 
are a part of a larger group. The research of Levitt among migrants 
from Governador Valadares underscores the importance of a religious 
membership that is the key to an American-Brazilian identity (2003: 
864). And this not only counts for the migrants in the societies of set-
tlement. The non-migrants in Governador Valadares also are part of 
the transnational religious field, when they watch televised masses 
from Massachusetts to see their relatives on the screen (Levitt 2004: 
1).  
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4. Transnational Religion in Suriname 
The Brazilian population in Suriname differs substantially from the 
migrant communities in the US or elsewhere. Most migrants work as 
garimpeiros and live in the forest, far away from urban Paramaribo, in 
small relatively isolated groups. Most men and women have no family 
in the garimpo, and the social ties in workforces are often unstable, 
people switch often from one work place to another and might travel 
at a regular base between the interior and Paramaribo or Brazil too. In 
Paramaribo part of the Brazilians have settled with their families, but 
most are singles who stay in town temporarily, between periods in the 
forest, or going to Brazil after a time of work, varying from several 
year to some months. The people who stay and work in Paramaribo 
prefer to go to Brazil on a regular basis also because they need to re-
new their visa. Others remain years in a row without legal documents, 
especially when they live in the garimpo. In some places small ham-
lets developed where bordellos are based, and where shops and bars 
sell food, drinks, clothing, and utensils for the work. These hamlets 
than become the centres for large areas in the forest where the inde-
pendent workers extract the gold. The largest of these hamlets house 
several Pentecostal churches also.  
The composition of the Brazilian population in Suriname, in the 
forest and in town, influences the religious activities they develop. 
First, there is a general lack of organization, of which possible repre-
sentatives such as the priests, or the president of the association of 
garimpeiros complained. Several people suggested that this lack of 
organization is a consequence of the undocumented status of most 
migrants the country. Organizing would mean becoming more visible. 
Another explanation put forward is the supposed temperament of the 
garimpeiros; “they are like nomads” said the vice-consul, explaining 
they have other problems to deal with than to worry about their legal 
rights and documents for example (Theije 2006b). Under these cir-
cumstances, religion appears to be the only field where at least some 
kind of organisation is reached. This is not a surprise, as religion is an 
important factor in cultural, social and political life in Brazil, and the 
experience of Brazilian migrants in other countries shows that this 
pattern is followed elsewhere too. So, religion is a means of organisa-
tion in Suriname too, albeit of limited scope. Many migrants told me 
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they were not participating in religious affairs in Suriname, although 
they used to be practicing in Brazil. In this section I will discuss some 
characteristics of the religious practices of the Brazilians in Suriname: 
the available religious structure in the country, the problem of lan-
guage, and the transnational religious elements.  
Just like Brazil, Suriname is a religiously plural society. The popu-
lation of less than half a million people is more or less equally divided 
between Hinduism, Catholicism, Protestant Christianity (the Evange-
lische Broedergemeente, the Herrnhutter community, is the largest 
group, but Pentecostal groups are growing) and Islam (Algemeen Bu-
reau Voor De Statistiek 2006: 33). Apart from these ‘world religions’ 
many Surinamese are involved in Winti, an Afro-Surinamese cult that 
is especially popular among urban creoles. The religious institutions, 
structures and networks that the Brazilian immigrants encounter in 
Suriname are largely built from these ingredients. All of these relig-
ions with the exception of Winti have institutionalized practices but 
also know many informal elements. The catholic and protestant beliefs 
are similar to those in Brazil. Contrary to what maybe is expected 
Winti is quite different from Afro-Brazilian religions (due to the syn-
cretism with a different Christian church). However, similar to the 
Brazilian situation there always seems to be place for new churches 
also. I will come to that in a moment. Let me first say something brief 
on each of the religions. 
The Herrnhutter religion is the largest protestant church in the 
country. Although it is different from protestant and Pentecostal 
churches in Brazil, it attracted many Brazilian migrants that arrived in 
the 1980s and 1990s. However, several Brazilians who have lived for 
ten or fifteen years in Paramaribo said that after many years of being 
a member of the Evangelische Broedergemeente, lately they are 
participating in the Brazilian Pentecostal churches that were founded 
in Paramaribo since the end of the 1990s. The many Pentecostal 
churches that are available now, indeed attract most part of the Brazil-
ians who develop religious activities, not only in town (where more 
options are available), but also in the larger garimpos in the forest, 
where they are the only churches present. Surinamese Catholicism has 
no parishes in the gold fields, but in town Catholicism is well organ-
ized. The Surinamese Catholic Church followed the policy for many 
years to minister to every ethnic group with clergy from the same 
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group. So for example they would have a Javanese priest for the Java-
nese Catholics, a Chinese priest for the Chinese Catholics, etc. As part 
of what is called the nationalistic policy this was changed some time 
ago (Vernooij 1998). From that time on, parishioners and priests 
would preferably no longer come from the same ethnic group. In a 
land of many languages and ethnic groups a recent result of this policy 
is that there are now Portuguese-speaking Brazilian priests in the  
Creole, Dutch and Sranantongo-speaking, neighbourhood Latour and 
Dutch-speaking Belgian priests in the Portuguese-speaking Brazilian 
neighbourhood Tourtonne.  
For the Brazilians the fact that they do not speak the local lan-
guage is an obstacle for their religious participation in Surinamese 
congregations. Catholics would attend in one of the parishes in Para-
maribo where a weekly mass in Spanish was offered, which was the 
nearest to their mother tongue. Recently a Portuguese speaking nun 
and the Brazilian priests of Latour have started to organise a special 
Mass in Portuguese once or twice a month in Tourtonne. However, 
this is not a very structural solution, which can be seen as a sign that 
offering services to national communities is not a priority of the Suri-
namese Catholic church. The prevailing policy is directed to integra-
tion. Before they started in the parish, the Catholic priests spent sev-
eral months in the Netherlands to learn Dutch, the official language in 
Surinam. 
The policy of Pentecostalism with respect to language is the oppo-
site. All Brazilian Pentecostal services are administered in Portuguese 
and the Pentecostal pastors do not speak Dutch or Sranantongo. Sev-
eral Brazilians that had been living in Suriname for many years al-
ready and had become members of Surinamese churches are now at-
tracted to the Portuguese language used in the churches and some 
have become members of the Deus é Amor community recently. Just 
like in Brazil the members of the Pentecostal churches are referred to 
as brothers and sisters, and in town as well as in the garimpo they 
were respected inhabitants. Even Brazilians that identified as Catho-
lics would “visit” a Pentecostal church now and then. They did not 
convert, and did not consider themselves members of this church, but 
they liked the “praising God, pray, and hear the Word”. To find this 
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“I enter in any church”, said garimpeiro Raílson.7 And for this, the 
language is very important, more important than the religious tradition 
of the prayer or preaching. The mixture of different religious tradi-
tions that is so characteristic for Brazilian popular religiosity, finds an 
extra motivation in this situation of a migrant population that does not 
speak the language of the country it lives in. Interestingly, the Portu-
guese language services of the Deus é Amor church started to attract 
Surinamese people too, so that now there is simultaneous translation 
whenever there is someone available who has a command of Portu-
guese and Dutch or Sranantongo.  
Both the Catholic priests and the Pentecostal pastors declare that 
the Brazilian population of Suriname comes to the churches because 
they have many problems and are looking for a spiritual consolation. 
Many health problems, poverty because the profits form the garimpo 
are declining, or because for some reason the person lost all he or she 
had, and for the rest all the same problems as they would have in Bra-
zil, such as discordance in the family and worries in relation to rela-
tionships and love. Apart from religions’ feature of offering security 
both connected to the world of God and gods, as to the here and now 
in the local group, the transnational character of many religions may 
be attractive to Brazilian migrants in Surinam. The local Catholic 
structure is of course part of the transnational and global network of 
Roman Catholicism, and of the Redemptorist religious order. As a 
global institution the Catholic Church aims at centralizing and control-
ling the practices and beliefs of its followers. At the same time, how-
ever, it has to give room for adaptation to the local context 
(Mariz/Theije 2001). In Surinam, with respect to Catholicism it ap-
pears to be a sign of the times that the Redemptorist congregation that 
almost founded and surely structured Catholicism in the country for 
almost a century substituted its Dutch missionaries for Brazilian friars 
recently. And this is not the only link between Brazilian and Surinam-
ese Catholicism. The Sisters of Paramaribo also have connections in 
Brazil, and one of the Surinamese nuns who lived for many years in 
Brazil, is now a mediator and contact person for many Brazilians in 
trouble. In collaboration with the Brazilian friars she organizes a Por-
                                                     
7  Garimpeiro, 38 years old, working at concession Antino, interview February 
2006. 
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tuguese language mass in Klein Belém every two weeks that is very 
successful. And she maintains an extensive network of help to Brazil-
ians in trouble. 
Transnational religious practices are one of the manners in which 
migrants maintain a connection to their homeland. The Brazilian Pen-
tecostal churches in Suriname establish a very direct link, institution-
alized in the person of pastors that come to work with the Brazilian 
community and conduct services in Portuguese. It is possible to reason 
the other way around also: because the Pentecostal churches ‘follow’ 
the migrants to new locations, in other countries, they become transna-
tional religious organizations themselves. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, our main objective was to clarify the idea of transna-
tional religion and its role in migration and transnationalism, based on 
literature and preliminary data on the case of Brazilian migrants in 
Surinam. Religion has an important impact on the way people experi-
ence their situation, create notions of belonging and identity, and the 
meaning people give to their everyday lives. It also offers many con-
crete tools for adaptation and social integration. Many religious or-
ganisations are global institutions, and this may facilitate the participa-
tion of the migrants – the religious rituals, symbols and organisation 
are known and familiar. This makes them a suitable field for migrants 
to seek forms of belonging and security in the often dangerous and 
insecure situation of the migrant existence. As transnational organisa-
tions, religious groups may also play the role of representing a group 
of believers, and become a player in the political field too.  
The religious consequences of the recent migration of Brazilians 
to Suriname are not yet known; we still have to see whether these 
Brazilians establish a “Brazilian life” in Suriname or “creolize” into 
the Surinamese society. Transnational religion may play a role in  
either of these processes. By constructing social fields that are not 
limited by cultural, political and geographical boundaries, the Brazil-
ians in Suriname might be engaged in the construction of a transmi-
grant identity, instead of referring to a Brazilian or creating a Suri-
namese identity. For the individual seeking religion the resources in 
Suriname the available resources are different from those in Brazil. 
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The Catholic Church does not make itself very present in Belenzinho, 
and still less in the interior where most of the migrants live. The Pen-
tecostal church is much more visible, near to the Brazilian population 
both on various localities in Paramaribo town, but also the forest, 
which makes this church an important factor because of the availabil-
ity of religiosity every day of the week. The migrants use both re-
sources in many cases in an occasional way, without getting involved 
in a structured way in church life, bases on individual choices that are 
isolated in time and place. The composition of the Brazilian popula-
tion in Suriname makes the clients of the churches an extremely un-
stable group. Some live in the interior, spend some weeks in the city 
now and then during which they might seek religion; they go to a 
catholic Mass or visit the Pentecostal churches some times, but then 
they return to their work in the forest, where they may stay for months 
in a row before returning to Paramaribo. In such cases, the religious 
activities of the individual will not result in a close connection to a 
community of believers. 
I did not find any specific links that Surinamese congregations 
could have with localized Brazilian parishes, which would justify the 
identification of transnational religions. The church Deus é Amor 
could be constructing connections between Pentecostal communities 
in the places of origin of the migrants, and Suriname; however, it is 
probably not so easy to happen because the Brazilian population in 
Paramaribo is so unstable. Furthermore, the migrants originate from 
many different places in Brazil. Not even the three Brazilian Catholic 
priests should be seen as representatives of Brazilian Catholicism, 
solely at the service of the Brazilian migrants. “That they are Brazilian 
is pure coincidence” he said Father Vernooij historian of religion 
and Redemptorist priest himself (personal communication, February 
2004). And this makes sense, because they are not in the Brazilian 
neighbourhood. Nevertheless, the Catholic missionary practice can 
only confirm the transnational character of religion. 
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Heloisa Buarque de Hollanda 
A short Sketch on some Signs of Transformation 
in Brazilian Urban Imaginary 
This brief sketch has to do with a phenomenon that may come to have 
important developments in a country like Brazil with large gaps be-
tween social classes and a perverse persistence of economic inequal-
ity. I am referring to the new cultural developments that come from 
the periphery and are beginning to enter into dialog and to intervene 
with mainstream culture. The examples are countless. Funk rhythms 
take over FM radio stations and middle-class parties. Cobertores 
(Blankets), a sold-out show about the reality of homeless children 
directed by choreographer Carmen Luz, with a cast of youngsters 
from the Andaraí slum, plays to unexpected success. The world of 
fashion bows to the style of slum artists. A novel such as Cidade de 
Deus (City of God) makes the bestseller list and its film adaptation is 
nominated for an Oscar.  
In this scenario, at least one thing is making itself clear: a new 
element is reformatting our cultural paradigms and spreading through-
out the urban landscape of Brazilian cities. Examining my increas-
ingly heavy folder of newspaper clippings, I began to work with this 
new phenomenon from a critical point of view.  
At this point, I noticed the first issue that this material raises, one 
that signals the importance of the new cultural expressions currently 
emerging from the peripheries of the large cities. After dedicating my 
entire life as a researcher to identifying the possibilities of resistance 
and political challenge of the cultural production that followed the 
1960s rebellions and their repercussions, I feel uncomfortable and 
insecure when faced with the challenge of defining a position from 
which to study such manifestations. For the first time in my middle-
class scholarly experience, I found myself in trouble. Therefore, I 
decided to employ the utmost prudence in positioning myself in this 
new arena.  
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In a broader sense, we still do not have a sound critical body of 
studies on the cultural production of the urban peripheries. The few 
existing works analyze such cultural production either from the per-
spective of social and cultural inclusion or they deal with the impact 
of its strong presence on the media. However, I do not intend to move 
along in any of these directions. What interests me here is a very spe-
cific and limited matter: the connections, appropriations and debates 
generated between the cultural mainstream and the cultural manifesta-
tions of the urban peripheries. It is worthwhile to point out the speci-
ficity of the composition of social forces in Brazilian culture, where 
social inequalities and wealth distribution continue to be unsolved 
problems, creating a real gap between elite and popular cultures. What 
I intend to do here is just focus on a few ongoing cultural crossovers. 
Regarding my methodology, I decided to revisit two of my older 
and most persistent objects of study: the first one being the articula-
tions between culture and politics and the second the creation of alter-
native means for cultural production.  
I’ll begin with the first one. It is a known fact that black militancy 
in Brazil never succeeded in becoming well organized due to several 
complicating factors such as the movement’s internal divisions, the 
obstacles to prioritizing racial issues when faced with demands related 
to class inequalities, or the challenges of facing national beliefs that 
always tend to overlook the existence of a strong racism pervasive in 
our daily lives.  
It is true that after 1988, the centennial of the Abolition of Slavery 
in Brazil, there was an increase in political awareness concerning spe-
cific racial issues. Nevertheless, it can be said that black movements 
in Brazil, in spite of some unquestionable progresses, never succeeded 
in creating a critical and political body that could in fact represent the 
large percentage of blacks and mestizos in Brazilian society.  
But today, new black generations are not merely engaged in the 
preservation of their history or in the affirmation of racial pride. Going 
much further, they are also strongly addressing issues of social exclu-
sion suffered by low-income populations, consisting mostly of blacks, 
mestizos and migrants.  
The frontline selected by these young movements is activism 
within the arts, with a strong commitment to social transformation. 
The activity (or attitude as it is called), is now experienced simultane-
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ously as art and as a way of intervening in their poor communities. 
The most significant media used by this youth is hip-hop, an artistic 
genre that includes five forms of expression: MC, Rap, Break dance 
(the bboys), Graffiti and Knowledge.  
I will briefly explain the latter, since it is a significant and rela-
tively new element in Brazilian hip-hop. A key element of hip-hop 
aesthetics is to raise awareness and to value local history and racial 
roots, which brings up the need for information and knowledge. Or-
ganic knowledge – whether academic or not – is now being experi-
enced as an element of the hip-hop culture, validating some of its 
agents as voices of the periphery. New organic intellectuals are in-
creasingly present in public spaces giving interviews, taking part in 
both national and international seminars and congresses, and produc-
ing academic papers and university theses. In the public arena, the 
outstanding activists include DJ Marlboro, Mano Brown, MVBill, 
Ferrez and José Junior among many others. The academic pioneers of 
Brazilian hip-hop are Écio Salles (from the Afro Reggae group), Eric-
son Pires (from the Hapax group) and Alexandre Vogler (from the 
Rradial group). 
Coming back to hip-hop, the most frequent criticism heard in Bra-
zil is that it is “Americanized”, that it has nothing has to do with the 
“root” culture. 
I cannot resist making an aside here about the clear similarity of 
this critique with the one that used to be made against black move-
ments in the 1960s and 1970s, equally accused of being a North 
American import.  
Having pointed this out, I shall continue with two observations on 
the supposedly “foreign” character of local hip-hop. One is about the 
questioning raised by these movements of the very notion of a na-
tional culture. The political activism and the anger expressed by the 
hip-hop idiom seem to sprout not merely from a supposedly foreign 
cultural trend but above all from the awareness that hip-hop is able to 
articulate a supranational forum of poor and black youths who wish to 
raise the banner of global resistance. Seen from this viewpoint, hip-
hop echoes somewhat the more sophisticated tone and logic of recent 
World Social Forums.  
The second point comes from the eclectic character of rap in Bra-
zil. From a rhythmic viewpoint, Brazilian RAP is a merging of the 
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genre born in Jamaica and raised in New York ghettos with the sound 
of pagode, samba, frevo, maracatu, axé and even bossa nova, without 
specifically privileging any of these beats or tunes, in the best hybrid 
style of Néstor Garcia Canclini.  
From the viewpoint of political emphasis, a few adaptations were 
also made. For instance, there is a quite eloquent local reading for the 
RAP acronym. In English, RAP is the abbreviation for Rhythm and 
Poetry. In its Portuguese translation, RAP became the abbreviation for 
Rhythm, Attitude and Politics.  
Among its practitioners, the hip-hop attitude is called the gangsta 
revolution, whose goal is to build community awareness within the 
panorama of violence and poverty found in urban peripheries. One of 
the axes of the hip-hop political project is pedagogic action instead of 
aggressive confrontation. Most of the time this means intensive re-
lease of information and provision of access to culture, both now seen 
as basic rights of all citizens and identified as a strategic factor for any 
project of social transformation.  
The new black consciousness acts in groups, sells a lifestyle and 
generates financial inputs, so as not to depend entirely on the State. 
There are some successful examples, such as Afro Reggae (in this 
sense an exemplary group) or the siblings MV Bill and Nega Gizza, 
activists of CUFA (Slums Central Union, which gathers 326 Rio de 
Janeiro slum communities), where Rap is practiced as a means of 
showing the precarious living conditions of slum-residing blacks. 
Nega Gizza leads two quite aggressive radio shows, being the first 
woman to have a talk show of this kind on an FM radio station. MV 
Bill, in the video clip Soldados do Morro (Slum Soldiers), denounces 
in national broadcast by means of shocking images the drama of teen-
agers with heavy loaded machine guns working for drug dealers. An 
important fact shown coast to coast, since 90% of this kind of work is 
done by children and teenagers, starting from nine years old.  
Today, there are thousands of hip-hop groups all over the country, 
setting the tone for this new political profile which is creating condi-
tions for the concrete visibility of racial claims in Brazil.  
I would not like to close the hip-hop subject without mentioning a 
“phenomenon inside the phenomenon”, that is, the very strong role 
that women play in this area. There are many well-known hip-hop 
women, such as Tati Quebra Barraco, Nega Gizza, Ana Cristina, 
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Monica, Kelly, Danielle and others. They include rappers, who use a 
very politically minded idiom, and funkers, who have a rebellious 
attitude. Among the latter, Tati, the pioneer, stands out. Tati is the first 
woman to break the barrier of male-only funkers.  
Tati Quebra-Barraco’s performance – whose artistic name literally 
translates a slang euphemism for “the act of sexual intercourse” – both 
seduces and shocks. She comes onstage, shoots out sentences filled 
with strong sexual meaning, breaks down prejudices, demands equal-
ity between men and women, and stirs the public into frenzy.  
In private life, Tati never gives interviews. She is married, the 
mother of three children and, in her own words, a dedicated wife and 
housekeeper. On stage, she turns into a hurricane woman who, similar 
to a machine gun, shouts war screams. Tati, a role model for other 
funkers, is a “funk girl with attitude”, who screams and mimics for-
bidden porno situations and boasts about her freedom and power.  
It is easy to foresee the controversies generated among the femi-
nists by funkers’ performances. A women’s movement from São 
Paulo, the Geledes, has carried out some work with female funkers 
about the reproduction of male chauvinism and the reactionary con-
tents of their lyrics. This initiative has certainly given them an in-
creased awareness of what they are singing about, but has not suc-
ceeded in changing their ways. Tati and her followers continue with 
what they see as an appropriation of the sexual brutality surrounding 
their lives.  
In opposition to the funkers, one finds the rappers. Led by Nega 
Gizza, who has the same empathy and success with the public, but 
whose lyrics avoid explicit sexual appeal to attract the audience, they 
reject both the funk which Gizza considers macho oriented, as well as 
American rap, which she calls “dribble music”. Gizza defines herself 
as a politically committed rapper and a hip-hop activist, as well as a 
feminist who fights in favour of revolutionary black woman.  
Whether it is Tati, manipulating the system, or the warrior Giza, 
raising the flag of social change, it is clear that something is already in 
the air, promoting debates and political openings for low-income 
women.  
Literature has also not remained immune to change. It is part of 
the Brazilian literary tradition that a great deal of attention is given to 
the themes of poverty, hunger, social inequalities and, lately, urban 
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violence. It is also part of our cultural tradition that intellectuals – in 
this case, writers – lean towards political engagement and social com-
mitment. In Brazilian literature, the writer has always been the only 
voice to speak on and in favour of the poor and the excluded (in this 
sense there is an excellent work by Roberto Schwartz called The Poor 
in Brazilian Literature).  
In 1997, however, our literary world was surprised by the publica-
tion of a novel that, in a short time, became one of the top Brazilian 
best sellers of recent times. I’m referring to City of God, by Paulo 
Lins, currently translated into numerous languages.  
Paulo Lins brought a completely unexpected variable to our liter-
ary circles: poor people have a voice and can even write. Even more, 
they can write books that turn out to be a huge success with the public 
and critics. However, let us begin at the beginning.  
Paulo Lins, a resident of the City of God slum, graduated from 
the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro and began to write his first 
poems while working as a high school teacher.  
At a certain moment, he started working as a research assistant, 
writing ethnographies about City of God’s community for Professor 
Alba Zaluar, who was doing research on urban violence. Since Paulo 
showed great difficulty in organizing his reports, Alba Zaluar sug-
gested that instead he could make a literary narrative with the results 
of his findings. And so it was done. Eventually, Alba showed Paulo 
Lins’s texts to Professor Roberto Schwarz who immediately detected 
the literary potential of Paulo’s reports. He then suggested that 
Paulo write a novel using this material, and introduced Paulo to a 
leading publishing house (Cia das Letras). Paulo was enthusiastic 
with Schwarz’s reaction but immediately realized the pioneering  
importance of the task ahead. He went into a panic. It was only 
through great effort and with the help of his main literary model, 
Dostojevsky’s Crime and Punishment, that he managed to finish the 
novel. 
Starting of from his close relationship with periphery communities 
that included lowlifes, outlaws and drug dealers, for the first time in 
Brazilian literature, we had a detailed anatomy of the daily life of 
poverty and crime in our country, now with the added flavour of genu-
ine personal testimony. For the first time, the slums were no longer 
treated as idealized places separated from the paved streets, but as 
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places that contain the open violence and the nonconformity found in 
slums.  
As a result of the unquestionable success of City of God, new 
roads were opened for creative writing. Maybe even a new canon has 
been as being generated.  
In 2000, a new book of equal importance came out, although with 
a different impact from that of City of God. The book is Capão pe-
cado, by Ferréz (pen name of Reginaldo Ferreira of Silva). Capão 
pecado – (pecado means sin in Portuguese) – paints a sophisticated 
portrait of Capão Redondo, a São Paulo neighborhood with one of the 
highest rates of poverty, violence, drug dealing and criminality, and 
where Ferréz grew up and still lives today. Its more than 200.000 resi-
dents do not have access to sewage systems, hospitals, or any type of 
medical assistance. Capão has the bloody rate of 86.39 murders for 
each 100.000 inhabitants, much above the national average, which is 
already stratospheric by international standards.  
This book shows a higher level of integration with the hip-hop 
universe than its predecessor, City of God. Ferréz employed rap lyrics 
as a reference, with their mix of ghetto chronicle and summons of the 
brothers to action. A starting point quite different from the literary 
canon which had informed the making of City of God. In the book, we 
have the participation of Mano Brown (a rap celebrity, also a resident 
of Capão Redondo), who provides the epigraphs of each chapter of the 
book. The two of them, together, from then on became outstanding 
community leaders. 
The second book by Ferréz, Manual Prático do Ódio (s. Practical 
Handbook of Hate) more aggressive than the first one, describes the 
dilemma of a generation marked by the sequels left by the lack of 
attention from the State as well as by the intensity of media impact in 
the poor communities. 
The thing that surprises us most when reading Ferréz’ books is a 
very unique displacement of the locus of violence. Instead of being the 
theme of the narrative, violence is now simply the daily reality of the 
characters themselves, who are no longer perceived as criminals but as 
commonplace people like any of us, with their individual emotions, 
their respect for family, feelings of love and jealousy, and dreams of a 
better future. This comes as a shock to readers who do not live in the 
scenery of crime, and provides an uncommon form of identification 
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or, at least, an understanding of the aggressor’s character, non-existent 
in our literature until then. 
After his success, Ferréz was granted a scholarship to study litera-
ture at an American university. He decided not to go. His refusal in-
cluded the offer of a North American producer who attempted to buy 
the rights of Capão pecado for the cinema. Ferréz explained in a 
newspaper interview: “I write to be read by my community. My place 
is here. My war is here.” 
Committed to this war, Ferréz has created, in partnership with 
Mano Brown, the movement 1 DASUL, a cultural enterprise that, 
among other activities, has its own CD production company and a 
fashion brand called Irmandade (Fraternity).  
Today, his fashion brand occupies a 65 square foot warehouse and 
has two other manufacturers, producing an average of 300 pieces a 
day. The griffe Irmandade, characterized by illustrations denouncing 
the system, has a store in downtown São Paulo and its production is 
distributed to seven Brazilian states, in addition to holding the distri-
bution rights for fashion brands belonging to six other rap groups. The 
griffe Irmandade also prints monthly booklets for an anti-drug pro-
gram and plans to open up a clinic for treatment of drug addicts.  
Ferréz has also organized two special numbers of the magazine Caros 
Amigos called “Marginal Literature”, that gathers and publishes pe-
riphery writers, providing space for local talents. 
In his own words him, Ferréz is engaged in the project of “break-
ing down the door” of literary history for those who come from the 
margins of society. He explains: Marginal literature is the one pro-
duced by those sections of society whose writings find no place within 
the canon. However, he warns: When we obtain something through 
art, it does not mean that we will calm down. What we have to do is to 
organize our hatred, directing it towards those who harm us. All the 
things that the system has denied us we must take. This statement 
uttered by Ferréz brings up the main subtext of new cultural projects 
being produced in the margins. For the first time in history, outloud 
and clearly, the poor state their desire and their right to consume the 
very same material and symbolic goods historically enjoyed only by 
the middle and upper classes. They want the latest model of Nike 
sneakers, as well as access to specialized information and high culture. 
This leads us to conclude that the greatest revolutionary novelty oc-
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curring is, indeed, the emergence of a process towards a concrete de-
mocratization of expectations.  
Another segment that has surprised most people is represented by 
the art collectives (roughly defined as gatherings of visual artists who 
meet around a specific cause or project and who use art forms other 
than those of graffiti, the official visual expression of hip-hop culture).  
The collectives began to appear at the end of the 1990s and per-
form interventions in the urban space.  
Quickly, such interventions, also in the spirit of “the urgent thing 
is to act”, began to take a political stance of social denunciation, now 
in the streets and public plazas. Simultaneously, such works discuss 
the very structure of production within the framework of art circuits 
and art markets. In the self-definition of collectives, one notices a 
symptomatic proximity to Antonio Negri’s notions of “crowd”, 
“work-affection” and “life-art”. 
These collectives, which are spreading in exponentially through-
out Brazil, bring something new with them. Collectives are not coops, 
they are also not groups, they do not have a fixed number of partici-
pants, nor could they be characterized simply as artistic movements.  
Very much on the contrary, the organization of collectives is rhy-
zomatic and nomadic, which marks their difference within the art 
segment. Collectives are formed merely to meet the challenges of one 
or more projects. They are created for a specific end, and soon after-
wards are recomposed with new participants, in another project. This 
means that the composition of a group is not fixed, but mobile. An 
artist can take part in a group due to a given project, and in the next 
project he may join another group for the accomplishment of another 
project.  
Communication among collectives happens quite intensely 
through blogs and discussion lists on the Internet. Some sites gather 
information in a more nodal way, better exemplifying the network 
logic that rules this production. There is, for instance, the site 
<www.redecoro.zip.net> (a blog with information about sites) and the 
network of art theoreticians on the site www.artesquema.com. Collec-
tives are financially independent and informal units, self-managed, 
decentralized and flexible. For each project, the collectives search for 
sponsorship, offer courses, sell products or perform services such as 
illustration, design, video etc. In this lies their uniqueness.  
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According to participants in some of these collectives, they were 
the result of necessity, not desire. Their banner is: “That which is ur-
gent is real.” 
A good example is the action “Occupation within Occupation”. 
For three weeks in December 2003, 120 artists performed an interven-
tion at the Prestes Maia Building, located in downtown São Paulo, 
which had been occupied by 470 families from the Downtown Home-
less Movement (MSTC). In that action, the artists performed works in 
cooperation with the homeless, promoting interaction between artists 
and MSTC members, thus giving the intervention a sense of redress or 
amendment.  
This form of art is known as “artvism”, a hybrid of art and activ-
ism. Or, as they themselves ironically call it, “arrivismo”, which, ac-
cording to the Portuguese dictionary means “the behaviour of those 
who aim to improve their social status at any cost”.  
The priority given to political actions reminds us of the aesthetics 
of rap, graffiti and marginal literature, previously addressed herein, 
whose form of political engagement is to stress immediate action and 
the aggressive release of information.  
We should also call attention to the fact that the production of a 
group does not value individual artistic production. The author of the 
artwork is always the collective entity, not the artist x, y, or z. A brief 
manifesto has been signed by Túlio Tavares, participant of the group 
A Nova Pasta (The New Folder), which included one single artist. 
The creation of this group with only one participant is not simply 
an act of nonsense. The implicit idea in the creation of this group is 
the denial of that which the artist calls “umbiguismo” (Umbigo in 
Portuguese means navel) meaning self-centeredness, or better saying, 
is related to a criticism of the ideas of individualism and the need for 
authorship and authenticity that structures the modern art market.  
At this point, we have touched a sensitive point concerning the  
effect of the collectives. The broadest questioning of the notions of 
authorship and intellectual property.  
At a time when free software and digital inclusion are being dis-
cussed in industrial and social forums under the motto “good knowl-
edge is shared knowledge”, a similar claim appears in avant-garde art: 
the copyleft movement. This movement deals with what is called 
“creative plagiarism”, “cut up aesthetics” or “sampling”.  
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Led by artists and writers, the copyleft want to allow the reproduc-
tion of works, as long as they remain “open”. Debates promoted by 
the copyleft movement have generated some advancement as well as 
the regulation of creative collectives – a flexible legislation for literary 
and artistic works. There are licenses such as “some rights reserved”, 
“recombination”, “public domain”, and many others. Copyleft and 
creative collectives are juridical innovations meant to not only over-
come piracy but also to emphasize a sense of a cultural “factory” in 
order to create and promote social and artistic cooperation. 
There is also the strategic use of media, which proposes new 
means of using television, radio, video, web sites, publications and 
other types of electronic media in order to give voice to minorities, 
alternative communities, political dissidents and street artists.  
Well, the results that will be achieved by all these claims and 
questionings, in terms of a change in the structure of social forces in 
Brazil, are not easy to foresee. However, this production has already 
had an important side effect.  
Historically seen as a “Divided City”, Rio de Janeiro, the city from 
where I observe this phenomenon, has begun to open channels be-
tween territories that were formerly impenetrable. 
The Brazilian middle class is starting to demonstrate an unex-
pected interest in hip-hop aesthetics and attitudes. In the wake of such 
interest, a new form of political participation for artists and intellectu-
als is emerging, related to urban periphery communities and centred in 
the logic of solidarity action – also called ‘brodagem’ in hip-hop dia-
lect (which means, acting as a brother).  
Characterizing the emergence of a new form of intellectual en-
gagement, artists abandon the rhetoric of protest and the role of 
spokespersons for the excluded, beginning to interact directly with the 
communities, bringing informal professional education to places 
where formal knowledge does not penetrate. Consequently, an impor-
tant network to exchange cultural skills and values is emerging. The 
political motto of this moment is, “To act is the important thing to 
do”. 
Some examples of brodagem are well known. Waly Salomão and 
Caetano Veloso, after a terrible slaughter in the slum of Vigário Geral, 
climbed the hill and helped to create the Afro Reggae Cultural Centre. 
The Centre offers art, music, poetry, and philosophy workshops.  
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Rosane Swartman and Vinícius Reis, film directors, created a cen-
tre of cinema studies in the Nós do Morro, at the Vidigal slum Gringo 
Cardia, a well-known artist and set-designer, has been heading the 
Show Factory School since June 2000, a school that intends to capaci-
tate low-income teenagers who wish to become actors, ballet dancers, 
fashion designers, carpenters, sound operators and set designers.  
Rosana Palazyan, a visual artist, works with the inmates of João 
Luiz Alves, a house of correction for youngsters that trains teenagers 
arrested for armed assault, homicide and drug dealing. The results of 
her work are exhibited in important galleries and museums. 
Tetê Leal, a sociologist, created Copa Rocca in the Rocinha slum 
to train dressmakers, fashion designers and entrepreneurs. Today Copa 
Rocca employs over 100 people, sells its products to leading local 
fashion brands, takes part in international fashion shows, exports to 
Selfridge’s and Galerie Lafayette, and works in cooperation with well-
known artists such as Antônio Dias, Ernesto Neto and Carlos Vergara.  
I would like to stress the point that these actions are not in any 
way charity-oriented endeavours. They are business oriented, and 
indicate cultural exchanges and joint authorships that result in prod-
ucts displaying a plural composition of skills, styles and aesthetics. 
On the other hand, and equally important, is the fact that cultural 
and social exclusion as an issue, and hip-hop as a style have strongly 
permeated the city’s artistic production and cultural events.  
As an issue, it is easy to observe the redirecting of the current  
national film production and the prestige of films such as News of a 
Private War (Notícias De Uma Guerra Particular), by João Moreira 
Salles, City of God (Cidade de Deus), by Fernando Meirelles, Ca-
randiru, by Hector Babenko, The Bus 174 by José Padilha, The Rap of 
the Little Prince Against the Greasy Souls (O Rap do Pequeno Prín-
cipe Contra as Almas Sebosas) by Paulo Caldas e Marcelo Luna or 
Yellow Mango by Claudio Assis. 
As a style, a recent example is the huge success of Fashion Week 
2004 in Rio de Janeiro, at the Museum of Modern Art, where the 
usual ethereal and Caucasian look of the top models was replaced by 
the black beauty of carioca gangs that entered the catwalk to applause, 
wearing designer clothes of prestigious fashion brands such as 
Andréia Saleto and Blue Man. 
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This type of exchange, so hard to measure critically, is not exempt 
from the possibility of reinstating the old appropriation trick, where 
mainstream culture appropriates new marginal cultural forms. How-
ever, and being optimistic, it is difficult that in a rigidly structured 
class society such as the Brazilian one, the ongoing cultural inocula-
tion between classes, ethnicities and antagonistic interests does not 
generate political benefits in the medium and long term. 
Intellectual activity itself is now seeking (and maybe finding) its 
place in this new cultural landscape.  
Maybe our old reactive trenches are being transformed into active 
movements in favour of an ethic- and solidarity-oriented globaliza-
tion.  
Maybe those trenches and their policies of ambiguous tolerance 
are already being replaced by new forms of action and articulation 
among the academy, artists, NGOs, unions and associations, thus dis-
solving old corporate equations into new, and even urgent, ways of 
making politics.  
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Olívia Maria Gomes da Cunha 
The Sensitive Territory of the Favelas:  
Place, History, and Representation 
The appearance of the first favelas in Rio de Janeiro’s urban landscape 
at the end of the 19th century was accompanied by reports in the pages 
of the national capital’s newspapers. Three years after the Ministry of 
War dispatched soldiers returning from the Canudos War to be posted 
at the top of the hill in the center of the city – shortly dubbed the 
“Morro da Favela” (Favela hill) – the first public outcries began ap-
pearing in the press. In November 1900, the Jornal do Brasil newspa-
per published warnings by public authorities that the precarious and 
unsanitary shacks located on the hillsides could become a haven for 
criminals (Alvito/Zaluar 1998). Motivated by fear, an array of initia-
tives sought to alter the dangerous conditions endured by migrants, 
ex-slaves and other poor people unable to follow the rules of appro-
priate behavior established by public health officials and other agents 
of the civilizing marvels of the turn of the century (Valladares 2006). 
From then on, poverty, origin, color and the social class of favela resi-
dents would be inevitably associated to a way of living in, occupying 
and interpreting the city.  
In the 20th century, ambitious plans for urbanization and remodel-
ing were used by public health institutions as a justification for the 
destruction of boarding houses, shacks, and small settlements in semi-
rural areas that failed to meet the criteria for introducing modernity 
into the tropics. Together with public health officials, legislators and 
city administrators focused on standardizing the new construction 
codes in the name of hygiene and the eradication of epidemics that 
scourged tropical cities. Urban plans and moral panic, followed by 
violent incursions, intensified in the communities that resisted these 
new measures. By mid-century, the favelas were no longer limited to a 
few “concentrations of unhealthy settlements” and had transformed 
the profile of the city, proliferating in form, size, population density, 
styles, and physiognomy. The favela became the symbol of a disor-
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derly, dangerous and unhealthy city (Meade/Walker 1991; Lima 1989; 
Valladares 2006; Fischer 2007; 2008). 
However, the expansion, penetration, and rooting of favelas in the 
disorganized fabric of the city from the late 19th and early 20th centu-
ries were not exclusively the result of the resistance of its residents. 
Favela residents were regularly forced to negotiate the terms by which 
their presence would be tolerated, so as to avoid invasion and re-
moval. Daily violence and other forms of “social suffering” (Das 
1997) did not exclude forms of communication between the favela and 
the ‘others’ – dialogues and deals involving questionable authorities, 
corrupt public employees, sympathetic politicians, police ‘from the 
area’, and other personalities who from the early 20th century began to 
populate the chronicle of the city, which grew despite differences 
naturalized and turned ‘cultural’. From the beginning of the century, 
these arrangements steered the growth of the city. The political ploys 
that mediated forms of communication between the favela and its 
intermediaries would transform its codes of visibility (Perlman 1976; 
Pandolfi 2002; Silva 2002; 2004; Alvito 2004). 
The favela of the poor but decent worker featured in the sambas 
that chronicled Rio de Janeiro’s social life in the 1940’s, for example, 
combined with older images of moral panic that by the 20th century, 
were used to represent favelas in various genres of Brazilian music. 
The favela became a visible index of estrangement, an image of the 
city and its codes of conduct. As such, it transcended its reference 
points and occupied other territories, influencing other discourses. 
Favelas were already present in radio and print journalism, and by the 
end of the 1950’s began to appear in film. It is at this moment that 
Brazilian film director Nelson Pereira dos Santos translated post-war 
Italian realism, reinterpreting its scenes, figures and text based on the 
popular imagination of the favela: the lyricism of the malandro and 
his musicality.1 
Following the movies Rio Zona Norte (The Northern Zone of Rio) 
and Rio 40 Graus (Rio 40 Degrees), the favela became the backdrop 
of a more radical representation of the differences that socially struc-
                                                     
1  See, for instance, Nelson Pereira dos Santos’ Rio Zona Norte (1957) and Rio 40º 
(1955), and the 1960 Academy Award Winner and winner of the Palme d’Or at 
the 1959 Cannes Film Festival, Marcel Camus’ Black Orpheu. 
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ture and culturally express Brazilian society. As in Casa Grande e 
Senzala (The Masters and the Slaves) – the model which Gilberto 
Freyre conceived in the 1930’s to portray Brazil through a kind of 
structuralizing dualism – the favela was transformed into a symbolic 
reference of dualities and antagonisms, as well as of passages and 
dialogues between different concepts of Nation (Freyre [1933] 1997). 
The favela becomes the Nation of the “other”, averse to order, trans-
formed into an emblem, the utopia of new generations. 
If on one hand the nascent Cinema Novo and, later, the tropicalist 
parangoles of Hélio Oticica during the 1960s were to transform disor-
der, misfortune, fear, and barbarity into an inventory of cultural diver-
sity in Brazil under the military regime, on the other, the favelas 
would be irreversibly transformed through daily urban violence into 
city-states, festering territories, and virtual democratized territories. In 
the beginning of the 21st century, in the movie based on Paulo Lins’ 
book City of God (1997), film directors Fernando Meirelles and Katia 
Lund present a romanticized portrait of a middle class seduced by the 
magical possibilities of an encounter that transgresses social and geo-
graphical limits of the “legal city” and the favelas (Fischer 2007). 
Impossible love, community-based heroes and native Robin-Hoods 
hyper-realistically invaded the screen. The urban utopia that describes 
the city as a metaphor of the country is thus revealed (Cunha/Gomes 
1996; 2002; Bentes 2002; 2003; Freire Medeiros/Santanna 2006).2  
The representations manufactured by the media, in literature, and 
those that populated the imagination of politicians, administrators, 
urban planners, policy makers, and social reformers, however, did not 
always reproduce the experiences lived by members of these commu-
nities and their neighbors. As with any form of representation, a large 
part of the mediated images of the favela reflect the unease of those 
who observed them. They composed a body of knowledge that saw 
the favela as averse to order, a place of absence of citizenship. These 
are stubborn and difficult images to overcome at the dawn of the 21st 
century. The simplified way in which I have tried to contextualize 
                                                     
2  For a different vision of the association of favelas and violence in Fernando 
Meirelles’ and Katia Lund’s movie, City of God, see, for instance, the debate be-
tween two intellectuals, ex-resident of Cidade de Deus, rapper, and composer, 
MV Bill, and Paulo Lins, author of the book The City of God, on which the 
movie was based. See <http://www.vivafavela.com.br> (26.04.2006).  
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historically the daily array of speeches, or, better put, “discursive in-
terventions” of the favela and its settlers, which are permeated with all 
kinds of symbolic violence, has a justification. It is to situate the dis-
cursive field which shapes both public policies and the subjectivity of 
the residents of the favela who populate the imaginary of Cariocas 
[Rio de Janeiro residents in general] – through which other forms of 
representation are insinuated.  
My purpose in this text is not to conduct an analyses of different 
forms of virtual organization of social movements and non-govern-
mental organizations (NGOs). My desire is only to note the emer-
gence of new and renewed discourses on favelas and their residents in 
a new territory – the Internet. To do so, I focus on one of many con-
cepts and objects given priority by NGOs and social movements that 
represent or collaborate in partnership with favela communities: the 
uses and meanings of the notion of history as a focus and strategy for 
political legitimation. They are discursive and visual structures that 
are built in the programs of non-governmental organizations, the gov-
ernment and social movements. Even though the Internet is not an 
unoccupied, rocky or flooded terrain without an owner, or under legal 
litigation, it is here that the favela is virtualized and given sensitivity. 
This chapter will explore different forms of occupation of virtual terri-
tories by tracing the questions and practices that situate the production 
of new, and the reinterpretation of old local histories. 
 
1. Who speaks about the Favelas? 
The use of mediating resources such as the Internet by social move-
ments in different arenas of political debate became more visible in 
the 1990’s. In order to reflect upon and analyze the construction, 
forms of circulation, and uses of categories that spatially and tempo-
rally situate the contexts in which images and texts are aimed at a 
variety of readers and surfers, various studies have noted the use of 
cyberspace as a field for diverse forms of social activism. Arturo 
Escobar and other authors have mapped the epistemological implica-
tions for anthropological research, as well as the political dilemmas 
that involve activism in virtual spaces (Escobar 1994; Ribeiro 1998; 
Wilson/Peterson 2002; Aranha 1996; Kolko et al. 2000). The virtual 
dimension of these new fields and spaces have required social move-
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ments, NGOs and new actors that adopt the Internet as their territory 
of existence to use and reinterpret written and visual languages. 
In favelas and “favela communities” – as some prefer to call them 
– such as the Complexo da Maré (a group of communities), Rocinha, 
Cantagalo, Borel, Prazeres, Complexo do Alemão, Cidade de Deus, 
and Serrinha, local groups arose that began to work with churches and 
schools in meetings organized by older community members, as in the 
case of Centers for Memory, Historical Centers and local “networks” 
(Pandolfi 2004).3 In addition to these initiatives and, at times in con-
junction with them, the construction of websites as spaces for dis-
semination and networking stimulated new forms of creation, lan-
guage, and mobilization (Briggs/McBride 2002).4 In this context, in-
terpretations of the history of conflict involving the State, social 
movements, NGO’s and private institutions that act in favela commu-
nities involve a series of images and ideas that concern the meaning of 
favelas and principally how they should be represented (Leite 2004; 
Novaes 2004; Pandolfi 2004). The question of representation – but 
mainly, the legitimacy of the ‘voice’ and ‘image’ which comes from 
favelas – have a central importance in the texts that circulate in these 
sites. 
 It is not by chance that the website of an NGO born out of social 
movements in the form of a network – networking with groups and 
institutions in and outside of the favela – the Observatório das Fave-
las (OF) – refers directly to representation as a field of activism and 
political transformation. Defining its objectives, OF identifies com-
munication as political practice, in that 
it produces and gives visibility to new representations of favelas, break-
ing away from the paternalistic and criminalizing language traditionally 
used in this context. For this purpose, OF supports the creation of a 
communication network that involves the media, especially community-
based media; produces books, films and images that promote a new per-
                                                     
3  Among others, are projects directed to the production of local memory and his-
tory in communities such as Rocinha (“Varal de Lembranças), Mangueira (“Mu-
seu do Samba”), Complexo da Maré (“Maré de Histórias”), and Borel/Casa 
Branca (“Condutores de Memória”). 
4  The presence of computers network in ‘community centers’ inside favelas is a 
reality since 1994 when an NGO called Centro de Democratização da Informação 
(CDI) – Committee for the Democratization of Information – opened its first 
branch in in the Santa Marta favela <http://www.cdi.org.br> (26.04.2006). 
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spective of favelas, and organizes and disseminates publications pro-
duced by young students in the favelas.5 
For this purpose the OF disseminates and commercializes images on 
its website. With these “images of the people”, in which the favelas 
and their residents are represented, the website seeks to produce a 
vision from the point of view of the community, those who live the 
daily experience of belonging to the favela. In addition to the OF, two 
other non-governmental organizations have sought to create a political 
and social practice of intervention in representation, the websites Viva 
Favela (VF) and Favela News Agency (ANF). ANF, created in 2000, 
disseminates images called the “eyes of the favela” and defines itself 
as: 
[…] an agency that simultaneously links the favelas, and serves as a 
bridge to the pavement [as neighborhoods with urban infrastructure and 
services are known]. It is a humble site which is created and maintained 
by the volunteer labor of our small team – just like a community work 
project. We gather our content through casual meetings and contacts, and 
put together Favela News Agency little by little, just as the favelado 
builds and improves upon his house. In modest terms, this reflects a great 
ambition: to offer true information on the sensitive territory of the 
favelas. To give voice to community members on the Internet, including 
youth and community leaders, always so absent from the media. Every-
one is invited to participate, make their voice heard, their diversities, pro-
jects, and struggles. The Favela News Agency is a virtual structure that is 
never completely finished, always interactive, and ready to grow and 
deepen its roots in the real city.6 
Viva Favela, created in 2000 by journalists and community leaders 
under the sponsorship of the non-governmental organization Viva Rio, 
is one of the best known initiatives and inspires an intense reflection 
on ways of “talking about”, “representing” and “giving voice” to those 
in the favela. It represents a kind of network created among journal-
ists, social scientists, NGO’s activists, and favela residents (Valladares 
1977; Grynszpan/Pandolfi 2003). As a member of this network, the 
group Central Única das Favelas (CUFA), for example, coordinates 
cultural, Hip-Hop and black movements through a network that con-
siders the favela as an emblematic territory:  
                                                     
5  According to Observatório de Favelas, in <http://www.iets.org.br> (26.04.2006). 
6  Agência de Notícias das Favelas, “Favela na Internet” in <http://anf.org.br/> 
(26.04.2006). 
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Youth from the Hip-Hop movement, presidents of residents’ associa-
tions, community leaders, sambistas, artists and workers in general from 
diverse communities in Rio de Janeiro organized themselves around an 
idea: to transform the favelas, or better, the unrecognized talents and po-
tential, due to social, racial prejudice. […]. CUFA (Central Única de 
Favelas) emerged as a direct result of this idea, acting in different areas, 
embracing diverse communities that come together around a primary 
‘body’ – that is CUFA itself, bringing together these communities for the 
joint development of a great diversity of projects in an attempt to value 
not only the communities, but each individual found within.7 
Rather than exclusively disseminating local interventions, their web-
site coordinates the field of cultural production of youth who produce 
and consume Hip Hop in the city. CUFA insists on its legitimacy for 
expressing the voice of marginalized groups without mediation. Ex-
plaining the choice of Hip Hop, its organizers have affirmed that: 
[…] the periphery is a figure that should speak for itself, have its own 
voice, and participate in cultural, political and social dialogue one-on-one 
with other social groups. The periphery is a majority treated by a minor-
ity. To dominate the discourse is part of our project of situating things in 
their true place.8  
 
2. Putting Favela in its Place 
In some of the initiatives mentioned the construction of representation 
of favelas implies diverse forms of negotiation concerning what 
favelas were in the past. In other words, in the elaboration of narra-
tives of their histories, they discuss different projects that aim at con-
struct, “research”, “recuperate” and produce local history in order to 
transform the stigmatization of favela residents and their place of resi-
dence.  
An idea common to the many different projects initiated in Rio de 
Janeiro in the past five years is that all favelas have a history in which 
residents are both subjects of their formation and participants in their 
                                                     
7  “Porque Hip Hop”, Central Única das Favelas, <http://www.cufa.com.br> (26.04. 
2006). For a discussion on the implications of race and skin color in the everyday 
practices of discriminations of Favelas’ residentes, see Sherriff (2001) and Gold-
stein (2003). For a estimulating analysis of transnational Black politics involving 
Favelas/ Slums in Rio de Janeiro and Los Angeles, see Vargas (2003; 2006). 
8  “Porque Hip Hop”, Central Única das Favelas <http://www.cufa.com.br> (26.04. 
2006). 
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reproduction.9 The semantic uses and feelings that support these prac-
tices suggest that this is a complex terrain that involves forms of pro-
duction and transformation of subjectivities. A significant number of 
initiatives for the production and recuperation of the memory and 
history of favelas began in 2000, based on networks of local organiza-
tions – community associations, community centers, and schools – 
and external partners, local mediators, municipal, state and federal 
government institutions, international agencies, and academic “volun-
teers”(primarily anthropologists, and to a lesser extent, historians). 
This foundation, reflected in the diversity of partners, raises a series of 
questions: under what circumstances did history become a focus of 
relevant and transformative actions that would be able to bring to-
gether such a diverse group of partners and participants? It is difficult 
to specify an exact chronology that would allow us to trace the forma-
tion of a network, and more or less systematic forms of connection, 
given the diversification and multiplication of partnerships over the 
past years. However, it is worth trying to understand how “producing 
histories” and examining forms of representation are linked as an in-
flection in the same discourse and political practice carried out on the 
Internet. Histories retold and recorded – from different kind of sources 
– can be interpreted as unstable instruments in the production of urban 
and local subjectivities.  
The sophistication of the resources used in the production of 
favela histories cannot prevent a questioning of whether these instru-
ments – favela websites – are ‘representative’ of the voices of their 
residents. There are many disagreements and criticisms about the au-
thenticity of these representations and the legitimacy of their produc-
ers in “speaking” in name of the residents of favela communities. Sev-
eral should be noted here. Created within the website Viva Favela, the 
homepage Favela Tem Memória [Favela has a Memory] is an attempt 
to create a virtual and real community of producers of histories of 
favelas (Ramalho 2004; ISER 2004). Combining the work of univer-
sity students who live in the communities, they use techniques of 
journalism, photo-journalism, history, oral history and ethnography to 
                                                     
9  See, for instance a project called “Condutores de Memória” which aimed at 
recontruct the local histories of favelas’ communities of Tijuca (Condutores de 
Memória 2006). 
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document the memory of community members. Despite the fact that 
the site is an initiative actually created outside of the favela, its con-
tent represents ‘homemade’ historiographical and journalistic materi-
als about favelas. The website is divided into various sections; the 
“Gramaphone”, the “Favelario”, “Speaking in Favela”, “Cloud Soup”, 
“Photo Gallery”, and “Time Line”. It seeks to make history “from a 
narrative perspective”, while using stylistic and technical support that 
intervenes not only in the text but also in the training of those who act 
as collectors and producers, the “community correspondents”.  
The project has been recognized as a unique experience that 
sought, above all, to overcome symbolic, special and political barriers 
that implicitly or explicitly differentiated the various actors involved 
in the project – individuals and institutions “from the pavement” and 
the favelas. This project began when participants launched a series 
of experiments aimed at confronting images of stigmatization while 
giving voice to favela residents. Cited as a singular experience that 
sought, above all, to overcome symbolic and political barriers that 
implicitly or explicitly differentiated the various actors involved in its 
activities, the project was the initiative of producers who trained resi-
dents in the production of news, images, and local histories. One of 
the roles of these ‘correspondents’ was seeking news in a medium 
little known on the part of mass media and state institutions. For resi-
dents and those familiar with the social and symbolic space of the 
favela communities, these ‘correspondents’ would be able to repro-
duce the voice of its residents on their own terms (Sant’Ana 2004). At 
the same time, in taking the term ‘correspondents’ from the language 
of journalism, the project was based on the idea that residents were 
mediators authorized to enter as members rather than strangers in a 
feared territory. Even while edited by a team of professionals and 
specialists responsible for the training of ‘correspondents’, other local 
histories of the favela were constructed from the perspective of its 
residents.  
The texts, interviews and data collected by the ‘correspondents’ 
were combined with other materials – information about favelas found 
principally in the newspapers of the 1950s and 1960s. This kind of 
source also has an enormous importance in other projects and provides 
a visual memory of the historical construction of the marginalization 
of residents of the favelas. An example includes the Centro de Estudos 
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e Ações Solidárias da Maré (CEASM), in the Maré favela complex, in 
sponsoring the collection of local histories and production of newspa-
pers. A relevant part of the archives of images is the result of a proc-
ess of collection by university students resident in these communities, 
with supervision of professors in the social sciences. In the photos, 
perceptions on the part of the press and the elites, shocked at the 
growth and proximity of the favelas, lead to the gradual stigmatization 
of the favela as something that should be removed from the city. In 
contrast to this perspective, students were trained to photograph the 
contemporary day-to-day of the favelas.10 The photographs of houses 
built on sticks (palafitas), materials used in construction, as well as 
the use of metal, the remains of tapume (pieces of wood used in the 
construction of public buildings reutilized in the building of houses), 
and other left-overs from city construction sites are intermingled with 
personal stories about the daily experience of transformation of the 
physical space beyond its migrant origins (CEASM 2004). The resi-
dent of the favela radically and continuously transforms the physical 
space where they live. Still, ‘residence in the favela’ is a continuation 
of other forms of organization and policies of deterritorialization car-
ried out through removal – a form of violence that is constantly pre-
sent. Thus, if the history of struggle allows for the recognition over 
time of the legitimacy of living in the favela, even if under precarious 
conditions, the history of removal gives authority to versions recreated 
around local ownership, based on spatial references. Thus, in trying to 
implode the negative signals of these historically produced strategies 
of subjectivity, some of the actors and their projects, contradictorily, 
would be preserving and even giving force to their boundaries and 
features of difference based on a supposed common experience. In the 
current era of urban transformation of Rio, in which the favela and its 
members have become the focus and scene of publications, presenta-
tions, actions, symbolic forms of violence, and policies of all kinds, 
the recognition of their history makes explicit a series of questions 
that should be objects of reflection. 
Beyond the unique character and the stylistic, aesthetic and above 
all rhetorical experimentation initiated by Viva Favela (VF) and the 
website Favela Has Memory (FTM), other forms of occupation have 
                                                     
10  See <www.imagensdopovo.org.br> (26.04.2006). 
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proliferated on the web. The websites Central Unica de Favelas – 
CUFA – and the Favela News Agency (ANF), for example, emphasize 
other forms of representation. Directly linked to community organiza-
tions and, in particular to black and cultural movements and other 
cultural expressions, such as the Hip-Hop movement – they establish 
ties with other networks, mediators and forms of participation in the 
public debate, including projects of sports (street basketball), music, 
and cinema.11 
But these differences are not only stylistic, nor are they limited to 
institutional arrangements. The ‘authority’ of their producers – resi-
dents of the favela – is highlighted to give legitimacy to the purpose-
fully chaotic aspects of the site. Due to their specificities, these pro-
jects cannot be compared entirely on the same terms. I prefer to see 
them in their complementary dimension and in their possibility of 
suggesting a particular moment for the transformation of strategies for 
political mobilization in favela-based communities of Rio de Janeiro. 
By virtue of their importance in the realm of actions involving social 
movements, nongovernmental organizations, and the State, these com-
munities have attained significant visibility, which implies a measur-
able expansion in the networks of interaction which exist under, be-
tween and in between the lines of the discourses that promote a polar-
ized view of, literally, the favela versus the asphalt – that is, the paved 
areas of the city. These networks promote different ways of semanti-
cizing the categories “favelado” and “favela resident”. By defending 
common memories, histories and pasts, these agents call for their 
rights to power and authority of the word, even if mediated, and at 
times “handled” by able writers. One of the objectives observed is 
specifically to produce dialogue, and the coming together through 
symbolic leveling of citizenship in which a certain notion of history – 
that of the citizen who is aware, engaged and active, is a part. 
Among other initiatives, these projects capitalize on one of the 
possibilities created by NGOs and social movements – the idea that 
histories lived in favelas need to be told. However we need to differ-
entiate the forms of collection, production, and reproduction of knowl-
edge conceived of as history, and the way in which they circulate 
                                                     
11  See, for instance <http//:www.cufa.org.br> and <http//:www.cufaviaduto.org.br> 
(26.04.2006). 
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within and outside of the community. The initiatives briefly described 
here reveal a tension, also present in the tales, testimonies, and con-
versations about forms of engagement of members with these projects 
and their various “communities”. Who speaks, for what, and for 
whom are these stories on the favelas and their members told? By 
invading the virtual sphere of the internet, favela communities and 
their mediators produce a kind of exhumation of ghosts present in the 
popular and violent imaginary of the city, or reinterpret and recycle its 
leftovers, fragments, and whatever else can still be reinterpreted. In 
this form, banners and pop-ups implode our capacity to read the im-
ages of the internet as if it were simply words, “the sensitive territory 
of the favelas” – an phrase coined by the creators of CUFA (Central 
Única das Favelas) – populated by different actors and multiple inter-
ventions, in transforming itself into a text that invades the web as a 
territory of expression. 
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Esther Hamburger 
Wired Up to the World:  
Performance and Media in Contemporary Brazil1 
1. Performance, Television and Film: the Case of Bus 174  
On July 12 year 2000, in the Jardim Botânico upper middle class 
neighborhood in Rio de Janeiro city, Sandro do Nascimento, a young 
black man, was the protagonist of what would become a spectacular 
event of violence. Surrounded by police, what apparently started as a 
“small act of robbery” inside a regular urban bus became a threatening 
scenario, a dangerous stage, where aside from the hijacker and his 
victims, a series of Rio de Janeiro policemen and state government 
officials performed to the media. During four hours, from afternoon to 
early evening, television crews present at the scene transmitted the 
progress of the case live to the whole country. At the end of this bad 
thriller two people – the hijacker and two month pregnant 23 years old 
teacher Geísa – died. They were shot live on national television.2  
In the context of a wider project about the politics of representa-
tion and different forms of “appropriation” of television and film ap-
paratus in contemporary Brazil,3 this paper focuses on film Ônibus 
174 (Bus number 174), a documentary made a couple of years later 
which reviews and contextualizes the brutal events of that day. The 
film by director José Padilha places TV reportage in perspective. An 
assemblage of television footage, expo facto reports by privileged 
participants, such as hostages, the “SWAT” officer who was in charge 
of the operation, former friends and family of the protagonist, social 
                                                     
1  Preliminary versions of this work were presented in the Annual meeting of So-
cine, Brazilian Cinema Studies Association (Salvador, Brazil, November 2003) 
and in the São Paulo International Conference of Documentaries (March 2004), 
and published as “Políticas da representação: ficção e documentário em Ônibus 
174” In: Mourao/Labaki (2005: 196-215).  
2  Detailed description of Rio de Janeiro’s newspapers coverage of the event in 
Silva, Cristina Dias da (2004). 
3  “Inclusion and Exclusion: the Politics of Representation in a São Paulo favela” is 
funded by CNPq, the Brazilian National Research Council. 
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workers who knew him, as well as drug dealers, policemen and spe-
cialists who did not have any direct connection with this specific case, 
the film constitutes privileged material for research about the relations 
between the media, public visibility, violence and performance in 
contemporary Brazil.  
The term “appropriation” here designates different ways through 
which subjects represented in the media as this “other” – who is asso-
ciated with violence, poverty and race – control the ways their image 
appears on the screen. The hypothesis of the project is that different 
ways and degrees of “appropriation” assume specific aesthetical 
forms, and express different relations which filmmakers establish with 
their subjects. Within this broader framework, Bus number 174 pre-
sents a “perverse” form of “appropriation”. During a whole afternoon 
and early evening, the performance of Sandro, the protagonist here, 
galvanized television and the other media. As he became aware of the 
fact that he was at the center of the scene, his performance privileged 
this unique chance to speak up, in detriment of his own chances of 
survival. In this sense, his action can be analyzed as one – perverse – 
form of appropriation, first of live television, later of documentary 
film. Before turning to the film itself, I will start with a brief field-
work-inspired discussion of the conceptual framework of the project 
in construction, followed by a brief description of the ways in which 
favelas appear in the history of the Brazilian scene which will be use-
ful for understanding current shifts. Discussion of the case of Bus 174 
is then followed by sketches of other forms of “appropriation” of the 
means of representation which are present in other films. Unsolved 
questions about how to represent violence without reinforcing preju-
dice and discrimination conclude the paper.  
 
2. Politics of Representation in Contemporary Brazil:  
a Broader Research Project 
Urban violence, poverty and race have appeared as intrinsically con-
nected themes in the recent boom of Brazilian film. These themes 
gained a sort of “hyper visibility” in the media4 that contrasts with 
                                                     
4  Recent Brazilian film has been subject to different interpretations, some of them 
with emphasis on the shift of meaning in the representation of “favelas”. See for 
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their relative invisibility during the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s. 
Film and television treatment of violence, poverty and race has pro-
voked intense debate involving directors, musicians, critics and social 
movements. Questions in this debate revolve around the accuracy of 
filmic representation, the eventual excess of violence that would rein-
force stereotyped images of the poor, mistaken images of violence as 
the only possible account of daily life in poor neighborhoods and non-
legitimate appropriation of local images.  
This paper participates in this debate as part of a wider project 
which focuses on film and television representations of violence and 
poverty as an intrinsic dimension of the Brazilian contemporary social 
problem. The hypothesis here is that certain films and television pro-
grams express different forms of contemporary “appropriation” of the 
mechanisms of producing audiovisual representation of urban poverty 
and violence. The idea here is to relate different forms of representa-
tion to the different ways in which the people who represent and/or are 
represented in each specific work perform. The ways in which people 
perform in the process of filming – including rehearsal, rewritings of 
the script, sound track, mise-en-scéne, etc. express different games of 
appropriation of the mechanisms of constructing representation.  
This research is supported by continuing ethnographic experience 
in a favela in São Paulo since the end of the 1990s5 and is the result of 
my professional trajectory – departing from urban anthropology to the 
study and critique of audiovisual representations. My field experience 
in the late 1990s suggested that inhabitants of the favela were con-
nected to the world through television and radio reception. They were 
also aware of their relative invisibility in the media. Moreover they 
attempted to appropriate the means of producing their own representa-
tions of themselves and the world. In the early 2000s, amidst a broader 
process of change, still largely unknown, this situation of relative in-
visibility shifted (Hamburger 2003: 104-115). Different forms of 
                                                                                                                  
example Bentes, Ivana (2003); Ramos, Fernão Pessoa (2003); Xavier, Ismail 
(2003). For the place of violence in Cinema Novo see Xavier, Ismail (1983). 
5  The project I refer to here is called: “The impact of television on reproducive 
behaviour in Brazil”, carried out by a consortium of research institutes which in-
cluded researchers from CEBRAP/São Paulo, University of Texas, CEDEPLAR-
UFMG, NEPO-UNICAMP, ECA-USP, was financed by Rockfeller, Mellon, 
Hewlett Packard, and MacArthur Foundations.  
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emergent representation include viewing local television sensational 
newscasts, performing in popular “shows de auditório”, taking part in 
NGO experiences of local video production, community radio pro-
jects, local home video production, as well as starting an acting and/or 
singing show business career. Successful hip-hop groups have done 
sound tracks of recent films such as “City of God” or “O Invasor”.  
Early fieldwork information suggested that the main notions that 
feed this ongoing project, and will be tested in the interpretation of 
different films and programs, such as “the politics of representation” 
and the “appropriation of the mechanisms of producing representa-
tion”. In short, the project discusses the idea that the dispute for the 
control of what is broadcast, how and in what media is strategic in the 
contemporary metropolis. Moreover the idea is to call attention to the 
fact that black and poor favela inhabitants take part in this dispute 
through different attempts to interact with the media. Dispute over the 
control of what is represented, how and where, defines the relationship 
that people from different social classes and professional segments 
maintain with various audiovisual formats, such as TV programs (the 
news, reality programs, soap operas), documentaries and/or fictional 
films.  
Roughly, the idea is that in different ways, which are still under 
investigation, people try to appropriate the mechanisms of producing 
representation. And different aesthetic arrangements capture and ex-
press different forms of this appropriation. By becoming a candidate 
to take part in “reality shows” such as “Big Brother”, by writing a 
book about the poor neighborhood where you live (which eventually 
might become a movie), by writing and interpreting rap songs (which 
can become TV or film soundtracks), or by participating in audiovis-
ual workshops in poor neighborhoods or in prisons, people aim to be 
included in the universe of the visible – an universe which sometimes 
is framed as the universe of the “spectacle”.  
In the theoretical horizon of the project figures the problematiza-
tion of the notion of “spectacle” in itself. From the perspective of film 
and television makers, the question is how to represent violence with-
out reinforcing stereotypes and prejudices. Producing representation 
of poverty and violence nowadays means dealing with images that 
play a strategic role in the interplay of social relations and representa-
tions. 
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If the hypothesis of different ongoing forms of appropriation of 
the mechanisms of producing representation is correct, the idea that 
contemporary social relations should be understood in terms of the 
“society of the spectacle” – roughly understood as this almost inde-
pendent universe, which would fascinate and alienate people – would 
be questioned by the idea that even though unequal and distorted, 
interaction rather than separation would mark relations between view-
ers and films and/or television programs. Different kinds of continuity 
– some more perverse than others – would mark relations between 
viewers, people represented and professionals who work on the con-
struction of representation. Different forms of “appropriation” of the 
mechanisms of producing representation range from aesthetically ori-
ented political actions that aim at television exposure, such as 9/11 
(Hamburger 2003: 49-60), to films that construct their verisimilitude 
based on the body movement and oral language of endogenous casts, 
scripts that are based in insider reports, local sound tracks, etc.  
 
3. Favelas, Poverty and Violence in the Brazilian Audiovisual 
Scene  
Favelas have been present in Brazilian films since early years. In the 
1950s and 1960s, poor neighborhoods were connected with blacks, 
carnival, samba, afro-religion cults. In the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s 
poor urban landscapes were absent from the impoverished cinema 
scene, as well as from affluent television screen. The above-men-
tioned films disrupt this relative invisibility.  
Modern Brazilian film emerged in connection with favelas. With 
Rio 40 graus (1954) and Rio Zona Norte (1957) both directed by Nel-
son Pereira dos Santos, Brazilian film acquired the streets of the city, 
leaving classic scripts and studio settings behind.6 Two productions, 
by foreign directors with local connections, inspired by these break-
through films, deal with favelas– samba and carnival. Orfeu do Car-
naval (1959) by French director Marcel Camus, based on the play by 
                                                     
6  In 1935 Humberto Mauro directed Favela de meus amores, a film that unfortu-
nately did not survive. About Brazilian modern film see Calil, Carlos Augusto 
(2002). About favelas in the history of Brazilian cinema see Bentes, Ivana 
(2003). About Nelson Pereira and the relationship between his films and Italian 
Neo-realismo, see Fabris, Mariarosaria (1994).  
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Vinícius de Morais won the Palm d’Or in Cannes. Years later, Fábu-
las (1965), by Swiss Arne Sucksdorff with the help of some of his 
students at the film course provided by Itamaraty, the Foreign Affairs 
Department, was also shown in Cannes. Between these two “foreign” 
films, Cinco Vezes Favela (1962) by Marcos Faria, Miguel Borges, 
Carlos Diegues, Joaquim Pedro de Andrade and Leon Hirszman, ex-
presses five “cinema novo” images of Rio de Janeiro favelas. The five 
short fiction films bring documentary images of the city with special 
attention to blacks, black kids, favelas, carnival and music. All these 
films contemplate some kind of violence. “Favela boys” who face 
several acts of daily violence while selling peanuts around tourist 
places in Rio 40 graus. “Favela boys” who make money by stealing 
cats in bourgeois houses, or simply catching street cats, and selling the 
animals to tamborim makers who use their skin in Couro de Gato. A 
youth gang which robs and kills fellow friends in the neighborhood in 
Rio Zona Norte. Local bandits who kill Eurídice in Orfeu do carnival. 
Violence was there to signalize that black favelas were not idyllic 
places of music, dance and sensuality. Violence was there as if to alle-
gorically suggest that class conflict and discrimination intrinsically 
embodied and signified violence.  
Although violence and poverty were represented in many fiction 
films of the 1970s and 1980s, such as Hector Babenco’s Lúcio Flávio, 
passageiro da agonia and Pixote, the focus was on prison, police, and 
correction institutions, rather than on daily life in favelas. In those 
years and until the late 1990s, popular neighborhoods have been con-
demned to a certain “invisibility”. Weakness of documentary rein-
forces this sense of invisibility. Even though during these years many 
documentaries were shot in favelas, this local blooming got little 
broadcast, because in Brazil, television – the main producer and ex-
hibitor of documentaries worldwide – has completely ignored the 
genre.7  
Over the past 40 years, with rare exceptions, structural limitations 
to documentary production have enhanced the invisibility of popular 
segments living in large cities. Especially on television, this invisibil-
ity was, and still is, an expression of discrimination. At the same time, 
                                                     
7  For a panorama of documentary in Brasil see Teixeira, Francisco Elinaldo 
(2004). 
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in recent years, as the illegal traffic of weapons and drugs has domi-
nated poor neighborhoods, documenting favelas has become a “secu-
rity” issue. Local leaders have attempted to control the production of 
images about their communities. In the 1990s, Cacá Diegues’ remake 
of Orfeu was shot on a specially built favela. Nowadays, in order to 
shoot in these locations one needs their permission.  
During the 1970s and 1980s, when television consolidated itself as 
a popular and lucrative vehicle of an expanding industry with interna-
tional connections, urban sceneries of poverty and violence were ab-
sent from the screen. Telenovelas (Brazilian daily soaps) are well-
known for their glamorous characters and sceneries (Kehl 1986; Leal 
1986; Sarques 1986). Even though they are shot on location, they 
rarely use favela locations. As regards TV news, during the military 
years, the tone was official, i.e. newscasts talked basically about gov-
ernment actions. Poor neighborhoods and their inhabitants were not 
considered newsworthy. Television news focused on ‘great events in-
volving great personalities’. This rigid and formal agenda was coher-
ently represented in an “objective” news style: fixed images, with a 
steady hand, edited in a clean, fast, and conventional way.  
Black people rarely appeared on the television screen, in news or 
in fiction.8 The country that television portrayed was white, peaceful 
and affluent. The official image privileged rich scenarios, where con-
sumption of goods abounded. Fictional plots involved cases of crime 
and drama, but the tonic was romance, in general a privileged path to 
social ascension. At the end of 1980s, television fiction started to 
question 1960s and 1970s “developmentist” optimism. In so doing, 
these popular electronic feuilettons anticipated public treatment of 
issues that would dominate the political agenda of the 1990s and early 
2000s, such as political corruption.9  
In 1991, Aqui, agora (Here and now) an early evening television 
local news program, aired on SBT channel, disrupted previous con-
ventions by introducing poor urban landscapes where ordinary people 
performed cases of domestic violence, as well as small scale conflicts 
– among neighbors or against companies which allegedly violated 
                                                     
8  On the slight presence of blacks on Brazilian TV see Araújo, Joel Zito (2000), 
book and film.  
9  For an analysis about the relationship between telenovelas and politics in Brazil-
ian recent history see Hamburger, Esther (1999). 
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consumers rights. Aqui, agora legitimated popular urban landscapes as 
sceneries for news programs recorded on location and with reporters 
and cameramen on the move. Shaky images produced by professionals 
who were out of breath while climbing up the hills transmitted the 
sense of immediacy, and contributed to reinforcing the impression of 
“hot news”, transmitted live. Aqui, agora reporters went out of the 
studios “in search of the news where it actually happened”. In contrast 
with the official tone of conventional coverage, Aqui, agora trans-
formed matters related to small conflicts and local crime into news. 
This short-lived program inspired similar newscasts in rival networks 
such as Record and Bandeirantes, but it also proposed aesthetic and 
thematic reformulation of television news with repercussions in 
Globo,10 and perhaps, in film. In the nineties, despite its good ratings, 
SBT took Aqui, agora off the air, due to the program’s low commer-
cial value, given advertisers resistance to invest in what was consid-
ered a lowbrow program.  
In the nineties representations of violence and urban poverty, spe-
cifically favelas, returned to film, but in a different register.11 Ameri-
can film director Spike Lee shot a Michael Jackson clip in a Rio de 
Janeiro favela.12 By the end of the 1990s and incorporating images 
from popular television newscasts, the documentary News of a private 
war started a new trend. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, favelas appeared in films as inhabited by 
“malandros”, i.e. characters who aimed to take advantage of every-
thing, who lived out of “smart” small illegalities, for whom life was 
to be lived with good humor. At the beginning of the nineties, Aqui, 
agora caused public opinion impact by bringing the ‘peripheries’ to 
televisual display. In the late 1990s, favelas reappeared as privileged 
landscapes for gang dispute, for drug dealers and, to quote the police-
man in Salles’s film, who coined the expression that named the film, 
for this “private war”.13 News of a private war’s co-director, Brazil-
                                                     
10  On ‘Aqui, Agora’ see Jabor, Arnaldo (1991). See also Bentes, Ivana (1994), and 
Hamburger, Esther (1995).  
11  For comparison between the ‘cinema novo’ of the early 1960s and the ‘revival 
cinema’ see Ramos, Fernão Pessoa (2003); Xavier, Ismail (1983), and Bentes, 
Ivana (2003). 
12  On Michael Jackson’s clip see Vieira, João Luiz (2004). 
13  Poverty and violence were not absent from cinema in the 1970s and 1980s.  
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ian-American Kátia Lund, also co-directed the celebrated and Oscar-
nominated City of God. The links between the two films do not stop 
there. There had been attempts before, but News of a private war is 
the first film to follow the track opened by popular TV news, i.e. to 
enter and actually register the otherwise invisible true war that goes on 
in Rio de Janeiro favelas. The film registered the director’s surprise 
with this next door, then unknown, to hell. Only a couple of years 
later, Bus 174 further developed the subject. 
 
4. Bus 174 
The structure of Bus 174 is similar to the structure of the incisive 
documentary Notícias de uma guerra particular (News of a private 
war) by João Moreira Salles, which José Padilha edited.14 Both films 
articulate conflicting elements of a tragic situation in an attempt to 
express complexities which resist easy explanations. Notícias con-
trasts views by people who are with the police with reports by drug 
dealers (men who are with the movimento) and with reports by favela 
inhabitants who do not align with any side. Ônibus 174 adds a forth 
perspective: the media.  
Notícias de uma guerra particular (1999) offered the first reflex-
ive glance at an universe that, at that time, was still only visible 
through the sensational lenses of popular TV news programs. The 
documentary, aired on cable television,15 resulted from the director’s 
initial project of filming a NGO project, a favela dancing company. 
As his crew did research among the young dancers, they came across 
daily violence on an unprecedented scale. Instead of a film about  
ballet, Salles’ film revealed to Brazilians who do not live in poor 
neighborhoods, and who have access to cable television and news 
papers, the barbarism already in place in Rio de Janeiro favelas. The 
film was possible thanks to an agreement between filmmaker and drug 
dealers, who not only allowed shooting, but also agreed to take part in 
                                                     
14  Notícias de uma guerra particular was one of the first documentary films in the 
1990s to deal with the universe of violence and drugs in Rio de Janeiro favelas.  
15  Due to high costs and low availability, very few viewers have access to cable 
television, therefore only a few viewers saw this documentary. Nonetheless the 
film influenced other film makers to deal with the subject further. 
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the project. Later on this illegal interchange was questioned by legal 
authorities.  
Only four years later, Bus 174 came out amidst a “boom” of 
documentaries and fiction films that bring to light this world, sub-
merged up to the early 1990s. The interplay between all these films 
expresses the intense ongoing dispute over the control of representa-
tion. Titles such as Invasor, Cidade de Deus, Cidade dos Homens, 
Carandiru, or Prisioneiros da Grade de Ferro can be interpreted as 
different specific cases of appropriation of the mechanisms of control 
over production of filmic representation about poverty and violence.  
News and Bus 174 present similar formal structure. Both films 
create a hyper-dramatic atmosphere by contrasting different point of 
views about life in contemporary Rio de Janeiro favelas. Drug dealers, 
policemen, ordinary people in the first, and the three plus the media, 
in the second, have their perspectives analytically confronted. Both 
films are punctuated by grave instrumental music – a narrative ele-
ment that reinforces the tragic picture. By articulating different – 
sometimes opposing, even enemies’ perspectives – both films adopt a 
comprehensive perspective which goes beyond simple melodramatic 
keys such as ‘good’ and ‘evil’. Nonetheless, they both emphasize the 
difficult nature of a no-way-out situation. It is not a coincidence that 
both documentaries end in the cemetery. News with a parallel montage 
of enemy funerals: a policeman and a drug dealer – both killed in 
combat. The final sequence confirms the tragic superiority of death 
with a steady shot of a cemetery white wall which slowly fills up and 
turns black, with names and dates of thousands of victims of this “pri-
vate war”. Bus 174 finishes with the solitary funeral of Sandro, the 
boy who at five saw his mother’s murder, some years later survived 
the Candelária massacre in Rio, was kept in the ‘Padre Severino’ re-
formatory (the same reformatory, with very similar takes of naked and 
humiliated male bodies, appears in News). Captain Pimentel, the po-
liceman whose statement suggests the title of News, is also inter-
viewed in Bus 174. It is possible that some interviewees who con-
cealed their identity, using similar masks – are also in both films.  
Both films use the strategy of articulating successive fragments 
without the use of the classic outside voice-over of an “objective” 
narrator who makes sense of the images, which in their turn are care-
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fully chosen as good illustrations.16 Careful editing alternates speeches 
that express different positions, sometimes even antagonistic posi-
tions. As a result a complex, panoramic but comprehensive view 
emerges: one which recognizes – and legitimates – existent opposing 
views concerning the same dramatic situation.  
The four years separating the two films are the years of the so 
called “revival” of Brazilian film, both fictional and documentary. But 
they were also crucial for the passage from the invisibility, character-
istic of the previous decades, to a series of diversified documental 
experiences that gave visibility to the universe of the urban popular 
classes. Both films express representation principles adopted in this 
new phase of Brazilian cinema. Violence, present in the allegorical 
register of the films made in the ‘cinema novo’ era, emerges with 
force in the contemporary documentary production. Violence appears 
in documentary-like images, as an endemic force that polarizes dis-
putes over the control of representation.  
By taking television archive material as his prime material José 
Padilha’s film brings elements that stimulate us to think about audio-
visual representation, television and film. Television footage of the 
occasion guide the film, in its chronological reconstruction of the 
event. Archive material was edited in a way as to foster our under-
standing of the situation. The idea here is that a film, done after the 
fact, with the benefits of distance, in time and space, both in produc-
tion and reception, can contribute to putting the television event in 
perspective, to foster our understanding of the tragedy, to stimulate the 
formation of an enlightened public opinion, which should be able to 
escape Manichaean views of the drama, especially a possible domi-
nant interpretation that would approve the police’s attitude of killing 
the aggressor.  
Documentary film in this case should be able to contextualize the 
event, to give voice to participants, in ways that live coverage cannot 
                                                     
16  In Cineastas e imagens do povo, Jean Claude Bernadet (2004) analyses Brazilian 
documentaries produced in the early sixties with a particular emphasis on the 
ways in which different films express particular relations between directors, who 
shoot, and the people represented in the screen. The book brings an insightful 
analysis of the use of the narrator in what he calls the sociological model. Con-
temporary films do not use voice-over narrative. Nonetheless, perhaps they keep 
other traces of the sociological model.  
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do. The analytical general view proposed in the film can be noticed 
right from the beginning, with the panoramic shallow flight over the 
city of Rio de Janeiro, pointing out the social differences registered in 
the urban geography, the beach and the hills (the favelas), until its 
arrival at the Botanical Gardens, approaching the scene of the crime.17 
Throughout the film, sequences of television material, recorded live 
on the day of the hijacking, are intercut with archive material, such as 
the police/criminal record of Sandro, news published in the press 
about his mother’s death, the Candelária massacre, in addition to 
countless interviews with hostages of the bus, policemen, journalists, 
drug dealers, real relatives or relatives by affinity, professionals who 
took care of him as psychologists, social workers and a capoeira 
teacher.  
Although not exactly in the same order, the film follows very 
closely the chronological script of the protagonist’s life, reconstituting 
his trajectory, not as the cruel man or violent criminal pictured on live 
television at the time, but as a victim of an unfair, violent and unjust 
society where he lived. The complex scenery composed of different 
and sometimes contradictory perspectives ends up, as much as in 
News of a private war, by creating a complex picture with no way out. 
The almost solitary burial of a boy illegally strangled inside a police 
car (the only moment, after hours of negotiation, when television 
cameras were absent) was accompanied by a lady, also solitary, who 
presented herself as the person who Sandro (already an adult) adopted 
as a mother, and to whom he promised to “be someone”. No blood 
family; appealing tragic soundtrack.  
Instead of the audience of millions who in 2000 followed live cov-
erage of the event, the film had a modest audience in Brazil. It suc-
ceeds in making the viewer – usually an upper middle class Brazilian 
– feel at least a little bit co-responsible – for omission, or for being 
complacent with stereotypes that associates blackness, poverty, igno-
rance, criminality and violence – a social context which, ultimately, 
would have murdered Sandro.  
Beyond what perhaps could be thought of as an overdramatic 
structure, which duplicates, at the other extreme, the stereotype of the 
                                                     
17  See Bentes, Ivana (2004) for a comparison with other films which open with 
similar aerial shots of Rio de Janeiro. 
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algoz, which associates black carioca poor male kids with violence, by 
presenting a decent and legitimate picture of a poor black who at the 
age of five saw his mother being slaughter, a couple of years later 
survived a police massacre and who finally was killed by police abuse, 
the film offers excellent material to think about the relationship be-
tween citizens who belong to an almost invisible society and the 
mechanisms of producing representation such as photographic cam-
eras and TVs.  
Bus 174 discusses a “mediatic phenomena”. The presence of cam-
eras transformed a robbery of small dimensions into a national event 
with international repercussion. And different reports on the event 
reveal unexpected critical perspectives, such as the one by a masked 
character. This drug-dealer, who protects his face for obvious reasons, 
does not approve of Sandro’s operation from the start, for organized 
crime condemns crime against bus passengers, simple people just like 
them. Furthermore, strategically, this masked bandit explains that the 
robbery was not properly planned as it would be very unlikely to es-
cape from the place where the bus stopped. Moreover, as the drama 
became the center of attention in the media, the chances of escaping 
diminished radically. This professional belittles Sandro as an “ama-
teur”. His opinion matches other interviewees’ opinions who knew 
Sandro very well either as a companion, a student, an inmate, or a 
hostage. They all unanimously describe him as a human being differ-
ent from the monster that was pictured during the event.  
The assembly of the in loco recorded material in chronological or-
der, mediated by contextualizing reports, allows us to reconsider the 
parallel development of the police and the kidnapper conduct. The 
film reveals that the presence of the media introduces a variable that 
paralyzed the police, leaving technical routine procedures to the wills 
of political leaders. Later on, after the arrest, it is only in the absence 
of cameras that the shameful act of revenge takes place.  
The presence of the media also changes Sandro’s performance and 
in this specific case the film allows us to infer a transformation. The 
inside of the bus becomes like a back stage – where not everything 
can be seen or heard – creating a true drama performance. Reports 
by some of the victims confirm that Sandro not only acted, he also 
directed their performance. Throughout the event, step by step, he 
gradually embodied the stereotype of the bad character, for which he 
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had a perfect “physique du role”. This character gradually takes his 
real mask out, only to vest an invisible mask of a well known stereo-
type character. He started by wearing a hat, a mask, and sun glasses, 
and by speaking through the voice of his hostages. He ended up by 
exposing his opened face through the opened window of the bus. 
Through this privileged post he told Brazilians, and the world, about 
the most dramatic episodes of his impressive biography. Things he 
emphasized are relevant here.  
As the chances of escaping become less likely, Sandro gives up 
hiding his face. He removes his mask, puts his face literally out of the 
bus window and yells. He addresses, not the hundreds of people that 
are watching the drama on the site, right behind the police cordon, but 
the millions of TV viewers who followed the developments of his 
dangerous operation live, on radio or TV.  
The lines Sandro shouted are expressive. He refers to things he 
imagines he shares with the people he imagines as his viewers. He 
says that unlike fictional events in the American film he saw on TV 
the day before, his actions were for real. At the same time, a hostages’ 
testimony, who escaped, tell us the story of the negotiations going on 
back stage between these antagonistic characters. Sandro told the hos-
tages – all women, since he had released the men – at his signal, to 
pretend they were being hit. In other words, he directed a play. He 
pretended to the outside public that he would shoot, while arranging 
with hostages to scream as if they were actually being hit. Inside the 
bus, hostages at that moment were lying on the floor, so that from the 
outside, their voices would be heard, but their bodies would not be 
seen.  
As I suggested before, the police, in its turn, played the role of the 
paralyzed. The operation was marked by comings and goings. At the 
time there was even suspicion that the bullet that killed one of the 
hostages was shot not by Sandro, but by a policeman who would have 
killed the innocent pregnant woman instead of the hijacker. This was 
not true. The suspicion itself nonetheless reveals general lack of con-
fidence in the police.  
The presence of the media immobilized the police and mobilized 
the hijacker. At the same time, the media became, itself, a prisoner of 
the event. TV channels and radio stations felt compelled to broadcast 
the story, with the kind of frenzy that is typical of mediatic events.  
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Sandro in his turn was in a sense “prisoner of the lights”, or, in 
other words, prisoner of the attention given to him by the cameras. 
Gradually, as I say, he switched his moves from the emergency gath-
ering of a little money, to the urgent performance of the role of the 
bad guy, which everybody who knew him and was interviewed in the 
film – including some of the hostages – agreed he was not.  
Although, according to the reports by his street companions, he 
hardly mentioned anything about his past or his family, when facing 
public visibility through television cameras, Sandro denounced his 
tragic early years. He seemed to be aware that his story would capture 
attention. He denounced that he had been consistently beaten during 
his life. This boy as a victim had appropriated the situation, aiming to 
revert it. And in his hours of fame, he uttered a threatening speech. 
Again, his bad man’s discourse, vicious victim, according to him was 
inspired by American movies, contrasts with the perceptions that the 
hostages had of him – with a double game revealed by them – from 
the outside he pretended to shoot while inside there was a guarantee 
that he would not hurt anyone. The windows of the bus framed the 
stage.  
As usual, live coverage explored the event without much contex-
tual information. In order to go beyond this sensational approach, the 
film recovers the wicked victim’s trajectory. It intends to recover the 
identity of someone who miraculously survived several violent trage-
dies. It pictures someone whose life embodied the Brazilian social 
drama with incredibly sharp colors. The film sharply denounces a 
succession of extremely unjust circumstances – we see simulations of 
his witnessing of his mother’s murder; of the horrendous police mas-
sacre of street kids, during the night, in front of the Candelária church 
in downtown Rio de Janeiro. We are presented with images that show 
humiliation and abusive treatment of kids in the correction institution 
where Sandro was sent, and from where, not surprisingly, he escaped.  
The film takes Sandro’s speech as a guide to tell his history. The 
characters he mentions, or that appear in the documents, are all inter-
viewed. The hijacking event – beginning during the day and, as a bad 
omen, finishing in the dark – serves as a guideline to the film that cuts 
scenes in order to put things in context several times. With a dramatic 
music in the background, the film develops towards the tragic end as 
if there was no other way out. Sandro’s relationship with the camera  
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– the performance of a desperate man facing the spotlights, which is 
quite obvious in the film – is the knot that remains to be undone.  
Bus 174 sharply denounces enduring Brazilian social inequality as 
the root of an incredibly tragic life. It powerfully assembled TV im-
ages in a way that allows viewers to rethink a relevant event which 
would otherwise be rapidly forgotten. It does, with more sensitivity 
and fairness, the same role as the TV coverage did – it lets the boy 
direct the show – despite the police, government, and the media – and 
against his own chances of surviving.  
The atmosphere of a tragic end is enhanced by setting up a narra-
tive in melodramatic tone. Bus 174 does not play with goodies or 
badies. Sandro appears as the victim of perverse social conditions. 
Viewers are presented with this terrible otherness for which they 
should feel co-responsible, at least for their complacence with dis-
crimination.  
In the case of Bus 174, the documentary material seems stronger 
than fiction. Sandro was five when he saw his mother being stabbed. 
He never knew who his father was. As a rebel, he adopted the streets. 
He was the witness of another cruelty, this time carried out by police-
men – the Candelária massacre. As a survivor the boy for a while, 
during what was perhaps the healthier period of his life, could count 
on a capoeira teacher from PUC, Rio de Janeiro Catholic University. 
Addicted, he went back on the streets. In the absence of a mother, he 
adopted one. He promised that she would be proud of him one day. 
The tone of the music highlights the path as an inevitable tragedy.  
Bus 174 is powerfully disturbing. The question it raises, though, is 
how to disarticulate this complex conundrum that associates poverty, 
race, gender and violence with fear? Would it be possible to think 
about aesthetical ways of disarticulating these common sense connec-
tions?  
 
5. The Politics of Representation 
The idea here is to try an analytical approach that could be used for 
the analysis of other contemporary Brazilian productions that, either 
dealing with fiction and/or documentary, express different ways of 
appropriating mechanisms of producing film and television represen-
tation. As I suggested in the introduction, the idea is that different 
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contemporary works reveal different forms and degrees of appropria-
tion of the media. Dispute over the control of who represents what and 
how seems to play an increasingly crucial importance in contemporary 
Brazil. In this dispute, representations about poverty, race, gender and 
violence play a strategic role. The most successful films in the so-
called revival phase can be understood from this point of view. The 
city is, in this sort of universe, privileged scenery, sometimes even 
with protagonist roles. Popular neighborhoods or, more specifically, 
favelas are at the center of these elaborations.  
Favelas have, as discussed earlier in this paper, been pictured in 
the Brazilian movies from a very early period. Films by Nelson 
Pereira dos Santos – considered a hallmark in the history of the Brazil-
ian cinema, precisely because of his search for urban landscapes – 
expanded the use of favelas, already present in other forms of artistic 
expression, such as painting, to cinema. From Grande Otelo’s charac-
ter in Rio Zona Norte (1957), a pioneering modern film, to local actors 
representing local characters in City of God (2002), there is a whole 
itinerary of representations to be discussed. During this development, 
the way of representing favelas has changed, as did the relationship 
among those who make films and those who are represented in films. 
My hypothesis, to be further investigated, is that the allegorical repre-
sentation of violence that marked “new cinema” movies gave way to 
documentary forms.  
In an allegorical register, cinema novo used violence to introduce 
a different element compared to the national commonsensical repre-
sentation – in which Brazil was seen, essentially, as a peaceful, “cor-
dial” country.18 In documentary contemporary register, violence 
comes to the forefront of national representation.  
Studies of reception conducted in contexts of social discrimination 
and intense media coverage, suggest different heterodox ways of in-
teracting with printed and electronic means of communication in an 
intense move to dispute the control over the means of producing rep-
resentation. Acknowledging this “politics of representation” leads one 
to think of aesthetic manifestations as expressions of specific relations 
that viewers and producers establish around special articulations be-
                                                     
18  Classic sociological interpretations stress the interpenetration of public and pri-
vate relations as a founding basis of “cordial men”, and a tolerant nation.  
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tween sounds and images. In this sense, performance embodies – cap-
tures and expresses – conflicts. Different cases express different ar-
rangements.  
In the long run, when inquiring about formal concrete arrange-
ments in terms of expression of articulations between certain charac-
ters that seek, one way or the other, to control the mechanisms of con-
structing their representation, we open a path to rethinking the idea of 
the society of spectacle as proposed by Guy Debord and that, in a 
diluted manner and lacking ulterior re-elaborations, has served as a 
reference to different sorts of work, in distinct theoretical perspec-
tives, which seek somehow to place the imaginary in the context of 
contemporary phenomenon.  
Contemporary films deal with different strategies to represent, to 
talk about violence and poverty. Some experiences, as the Kinoforum 
workshops or the ones that led to the film “Prisoners of the Iron Bars” 
(Prisioneiros da grade de ferro) try to transfer , to the inhabitants of 
the poor neighborhoods and to the inmates of the demolished prison 
Carandiru respectively, technical “know how” in order to stimulate 
this poor, black “other” to make their own films. Experiences of the 
same sort have been conducted among native Americans, Australians, 
and Brazilians (Ginsburg 1993). In Brazil the project “Video nas al-
deias” pioneered this kind of experience.19 Prisioneiro, the Kinoforum 
workshops, among many others, bring this experience to urban con-
texts of conflict and social discrimination – such as prisons and poor 
neighborhoods in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo metropolis.  
Feature fiction films pose a different order of questions, nonethe-
less, they can also be thought of in terms of a different appropriation 
of the mechanisms of making representations. Like Bus 174, City of 
God (2002) can be thought of as following the paths to favelas opened 
by News of a private war. Both films have the same co-director, Kátia 
Lund, who coordinated relations with local people. City of God is 
based on a fictional auto-ethnographic book by Paulo Lins, a former 
resident of the neighbourhood. Lins worked as a research assistant 
with anthropologist Alba Zaluar who did research in the Cidade de 
Deus neighborhood. His book departs from documentary material to 
                                                     
19  See the catalogue of the recent Video nas Aldeias exhibit at CCBB in Rio de 
Janeiro. 
Performance and Media in Contemporary Brazil 217
fragmented novel form where he tells a series of segmented cases. The 
story lacks a clear beginning, middle or end. It reveals, from an in-
sider’s point of view, the universe of barbarism that has been taking 
place in everyday life in this favela. A situation that is common to 
contemporary large Brazilian cities. Curiously, at least in São Paulo, 
in technical terms, Cidade de Deus would be classified as a conjunto 
habitacional, a project, or, in British terms, a council estate, as it is 
not a self-constructed illegal assemblage of shacks, but a government-
built housing project on the outskirts of Rio de Janeiro city. Book and 
film use of the word favela may be seen as marking a shift in an in-
sider’s tendency to despise the word due to its pejorative symbolic 
meaning.  
The script, written by Bráulio Pedroso, selects and condenses 
characters. It articulates a history with a classic narrative, which sys-
tematizes the trajectory of the local criminals – starting from past 
times of inconsequent roguery to contemporary times of pulp fiction 
violence style. However, beyond this systematic narrative, the film is 
the result of a year of laboratory sessions with the actors, who were 
local residents of Rio de Janeiro favelas, organized in the NGO Nós 
do cinema. For these boys, who are candidates to become ‘Sandros’, 
representing a ‘Sandro’ in the film is a way of playing out the role of 
Sandro. During the laboratory, this amateur-professional cast impro-
vised speeches which were incorporated by the director and the 
screenwriter, added to twelve successive versions of the script. 
Throughout this long and intense building process, the actors, in some 
ways characters of themselves, transferred to the film the texture of 
their everyday life – especially through body language and oral ex-
pression. In this way, it is possible to say that there was some sort of 
symbiosis among actors, director and screenwriter – an unequal one, 
as the hierarchy is quite clear. Director and scriptwriter, plus editor (in 
the post-production phase) retained the authorial prerogative of decid-
ing what to keep and what to leave out. But City of God inaugurated a 
“method” that was afterwards followed in the television series City 
of men. According to the method the script is based on ethnographic 
on-site research. Scripts describe situations. Lines are improvised by 
young actors on the set. Actual shooting follows two or three rehears-
als of each scene.  
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Fast pace editing of this well-constructed story played by local 
unknown actors who speak their own slang and act according to their 
own codes, shot on location, results in a powerful film. A sharp pic-
ture of a deeply rooted myth, which associates violence and poverty, 
turns out as verisimilar reality. The result is a work that uses fast 
paced language, using an aesthetic that many despised as pure adver-
tising, perhaps because it is clean and efficient, and giving a sense of 
authenticity and a documentary appeal. Mostly, City of God resembles 
the story based on the insertion of these “authentic” elements. 
The case of Carandiru is different, even though there are simi-
larities with City of God. The most recent film by Héctor Babenco, as 
much as Fernando Meirelles, is equally based on an ethnographic re-
port of someone who, in some ways, shares the prison experience as 
an insider. Drauzio Varella, the doctor who with this book revealed 
the writers’ side of his professional activity, sought with his book to 
explain the catastrophic massacre that in one day interrupted dramati-
cally the routine of the prison where he worked, killing 111 of his 
prisoner patients. Drauzio’s story cannot be seen as a report of some-
one “from within”, as he was doing voluntary work, visiting everyday. 
However, he has a sort of specific knowledge that makes him more a 
voice “from within” that our own. There is an inside/outside ambi-
guity in the book, implying some appropriation of the production 
mechanisms of the news. The “authentic” experience of the doctor 
inside the prison gives credibility to his report from inmates and read-
ers. The doctor’s initiative, sharing his apprehension, and the act of 
barbarism from the State that ordered the invasion of the prison by 
military police during São Paulo state-governor Antonio Fleury’s ad-
ministration, was an editorial success. As the doctor of the prison, the 
author talks from an ambivalent point of view – he is an insider that 
leaves every day. He has a position of authority as a doctor. But he 
knows the inmates by their names, he knows how to find his way in 
the entanglement of cells, hallways and pavilions.  
The film is therefore based on a report that involves some appro-
priation, even if it is a “half-one”. Carandiru is based on Drauzio 
Varella’s personal experience as a doctor in the prison – a mix of be-
ing an insider and an outsider that gave him a privileged perspective 
of the events that took place in the traumatic massacre of 1992, an 
extreme case of state violence. The doctor becomes a chronicler after 
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elaborating the experience he saw in the destruction of the atmosphere 
he once knew. Although the cinema version has weakened the role of 
the writer/doctor as an insider/outsider, Carandiru, as City of God, is 
the result of a professional-personal elaboration of an insider/outsider. 
Born and raised in the ‘City of God’, Paulo Lins talks about his com-
munity first as a anthropologist researcher and then as a novelist. His 
story contains documentary and fiction, ethnography and literary 
characteristics. The film maintains the ambiguity. There is, as men-
tioned before, the amateur actors cast, who elaborated the dialogues in 
consecutive versions of the script that were re-elaborated after labora-
tory sessions. The soundtrack is marked by rap music. The filming in 
the favelas transformed the locations as another element of reality in 
the film’s narrative.  
Eduardo Coutinho’s film Santo Forte (Strong Saint, 1999) and 
Babilônia 2000 (Babylon 2000) is also part of this cinematographic 
experience rediscovering the favelas. Here the issue is not violence. 
The first film is based on Patrícia Monforte’s anthropological research 
that reveals the religious universe of the favelas. The second one goes 
to the favelas to document the resident’s oral reflections concerning 
the turn of the millennium. In both cases, the initiative, the agenda and 
the characters’ selection were concentrated in the hands of the produc-
ers and the director who retain the initiative of the filming process. 
But the objective here is to document something that could be de-
nominated as “cinematographic encounter”. To make the film is seen 
as a relation. The film documents an interaction among the team, in-
cluding the director-interviewer, and the characters. It takes what was 
said as an expression of that moment. They also express the experi-
ence on location. The discovery of the favela after the trafficking. 
Eduardo Coutinho’s Santo Forte is also from the same year – and also 
shot in a favela with characters from there – but the theme here is 
religion and the priority is the chat and not much action. Babilônia 
was filmed in 1999. 
The different ways in which the people in these films appropriate 
the production mechanisms of their representation configure different 
strategies, crystallizing in different aesthetic proposals. It departs from 
the texture of the films in itself to analyze in what ways it expresses 
forms of appropriating the representation mechanisms. It is not the 
case here to replace the analysis of the aesthetic articulation of these 
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works with an ideological discussion about the relations involved in 
the production process of each work. Quite the contrary, the aim is to 
understand the dispute for control of constructing mechanisms of rep-
resentation as an intrinsic dimension of making documentaries, which 
in many cases justifies the use of fictional conventions.  
It is not the case here to judge the presence of cameras. Con-
versely, it is the case of inquiring about the elements surrounding 
them. The idea here is to propose an analytical criterion for the current 
productions, different forms of appropriating the production mecha-
nisms of representation in recent documentary and fictional works. 
This paper dealt specifically with the film Bus 174. The specific case 
reveals the contradictory ways in which the TV cameras end up stimu-
lating certain behavior – not so much for what is going to be shown, 
but for the fact of going on air itself. Therefore, the sense of breaking 
with the invisibility that had characterized the character’s life, with 
recurring victim positions, witnesses of bizarre tragedies, stimulates 
the addicted boy to develop a performance for the cameras. For this 
documental performance, negotiated in the realm of live news, em-
bodying a persistent role in the Brazilian culture, especially in the time 
we live. Sandro embodies a stereotype and takes benefit as much as he 
can of the capacity to cause fear. During his ‘15 minutes’ or so of 
fame, the rebellious boy immobilized the police, divided by divergent 
orientations, paralyzed by the impossibility of killing a transgressor 
live on TV to the whole country, as one interviewee reveals – the 
technically advisable shot would be to hit the head causing a fast and 
certain death without facilitating any action of the kidnapper against 
the hostages. However, a shot of that kind could have undesirable 
effects in the video, such as a cranial explosion. The police and the 
state government became hostages of what they could imagine as a 
negative repercussion of an aggressive act in the eyes of the public. 
The boy became a hostage of the character that he embodied, infuriat-
ing the police, humiliated by the inability to act when live TV is pre-
sent. On the other hand, the presence of the cameras guaranteed a 
certain survival. It is possible to conceive that if the police car had a 
camera, the murder would not have taken place. Conversely, the same 
cameras that guaranteed Sandro’s celebrity, forced him into a per-
formance that could not envision another way out but the tragic end 
that happened.  
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Bus 174 allows these kind of speculations, but perhaps it could 
have gone a little bit further concerning the disarticulation of precon-
ceived notions that surely connects the violent social order and its 
representations. Would it be possible to deal with the case without 
falling into the space that flirts with the melodramatic tradition, op-
posing victim and criminal, in some ways justifying violent acts by the 
lack of social dignity? Again, in concrete terms, the question is how to 
escape these traps? How to dismantle the convention that makes the 
media easy to manipulate, especially when representing violent acts? 
How to create other mechanisms, different from the attainment of 
violent acts, in order to set television and cinema guidelines?  
 
 
Bibliography 
Araújo, Joel Zito (2000): A negação do Brasil. São Paulo: Senac. 
Bentes, Ivana (1994): “Aqui, Agora, o cinema do submundo ou o tele-show da reali-
dade”. In: Revista Imagens, no. 2, pp. 44-49. 
— (2003): “The sertão and the favela in Contemporary Brazilian Film”. In: Nagib, 
Lúcia (ed.): The New Brazilian Cinema. London: I. B. Tauris, pp. 121-138. 
— (2004): “Do sertão à favela”. Paper presented at the Colóquio Representações da 
Metrópole, Brasil/França. São Paulo: CEM/ECA. 
Bernadet, Jean Claude (2004): Cineastas e imagens do povo. São Paulo: Cia das 
Letras.  
Calil, Carlos Augusto (2002): Introdução à História do Cinema Brasileiro Módulo I. 
São Paulo: Instituto Moreira Salles,. 
Fabris, Mariarosaria (1994): Nelson Pereira dos Santos: um olhar neo-realista? São 
Paulo: Edusp.  
Ginsburg, Faye (1993): “Aboriginal media and the Australian imaginary”. In: Public 
Culture, vol. 5, pp. 557-578. 
Hamburger, Esther (1995): “Female and Male, Fiction and News: Blurring Gender 
and Genre in Brazilian Television”. Presented at the XIX Congress of Latin 
American Sociology Association (LASA), Atlanta. 
— (1999): Politics and Intimacy in Brazilian Telenovelas. Chicago: Department of 
Anthropology, University of Chicago. 
— (2003): “Políticas da representação”. In: Contracampo, no. 8, pp. 49-60. 
Jabor, Arnaldo (1991): “Investigação sobre a revolução mexicana na TV, Arnaldo 
Jabor entrevista Albino Castro e Marcos Wilson, diretores do Aqui, Agora”. In: 
Folha de S. Paulo, June 22. 
Kehl, Maria Rita (1986): “Eu vi um Brasil na TV”. In: Kehl, Maria Rita/Costa, Alcir 
H. da/Simões, Inimá F. (eds.): Um país no ar: história da TV brasileira em três 
canais. São Paulo: Brasiliense/FUNARTE. 
Esther Hamburger 222
Leal, Ondina Fachel (1986): A leitura social da novela das oito. Petrópolis: Vozes. 
Mourão, Maria Dora Genis/Labaki, Amir (eds.) (2005): O Cinema do real, vol. 1. São 
Paulo: Cosac & Naify, pp. 196-215. 
Nagib, Lúcia (2003): The new Brazilian Cinema. London: I. B. Tauris.  
Ramos, Fernão Pessoa (2003): “Humility, Guilt and Narcissism Turned Inside Out in 
Brazil’s Film Revival”. In: Nagib, Lúcia (ed.): The New Brazilian Cinema. Lon-
don: I. B. Tauris, pp. 65-84. 
Sarques, Jane Jorge (1986): A Ideologia Sexual dos Gigantes. Goiania: Editora da 
Universidade Federal de Goiás.  
Silva, Cristina Dias da (2004): “Quando o algoz vira vítima: um estudo de caso sobre 
práticas narrativas de jornais em contextos de violência”. Paper presented at  
the Annual Meeting of ANPOCS, at thematic seminar Imagens da modernidade: 
mídia, consumo e relações de poder. Caxambú: ANPOCS. 
Teixeira, Francisco Elinaldo (2004): Documentário no Brasil, tradição e transforma-
ção. São Paulo: Summus. 
Vieira, João Luiz (2004): “Cidades brasileiras na globalização: Michael Jackson e o 
corpo transnacional”. Colóquio Representações da Metrópole: Brasil/França. São 
Paulo: CEM/ECA-USP. 
Xavier, Ismail (1983): Sertão mar: Glauber e a estética da fome. São Paulo: Brasi-
liense. 
— (2003): “Brazilian Cinema in the 1990s: the Unexpected Encounter and the Re-
sentful Character”. In: Nagib, Lúcia (ed.): The New Brazilian Cinema. London: 
I. B. Tauris, pp. 39-64. 
Robert Stam 
Tropicalia, Transe-Brechtianismo and the  
Multicultural Theme 
My paper will focus on the Brazilian artistic movement called Tropi-
calia, and especially on the music of Caetano Veloso and Gilberto Gil. 
Here I will directly explore their treatment of transnational and multi-
cultural history and themes as examples of political agency within 
popular culture. As a kind of conceptual video-jockey, I will counter-
point historical commentary and analysis with a series of musical 
video-clips. (The handouts will provide an itinerary, along with Eng-
lish translations of the lyrics of the songs.) 
The Tropicalists have been much in the news of late, due to Gil’s 
appointment as Brazil’s Minister of Culture, the publication in English 
of Caetano’s Tropical Truth, and the various Grammies, awards and 
film roles awarded to the two artists, such as Caetano’s appearance in 
Almodovar’s Habla con Ella. Journalistic critics of the English trans-
lation of Caetano’s memoirs were astonished to encounter a pop-star 
who could write like Proust and speak knowingly not only about 
French, American, and Brazilian culture but also about postmodern-
ism and globalization, in a text where names like Ray Charles and 
James Brown would brush up easily against names like Stockhausen, 
Wittgenstein, and Deleuze. Both Caetano and Gil, it seems to me, are 
Orphic intellectuals, or to play on Gramsci’s “organic intellectual”, 
“Orphoganic” intellectuals: they write books in one moment and lead 
dancing crowds in another. Reconciling the Dionysian and the Apol-
lonian, they are not only the performers of popular culture, they are 
also its theoreticians.  
As a multi-art movement, Tropicalia melded the popular and the 
erudite, the Brazilian and the international, the anachronistic and the 
contemporary, exposing Brazil’s contradictions to what Roberto 
Schwarz called “the white light of ultra-modernity”. Caetano re-
sponded to Roberto Schwartz’ analysis of this “absurdity” in his song 
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“Love, Love, Love”. Brazil may be “absurdo”, Caetano wrote, “mas 
Brasil nao e surdo, ja que tem ouvido musical”. 
Only a tiny proportion of the Tropicalia songs are “love songs”; 
the composers simply grant themselves the right to speak about any-
thing and everything. In “Pela Internet”, for example, Gil addresses 
the possibilities opened up by the Internet, but he multi-culturalizes 
the discussion by linking the new media to Afro-Brazilian culture, 
reminding us that West-African religions too were concerned with 
mediums and communication. More recently, Gil has become em-
broiled in the debates about “intellectual property rights”. In the spirit 
of indigenous notions of communal property, Gil is releasing some of 
his songs under the Creative Commons License so that others may 
freely “cannibalize” them. In a generous gesture of recombinant 
transtextuality, Gil, who has himself devoured so many influences, 
now offers the body of his own work to be devoured by others. 
My use of the metaphor of cannibalism is not, of course, acciden-
tal. It is well-known that the Tropicalia movement drew on the fa-
vored modernist trope of “anthropophagy”. Instead of the “bon sau-
vage” of the Romantics, the Modernistas preferred the “Bad Indian”, 
the cannibal, the devourer of the white European colonizer. Radicaliz-
ing the Enlightenment valorization of indigenous Amerindian freedom 
and equality, the modernists highlighted aboriginal matriarchy and 
communalism as a utopian model for a society free of coercion and 
hierarchy. The philo-indigenism of the modernists, like that of the 
French philosophes, enabled a deep anthropological critique of the 
political and moral bases of Eurocentric civilization.  
Tropicalia too was strongly influenced by “anthropophagy” which 
can be seen as the global South’s version of “intertextuality”, now 
viewed from the standpoint of neo-colonial power relations. Like the 
Modernists, the Tropicalists were eager to cannibalize artistic move-
ments from around the world. While the modernists devoured dada 
and surrealism, as Caetano himself put it, the Tropicalists devoured 
Jimi Hendrix and the Beatles, all part of a campy pastiche aesthetic 
which has sometimes been seen as a form of postmodernism avant la 
lettre.  
More than any other, it was Glauber Rocha’s 1967 film “Terra em 
Transe” that helped crystallize the Tropicalia movement. Caetano de-
lineated the film’s impact on the movement. “That whole Tropicalist 
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thing”, as Caetano famously put it, “became clear to me the day I saw 
“Terra em Transe”. My heart exploded during the opening sequence, 
when, to the sound of a candomblé chant, an aerial shot of the sea 
brings us to the coast of Brazil” (Veloso 1997: 99). Without that “trau-
matic moment”, Caetano writes, “nothing of what came to be called 
tropicalism would have ever existed” (Veloso 1997: 105). 
A baroque allegory about Brazilian politics, “Terra em Transe” is 
set in an imaginary country called Eldorado, but which looks very 
much like Brazil. The “Primeira Missa” fantasy sequence stages a 
tense encounter between African, indigenous, and European cultures: 
In this sequence, the character Porfirio Diaz, named after the Mexican 
ruler, arrives from the sea, in a scene suggesting a primal fable of  
national origins. Virtually any Brazilian spectator will recognize the 
reference to Cabral’s “First Mass”, celebrated with the Indians in 
April of the year 1500. But Rocha’s treatment of this primal theme 
departs dramatically from earlier artistic representations such as Vic-
tor Meirelles’ famous 1861 painting or Humberto Mauro’s 1937 Des-
cobrimento do Brasil. By conflating Cabral with the coup d’etat engi-
neered by Diaz, Rocha symbolically links the 16th century Conquest 
with 20th-century neo-colonialism and fascist coup d’etats. Diaz is 
implied to be a latter-day reincarnation of the conquistadores. In so 
doing, Glauber answers the modernists’ call for the “Decabralization” 
of Brazil.  
It is noteworthy that what first impressed Caetano in “Terra em 
Transe” was the conjunction of aerial shots of the Brazilian coast with 
the music of candomblé, a synthesis of image and music which power-
fully evokes the cultural crucible of the Black Atlantic. The very aes-
thetic of the Rocha sequence draws heavily on the Africanized forms 
of Rio’s yearly samba pageant, with its zany historicism, and its car-
nivalesque delight in anachronistic allegorias; indeed, the actor who 
plays the conquistador is Clovis Bornay, a historian specialized in 
carnival pageantry and well-researched “fantasias”. Secondly, the 
mass is accompanied not by Christian religious music, but by Yoruba 
religious chants, evoking the “transe” of the Portuguese title. Rocha’s 
suggestive referencing of African music implies that Africans too 
formed part of this primal encounter which gave birth to modernity 
and, ultimately, to globalization.  
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Since we are here in Berlin, just a short distance from the site of 
the Berliner Ensemble, it seems appropriate to open a parenthesis con-
cerning the relation between Brecht, Rocha, and Tropicalia. The pe-
riod of “Terra em Transe” and Tropicalia coincided with the height of 
Brechtian influence in Brazil. The Marxist Brecht, ironically, was the 
most popular playwright in Brazil during the military dictatorship, 
with ten different Brecht productions in 1968 alone. Brechtian theories 
exerted a strong influence on theatre groups like Arena and Oficina, 
and on filmmakers like Rui Guerra, Leon Hirszman, and Arnaldo 
Jabor. Rocha, for his part, was deeply impacted by a 1960 Salvador 
performance of Brecht’s “Dreigroschenoper” and he famously pro-
claimed that his three artistic gurus were Shakespeare, Eisenstein, and 
Brecht. Apart from his own hopes of making an adaptation of the 
“Dreigroschenoper” and his efforts to involve Orson Welles in an 
adaptation of “Galileo”, Rocha endorsed many aspects of Brechtian 
aesthetics, such as anti-illusionism, direct-address, epic interpretation, 
and contradiction between sound and image. 
“Terra em Transe” exemplifies what I would call, playing on both 
meanings of the word “transe”, a “Transe-Brechtian Aesthetic”. Rocha 
carnivalizes and Africanizes Brecht, filtering his ideas through the 
“transe” of West African possession religions. While Brecht deploys 
contradiction and disjunction between image and sound, Rocha goes 
further by staging the historical contradictions between vast cultural 
complexes – European, African, indigenous – existing in relations of 
subordination and domination. The Catholic mass is superimposed on 
music which incarnates precisely the religion suppressed by Christian-
ity, so here the music comes to represent not only an aesthetic dis-
junction but also the return of the historically repressed. The scene’s 
fractured and discontinuous aesthetic stages the drama of life in the 
colonial “contact zone”, defined by what Mary Louise Pratt calls 
“conditions of coercion, radical inequality, and intractable conflict”. 
Rocha’s neo-baroque Afro-avantgardist aesthetic here figures the dis-
continuous, dissonant, fractured history of the multi-nation through 
equally dissonant images and sounds. Here style itself becomes na-
tional (and transnational) allegory.  
The brief sequence from “Terra em Transe” offers a glimpse of 
what Tropicalia might share with Glauber Rocha. First, we find a 
common critique of the conservative cultural politics of the traditional 
Tropicalia, Transe-Brechtianismo and the Multicultural Theme 227
left, with its preference for the folklorized rural over the mass-
mediated urban, its resistance to technical innovations like the electric 
guitar, and its protectionist defense of what Caetano calls an “indige-
nous reserve of samba”. Like “Terra em Transe”, Tropicalia generated 
centrifugal, dispersive texts that fracture the left-populist cultural con-
sensus; they performed a kind of electroshock on dominant paradigms, 
excoriating both the reactionary Right and the populist Left. Second, 
Tropicalia absorbed Glauber’s emphasis on the unharmonizable con-
tradictions of Brazil, no longer smoothed over in the name of ho-
mogenizing ideologies like “racial democracy” or “Luso-Tropicalism” 
(Indeed, Caetano preferred the term “Tropicalia” to “Tropicalismo” 
precisely because it avoided the association with Gilberto Freyre). 
Third, Tropicalia absorbed Glauber’s Janus-faced openness not only 
to the popular but also to the avant-garde, whether Brecht and Godard 
in the case of Rocha, or Concretism and Oiticicca in the case of Tropi-
calia. Fourth, Tropicalia shared with Glauber the parodic return to 
foundational myths and national icons, whether Cabral’s “First Mass” 
in the case of Rocha, or Carmen Miranda in the case of Caetano, all 
epitomized in the triple pun of “Carmen Miranda-dada”, alluding si-
multaneously to Carmen Miranda, to the Dada movement, and to the 
cangaceiro couple Corrisco and Dada. Fifth, Caetano took from 
Glauber the idea of an anti-illusionist, transtemporal, and multi-
chronotopic aesthetic, one with the audacity to take on vast historical 
questions. Finally, Caetano too was “Brechtian” in his way. Apart 
from admiring the work of Brecht-influenced artists like Glauber 
and Boal, Caetano refers in Tropical Truth (Veloso 2002) to his 
“Brechtian” use of popular icons like Carmen Miranda. But like 
Glauber, Caetano and Gil were also “transe-Brechtianos”. Their work 
goes beyond Brechtian rationalism and scientism, with its emphasis on 
class, to open up wider social contradictions revolving around race 
and gender and sexuality and culture.  
“Tropicalia” favors a carnivalesque “aesthetic of mistakes”, in 
which artistic language is liberated from the stifling norms of correct-
ness. Carnivalesque art is thus “anti-canonical”; it deconstructs not 
only the canon, but also the generating matrix that makes canons and 
grammaticality. In Verdade Tropical, Caetano evokes something like 
this aesthetic revolution when he speaks of a “ransformation of the 
very criteria of taste” (Veloso 1997: 147). Tropicalism, for Caetano, 
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strives for an “equilibrio desequilibrado, feito samba” an awkward 
equilibrium comparable to the off-balance grace of samba or frevo. 
(We find this off-balance quality in the CD “Livros”, where the 
Olodum-style drumming sometimes does not “synthesize” completely 
with the neo-bossa style of the melody). What impressed Caetano in 
Glauber’s films, similarly, was not “the attempt to do things correctly 
[…] but rather the making of mistakes and succeeding on a com-
pletely different level, according to a new set of criteria for judging 
what was correct and what was not” (Veloso 1997: 101). 
The music of Caetano and Gil is deeply imbued with Afro-dias-
poric cultural values. “Beleza Pura” exalts the Africanization of Bahia 
and the cultural take-over by the Afro-blocos. Consistently, Caetano’s 
music associates black women with beauty, as in the song “Neide 
Candolina”, a tribute to two black women from Salvador. The city, 
Caetano suggests, should have more respect for “Liberdade”, a play 
on the word for freedom but also the name of Salvador’s largest black 
neighborhood. And Caetano has constantly dialogued with African-
American singers, whether through “covers” of songs by Nat King 
Cole or Michael Jackson, or through shrewd commentaries about the 
music, as in his wonderfully evocative homage to James Brown’s 
screams, which (quote) “tear in a clean rip over the lean swing of his 
band”.  
Another striking feature of Tropicalia, shared with Glauber Ro-
cha’s work, is its diasporic, transnational allusiveness; Caetano and 
Gil take the entire world as their province. One of the most beautiful 
songs ever written about New York City, for example, is Caetano 
Veloso’s “Manyata”. Although not all listeners are aware of the fact, 
“Manyata” paints a scene set along the lower bay of the Hudson river, 
in an indeterminate time anachronistically mingling centuries of his-
tory. The word “Manyata” constitutes a Brazilianized pronunciation of 
Manhattan, an example of transcultural filtration, where an indigenous 
American name is heard “through” an equally indigenized Portuguese. 
Within Caetano’s allegory, the river is obviously the Hudson; the 
woman in the canoe is obviously native American, the Goddess of 
Legend is the Statue of Liberty, and the “whirlpool of money” is Wall 
Street. The young woman in Caetano’s canoe, in this sense, is palimp-
sestically symbolic: she is at the same time Eve in a prelapsarian 
Eden, and a native American woman in a pre-Columbian world, but 
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she is also a native Brazilian woman, more particularly a Tupi woman, 
since Caetano calls her a “cunha”, Tupi for “young woman”. By link-
ing the native American woman to the torch symbolism of the Statue 
of Liberty, Caetano hints at the central role of the “Indian” in the 
“American”, French, and Brazilian versions of the Enlightenment.  
In his music too, Gilberto Gil forges links between widely sepa-
rated cultural worlds. His song “From Bob Dylan to Bob Marley: 
Samba-Provocation”, for example, forges a creative counterpoint be-
tween the Jewish-American Bob Dylan, the African-American Mi-
chael Jackson, and the Jamaican Rastafarian Bob Marley, all filtered 
through a Brazilian sensibility open to Africa, Europe, and all of the 
Americas. The refrain goes as follows: “Bob Marley died/ Because 
besides being black/ he was also Jewish/ Michael Jackson/ mean-
while/ is still around/ Because besides becoming white/ He’s become 
very sad.” Speaking more generally, Gil has served as a kind of musical 
“bard” of the Black Atlantic. Not only has he performed with musicians 
like Jimmy Cliff, Stevie Wonder, and Youssou N’Dour, he has also re-
ferred both lyrically and stylistically to the variegated musical forms of 
the Black Atlantic. “Sugar Cane Fields Forever”, for examples, traces 
popular music to its origins in the cane fields of slavery. For decades, Gil 
has been composing musical odes to Afro-Brazilian religious culture, 
whether to candomblé, as in “Iemanja” or to macumba, as in “Batma-
kumba”. Aware of the legacy of racialized repression around the dias-
pora, Gil composed the anti-apartheid song “A Prayer for Freedom in 
South Africa” (1985) and created the theme song “Touche pas a mon 
Pote” for the French anti-racist movement “SOS Racisme”. His song 
“Quilombo” memorialized Palmares, the 17th century maroon republic 
founded by fugitive slaves. The lyrics go, in part: 
It existed 
That black Eldorado of Brazil 
It existed 
Like a burst of light that freedom created 
It reflected 
The light of divinity the holy fire of Olorum  
[roughly, the Yoruba concept of God] 
It revived 
A Utopia of One for All and All for One 
The next video clips deal with the latter-day legacies of conquest and 
slavery, both in the negative form of dispossession and brutality, and 
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the positive form of artistic expression as a sublimation of historical 
pain. The first musical clip deals with a phenomenon common to most 
of the Black Atlantic countries – police brutality against black people. 
What differentiates the Brazilian case from the US case is the fact that 
police violence in Brazil is in a sense “integrated”, that is, the police 
who brutalize people of color are often themselves black or of mixed 
race. This difference derives, many would argue, from two historically 
distinct modalities of domination, the Anglo-segregationist model 
more typical of the US, and the Latin assimilationist model more typi-
cal of Brazil. Historically, the major confrontations of Brazilian his-
tory – Palmares, the Bandeiras, Canudos – have not simply pitted 
black against white; people of color have fought on both sides, even if 
an overarching white domination still structures the whole. As a result 
of these historical differences, the situation in Brazil lacks the stark 
clarity of a Rodney King-style white/black police confrontation. In-
deed, the recent cases where private camcorders registered police 
abuses illustrate these differences. In 1997, both in the Rio slum “Ci-
dade de Deus”, and in the Sao Paulo slum “Diadema”, police were 
recorded systematically beating, robbing, and even killing favela resi-
dents.  
A song which artfully analyzes such phenomena is the 
Caetano/Gil song “Haiti é Aqui”. To my mind, this single song says as 
much about the lived modalities of racial and class oppression in the 
Black Atlantic as a whole series of dissertations. The lyrics describe a 
scene in which Caetano himself played a role. Just as he was being 
awarded a “Citizenship Award” on a stage overlooking Salvador’s 
historic Pelourinho Square, Caetano saw mostly black police beating 
up a mostly black, or mestizo, or poor white crowd. 
The song’s refrain – “Haiti is here, Haiti is not here” – alludes to a 
famous quotation from the Brazilian philosopher Silvio Romero. Al-
most a century after the Haitian revolution, Romero warns that “Brazil 
is not, and should not be, Haiti”. The lyrics link Brazil to Haiti as a 
double site, both of a black revolutionary past and of a neo-colonial 
present, an association even more resonant in the light of recent events 
in Haiti. But here style is inseparable from substance. Brazilian popu-
lar music often encodes cultural tensions and syncretisms, not only 
through lyrics but also through melody, harmony, and percussion. 
Popular music, through its mise-en-scéne and performance, allegorizes 
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the nation. This particular song stages the power relations between 
Europe and Africa, between cello and the surdo, between melody and 
percussion, between the Casa Grande and the Senzala. But here the 
cello itself is percussive, and yelps with pain at the blows of the po-
lice. The song is declaimed, furthermore, in rap style, a style associ-
ated with black Americans, but also linked to Brazilian traditions such 
as “repente” and “talking sambas”. The rap style introduces a note of 
anger and aggressiveness, an implicit break with the sweeter harmo-
nies of bossa nova and the suave discourses of “racial democracy”. 
The aggressiveness contrasts even with the sweetness of Caetano’s 
own “Menino do Rio”, whose refrain – “Havai, seja aqui” – the song 
both echoes and transforms. Here relations are no longer cordial and 
the music is no longer sweet, instead we find the politicization of 
avant-gardist dissonance. The lyrics also recall the legacy of slavery 
and the pillory as the site of disciplinary punishments – “Pelourinho” 
after all means pillory. But now the whipping post has given way to 
mass incarceration and police murder. A pause in the music allows for 
a dramatic announcement of the murder by police of more than a hun-
dred inmates at Carandiru prison, a kind of Brazilian Attica prison 
massacre. Yet these events do not shock because of the doxa dissemi-
nated throughout society, the realm of “what everybody knows”, in 
this case the pseudo-knowledge of how blacks are supposed to be 
treated. At the same time, the lyrics and the percussion evoke the 
sounds of resistance in the drumming of the Afro-blocos. Their epic 
grandeur dazzles us, but this kind of culturalist strength is ultimately 
insufficient when citizenship is so fragile and compromised. And it 
doesn’t matter that Lente Fantastico visits Salvador, or that Paul 
Simon collaborates with Olodum to make “Spirit of the Saints”. The 
song alludes, then, to the differentiated commonalities of the Black 
Atlantic, where Brazil both is like, and is not like Haiti: Haiti is here. 
Haiti isn’t here. 
A good deal of the multicultural work in both Brazil and the US 
has focused on racial representation in the media. In his book The 
Negation of Brazil (A negação do Brasil), Joel Zito Araújo (2000) 
points out that Brazilian blacks are very much under-represented on 
Brazilian television, and when they do appear it is usually as subalterns 
or background figures. Araújo discusses the historical incident in which 
a Brazilian TV series, based on Uncle Tom’s Cabin, offended the black 
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community by using a white actor in blackface for the title role. The 
Gilberto Gil song “Mao de Limpeza”, here performed with Chico 
Buarque de Hollanda, also uses blackface, but this time in a comic and 
carnivalesque register. The song’s lyrics satirically upend a Brazilian 
proverb that suggests that “blacks, if they don’t make a mess at the 
entrance, will make it at the exit”. Calling that view “a damned lie”, 
the singers proceed to disentangle the association between blackness 
and dirtiness. The lyrics go as follows: 
The Hand of Cleanliness 
They say that when blacks don't make a mess at the entrance 
They make it at the exit. 
Imagine! 
But the slave mother spent her life 
Cleaning up the mess that whites made 
Imagine! 
What a damned lie! 
Even after slavery was abolished 
Blacks continued cleaning clothes 
And scrubbing floors 
How the blacks worked and suffered! 
Imagine! 
Black is the hand of cleanliness 
Of life consumed at the side of the stove. 
Black is the hand that puts food on the table 
And cleans with soap and water. 
Black is the hand of immaculate purity. 
They say when blacks don't make a mess at the entrance 
They make it at the exit 
Imagine! 
What a damned lie! 
Look at the dirty white guy. 
In this song Gil provokes a Brechtian Verfremdungseffekt; he makes 
the doxa of racist common sense strange. Imagine! How could anyone 
ever have associated blackness with dirtiness! Even the style is 
Brechtian in that it recuperates an “incorrect” stereotype within an 
anti-illusionist aesthetic. The phenotypic white singer Chico appears 
in blackface, while Gil, the black, appears in whiteface, but we are not 
supposed to believe that Chico is really black or Gil white. In cultural 
terms, the references are at least double, to the “boneca de pixe” (tar 
baby) tradition in Brazil and to the racist North American tradition of 
minstrels, but “Hand of Cleanliness” is written and performed in a 
completely different spirit. Here, the idea of blackface comes not from 
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white media entrepreneurs but from the black artist himself. And with 
minstrels, blackface usually functioned alone; there was no whiteface. 
Blackface was unilateral, premised on whiteness as normative and 
blackness as intrinsically comic and grotesque. But here, in a sly Bra-
zilian version of the costumed inversions of Genet’s play The Blacks. 
A Clown Show (Genet 1960), the song overturns the racist binarism 
which equates blackness with dirtiness; here blackness connotes im-
maculate purity. At the same time, the parodic and stylized perform-
ance itself implies the transcendence of the black/white binarism: the 
two singers are obviously friends, obviously playing at carnival, and 
obviously having a very good time. The racism of the proverb does 
not mean that whites and blacks cannot be friends or fight together 
against racism.  
At this point, I would like to bring the discussion back to anthro-
pophagy and the native Brazilian. The modernists, as we suggested 
earlier, linked the Indian to a counter-modernity of indigenous egalitari-
anism. The only problem with the modernist discourse was its failure to 
link these ideas to the actually existing Indians of Brazil. In this sense, 
modernism continued the Romantic stream of Indianismo which exalted 
a safely remote and symbolic Indian, without actually engaging with the 
flesh-and-blood Indians being dispossessed around Brazil. But with the 
advent, in the 1980s, of “indigenous media”, we find the present-day 
avatars of another modernist concept, Oswald’s idea of the “indio 
tecnizado”. The “high-tech Indians” of indigenous media use audio-
visual media such as camcorders and VCRs to preserve and reinvigo-
rate their traditions, and strategize against dispossession; the media 
become a recombinant means of cultural invention, a form of techno-
logical anthropophagy.  
The final clip, a Caetano song called “The Indian”, brings us full-
circle. The sentiments expressed in the song are not so distant from 
a recent “Solemn Declaration of Indigenous Peoples”, which pro-
claimed that “We the indigenous peoples declare to all nations. We are 
from a millennial lineage, and we are millions. And even if our entire 
universe is destroyed, we will live, longer than the empire of death”.1 
And indeed, Brazil in recent years has witnessed an Indian resurgence 
and rediscovery of Indian identity, as Sergio Costa has described in a 
                                                     
1  Quoted in Iokoi (1998: 47-48). 
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recent essay. Peoples thought to be on the verge of extinction have 
experienced upsurges in population and renewed pride.  
The song’s references, once again, are transnational, ranging from 
traditional indigenous culture (the reading of the night’s starry face for 
signs and omens) to 19th century Indianismo (Peri from O Guarani) , 
to Modernismo (the echoes of Oswald’s technicized Indian), to Bahian 
culture (the “Sons of Gandhi”), all alongside a postmodern multiracial 
gallery of pop culture heroes.  
Caetano and Gil, in sum, show how music and cinema can transfig-
ure historical relationalities in ways at once cosmopolitan, international 
and very Brazilian. Their art stages multicultural conflicts and connec-
tions in ways that complement and sometimes even transcend the meth-
ods of written history and the social sciences. Artists like Caetano and 
Gil display a chameleonic ability to move easily between various cul-
tural repertoires, to negotiate multiple worlds in a ludic dance of iden-
tities reminiscent of carnival and candomblé. They “perform” the cul-
tural debates in visual, sensuous, and percussive form. Whenever I 
present the music of Caetano and Gil, someone usually complains that 
the music is not really revolutionary since it is still a commodity sold 
through transnational corporations. That is true enough on one level, 
and I am not presenting Caetano and Gil as political models, or even 
claiming that they are revolutionary. These questions are ultimately 
much more complicated. Popular music cannot create a revolution, but 
it can provide a revolution’s soundtrack. Brazil, Caetano once said, 
has created the world’s most charming protest music, and in Brazil 
songs like Gil’s “Aquele Abraco”, and Chico’s “Apesar de Voce”, or 
“Vai Passar” became veritable political anthems. Popular music may 
not create a revolution, but it does matter, in the end, if masses of 
people listen to Gil rather than Xuxa, or to Public Enemy rather than 
Britney Spears. When popular musicians are dismissed as not revolu-
tionary, one wonders to whom they are being compared. Is it to Lenin 
and Trotsky and Che Guevara – in which case they will definitely be 
found insufficiently revolutionary. Perhaps they should better be com-
pared to other musicians, to politicized rappers for example, or to  
poets like Haroldo dos Campos, or intellectuals like Roberto Schwarz 
or Stuart Hall.  
Music is not a mere mirror of identity; rather, it shapes, critiques, 
and fashions new forms of identity and identification. “Haiti e aqui”, 
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for example, makes the middle-class white listener, who might not 
have personally suffered discrimination or police brutality in the flesh, 
think about those issues, much as Bertold Brecht’s poem about “Marie 
Farrar, infanticide” made its readers think about the abuse of maids in 
Weimar Germany. Music and art create new registers of feeling, 
channeling empathy to help us see and feel the world differently. The 
songs we have heard, I would argue, demonstrate music’s capacity to 
give pleasurable, kinetic shape to social desire, to mobilize feeling in a 
popular and mass-mediated form. Tropicalia inhabits, to borrow 
Caetano’s own words about Jorge Bem, “the transhistorical utopian 
country which we have a duty to construct and which lives inside all 
of us”. 
 
Video clips and lyrics 
Terra em Transe: The Film that Catalyzed Tropicalia 
Video 1: Glauber Rocha’s “Terra em Transe” (1967).  
New York, Sao Paulo and the Africanization of World Culture: 
Video 2: Gil’s “Funk-se Quem Puder” 
Funk-Yourself if you can/ It’s imperative to dance/ Feel the impulse/ 
Throw your butt around/ Tasting the Rhythm 
Funk-yourself if you can/ It’s imperative to play/ Fire in the vertebrae/ 
Fire in the muscles/ Music in all the atoms 
Our Atlantic, Athletic, romantic, poetic Republic of Music… 
Funk Yourself if you can/ It’s time to throw everything upside down/ 
without panic/ a quick form of playing/ time to swim back to mother  
Africa… 
The History of Black Revolt: 
Gilberto Gil’s music for Carlos Diegues’ “Quilombo” (1984) 
“Quilombo: the Black Eldorado of Brazil” 
It existed/the black Eldorado of Brazil/ It existed/ like a burst of light that 
freedom produced/ It reflected/the divine light, the holy fire of Olorum/ 
and it came back to life/ the Utopia of one for all and all for one… 
It existed/ the black Eldorado of Brazil/ It existed/ It lived, struggled, fell, 
died, and came back to life 
A peacock of many colors, the carnival of my dreams… Quilombo, 
Quilombo 
The Reality of Police Brutality: 
DVD 1: Gilberto Gil and Caetano Veloso: “Haiti e Aqui” (performed 
by Caetano) 
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The Subversive Uses of Blackface: 
Video 3: Gilberto Gil: “Mao de Limpeza” (performed with Chico 
Buarque de Hollanda) 
They say that when blacks don’t make a mess at the entrance 
They make it at the exit 
Just Imagine! 
The slave mother spent her life 
Cleaning up the mess that whites made 
Just Imagine! 
What a damned lie! 
Even after slavery was abolished 
Black continued cleaning clothes 
And scrubbing floors 
How the blacks worked and suffered! 
Just Imagine! 
Black is the hand of cleanliness 
Of life consumed at the side of the stove 
Black is the hand that puts food on the table 
And cleans with soap and water 
Black is the hand of Immaculate Purity 
They say when blacks don’t make a mess at the entrance 
They make it at the exit 
What a damned lie! 
Look at the dirty white guy! 
The Post-modern Indian: Kayapos with Camcorders: 
Video 4: Caetano Veloso: “The Indian” 
After the last indigenous nation will have been exterminated,  
And the spirit of the birds from the springs of clear water 
More advanced than the most advanced of the most advanced of tech-
nologies. 
He will come/ Fearless like Muhammad Ali 
(He’ll come since I saw him) 
Passionately loving like Peri (He’ll come since I saw him) 
Cool and infallible like Bruce Lee (He’ll come since I saw him) 
The axe (energy) of the afoxe of Gandhi 
Will come... 
Addendum: The Politics of Syncretism: 
Lyrics to Gilberto Gil’s “From Bob Dylan to Bob Marley: A Provoca-
tion Samba” 
Soon after Bob Dylan converted to Christianity, he made a reggae album 
as a form of compensation/ He abandoned the Jewish people, but re-
turned to them while heading in the wrong direction ... When the peoples 
of Africa arrived in Brazil, there was no freedom of religion. As a result, 
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Africans in Brazil adopted Our Lord of Bomfim, an act both of resistance 
and surrender.  
Refrain:  
Bob Marley died/ Because besides being black/ He was Jewish/ Michael 
Jackson/ meanwhile/ is still around, but besides becoming white/ he’s 
become very sad.  
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